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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 
By 
RYAN DOUGLAS MICKEY 
December 2015 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Michael K. Price 
Major Department: Economics 
In this dissertation, I explore how economic decisions diverge for different age groups. 
Two essays address the location decisions of older households while the third examines why 
different age cohorts donate to charities. 
The first essay estimates how the age distribution of the population across cities will 
change as the number of older adults rises. I use a residential sorting model to estimate the 
location preference heterogeneity between younger and older households. I then simulate where 
the two household types will live in 2030. All MSAs end up with a higher proportion of older 
households in 2030, and only eight of 243 MSAs experience a decline in the number of older 
households. The results suggest that MSAs in upstate New York and on the west coast, 
particularly in California, will have the largest number of older households in 2030. Florida will 
remain a popular place for older households, but its relative importance may diminish in the 
future. 
The second essay explores whether the basic motivations for charitable giving differ by 
age cohort. Using the results from a randomized field experiment1, I test whether benefits to self 
or benefits to others drives the charitable giving decision for each age cohort. I find limited 
                                                          
1
 List, Price, and Murphy (2015) 
  
heterogeneity for benefits to self. Individuals between the ages of 50 and 64 increase average 
donations more than any other age cohort in response to emphasizing warm glow, and this 
heterogeneity is exclusively driven by larger conditional gifts.  
The third essay is preliminary joint work with H. Spencer Banzhaf and Carlianne Patrick. 
We build a unique data set of local homestead exemptions, which vary by generosity and 
eligibility requirements, for tax jurisdictions in Georgia. Using school-district-level Census data 
since 1970 along with the history of such exemptions, we will explore the impact of these 
exemptions, particularly exemptions targeting older households, on the demographic makeup of 
each jurisdiction and consider the impact of these laws on the relative levels of housing capital 
consumed by older and younger households.  
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Introduction 
 
 According to Census projections, the number of persons over 65 years old is expected to 
grow from 43.1 million in 2012 to 72.8 million in 2030. In 2030, one in five people will be over 
the age of 65. In this dissertation, I explore how the economic decisions of older households 
differ from younger households in the context of location choice and charitable giving.  
The first essay estimates how the age distribution of the population across cities will 
change as the number of older adults rises overall. That is, I predict where older and younger 
households will live in 20 years. While I am not the first to run such projections, I am the first, to 
my knowledge, to run such simulations on a national-scale using on micro-data2 in a residential 
sorting model. Will Florida, Arizona, and other traditional retirement communities continue to 
attract the higher number of older households? I use a residential sorting model developed by 
Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009) to estimate the utility associated with living in different 
cities for two cohorts of households: households with heads under 65 years old (younger 
households) and households with heads 65 and older (older households). The model accounts for 
differences in household incomes across metropolitan areas as well as the long-run psychological 
costs of living away from one’s birth place. I then use these estimates to simulate where these 
households will live in the year 2030. Overall, all but eight metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
in the simulation have an increase in the number older households between 2010 and 2030. As 
expected, the greatest increases occur in the largest MSAs in the Northeast (New York City, 
Boston, Washington, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh), around the Great Lakes (Chicago, Detroit, and 
Cleveland), on the West coast (Phoenix, Tucson, San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Portland, and Seattle), and in Texas (Dallas and Houston). MSAs in Florida have mostly modest 
                                                          
2
 I use data from the micro-data from the 2010 American Community Survey provided by Ruggles et. al. (2010). 
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gains in the number of older households, and their relative importance may diminish in the 
future. Further, the results suggest that MSAs on the West coast, particularly in California, and 
upstate New York will age more than other areas of the United States. The MSAs with highest 
net migration of older households were in the Rust Belt (Buffalo, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Albany, 
Scranton), smaller MSAs in the Carolinas (Goldsboro, Wilmington, Greenville, Myrtle Beach), 
MSAs in Florida (West Palm Beach, Sarasota, Tampa, Fort Myers, Naples, Daytona Beach), 
relatively small MSAs in Texas (Beaumont, Brownsville, Tyler), MSAs in southern Arizona 
(Tucson and Phoenix), and most MSAs in California (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, 
Sacramento, Fresno, etc.). Large MSAs bordering the Atlantic Ocean in the Northeast (New 
York City, Philadelphia, Washington, and Boston) and along the Great Lakes in Illinois, 
Michigan, and Wisconsin (Detroit, Chicago, Green Bay, and Milwaukee) as well as a large 
number of Southern cities (Atlanta, Raleigh, Charlotte, Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, 
Nashville, Little Rock, New Orleans, Jackson, Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans) had the 
highest out-migration of older households. 
The second essay examines how the motivations for charitable giving vary for different 
ages. Evidence suggests that charitable giving usually increases with age until it begins to 
decline between 65 to 75 years old. Further, economic theory proposes two basic drivers of 
charitable giving: benefits to self or benefits to others. I use data from a large scale field 
experiment described in recent manuscript by List, Murphy, and Price (2015) that was designed 
to directly disentangle pure (benefits to others) and impure (benefits to self) altruism. In the 
experiment, each household in Alaska eligible to collect a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) 
received a letter in the last week of December of 2013 asking them to donate a portion of their 
2014 PFD to an eligible charity. The letters contained a randomized message either appealing to 
14 
 
the concern for the benefits to others (“Make Alaska Better for Everyone”) or to the concern for 
the benefits to self (“Warm Your Heart”). Using linear regression, I extend the analysis of the 
field experiment by estimating the heterogeneous treatment effects for each treatment by age 
cohort. Examining the effect on average donations, I find limited treatment heterogeneity in the 
“Warm Your Heart” message, but no age cohort is affected heterogeneously by the “Make 
Alaska Better for Everyone” message. In particular, the results indicate that individuals between 
the ages of 50 and 64 years old increase average donations more than any other age cohort in 
response to the “Warm Your Heart” message, but the statistical difference between the Mature 
and Older cohorts disappears when controlling for whether the individual gave in 2013. Further, 
the response heterogeneity of the 50 and 64 years olds is exclusively driven by the intensive 
margin, larger average donations from people who gave something, as opposed to increasing the 
number of donors. Finally, individuals under 19 years old give less on average compared to other 
age cohorts when they receive the message emphasizing impure altruism. That is, they are less 
persuaded than other ages to donate by a message reminding them that giving could make them 
feel good about themselves. I also present back-of-the-envelope calculations to predict charitable 
giving in 2032 under a number of treatment scenarios. One question left unanswered by this 
analysis is if the results are driven by cohort effects or actual aging. 
The third essay is joint work with H. Spencer Banzhaf and Carlianne Patrick and is still 
in the development phase. The most significant contribution of the essay is a unique data set of 
local homestead exemptions for tax jurisdictions in Georgia. To my knowledge, this is the first 
such data set in Georgia and possibly the United States. Local homestead exemptions in Georgia 
vary by generosity and eligibility. Further, many are targeted to older households. Using school-
district-level Census data starting in 1970 along with the history of such exemptions, we will 
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explore the impact of these exemptions, particularly exemptions targeting older households, on 
the demographic makeup of each jurisdiction. We would expect these subsidies to attract seniors 
to such jurisdictions (or prevent them from leaving), relative to control jurisdictions. Second, we 
will consider the impact of these laws on the levels of housing capital by testing whether the 
equilibrium ratio of housing consumption for seniors to younger households is higher in 
jurisdictions with age-targeted exemptions compared to control districts. We will test for such 
demographic "sorting” and heterogeneous housing consumption by age with a difference-in-
difference-in-differences model. 
On the whole, this work illustrates the heterogeneity between older and younger persons. 
While the first and third essays discuss how Tiebout (1956) sorting vary by age, they examine 
different questions and on different scopes. The first essay looks at location decisions between 
cities on a national scale and predicts future decisions; the third essay studies how particular laws 
affect location decisions and examine the location decisions at the school-district level within the 
state of Georgia. However, this does not mean that the two essays are not relatable. The first 
essay emphasizes the importance of cities being prepared for the coming demographic shift 
while the policies examined in the third essay may need to be reevaluated because of the 
demographic population shifts predicted by the first essay. Finally, the second essay expands 
upon the heterogeneity between different ages in a charitable giving context. 
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Chapter I 
Location Preferences of Older Households 
 
1. Introduction 
The population in the United States is aging. According to the 2010 Census, persons 65 
years and older accounted for approximately 40.3 million, or 13%, of the 308.7 million people in 
the United States (Howden and Meyer 2011). This segment of the population, whom I will refer 
to as older adults, grew 15.1% between 2000 and 2010 which is more than 50% faster than the 
overall U.S population growth rate of 9.7% over the same time period (Werner 2011) and second 
only to the 31.5% increase for persons between 45 to 64 years old who are mostly Baby Boomers 
(Howden and Meyer 2011). Figure 1 shows how the population has aged historically from 1990 
to 2010 and highlights the projections of the population over 64 years old from 2015 to 2060 in 
5-year increments3. The bars represent 1,000s of people 65 and older and are measured by the 
left axis; the dark gray (light gray) line characterizes the percent of the population 65 and older 
(between 65 and 84 years old) and is measured using the right axis. The percent of the population 
85 and older can be calculated using the differences between the dark and light gray lines. The 
2010 Census showed the largest proportion of the population 65 years old and older than any 
previous Census on record (Werner 2011). The proportion of the population in the United States 
over 64 years old will continue to grow as the Baby Boomer generation ages and overall 
population growth remains relatively slow. In fact, the Census Bureau estimates that there will be 
over 72.7 million persons 65 and older by 2030, representing 20.3% of the total population; this 
                                                          
3
The data for 1990 to 2000 comes from Hobbs and Stoops (2002) while the source for 2010 is Howden and Meyer   
(2011). Finally, the projections for 2015 to 2060 were found in the 2015-2060 Projections: U.S. Census Bureau, 
Population Division. (2012). 
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number increases to over 92 million, or 21.9% of the population, in 2060 (U. S. Census Bureau, 
Population Division 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Projected Population that is 65 Years Old and Older in the United States
 
 
 
 
As the number of older adults increase, the number of households (HHs) lead by older 
adults will rise. Older households are more likely to have a retired head and a higher proportion 
of income that is location independent as they are more likely to rely on a fixed income from 
Social Security benefits, pensions, accumulated wealth, and other retirement plans. Therefore, 
older households may face fewer financial constraints when making location decisions compared 
to working households which allows them to put more weight on other preferences, such as nice 
weather or living near relatives. While older households are less compelled to seek economic 
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opportunity, they face other constraints to moving, such as health concerns and limited resources. 
Overall, older households are less likely to move than younger households; however, their 
reasons for moving and, therefore, their destinations may differ. 
These demographic trends cause numerous social, economic, and political issues. Social 
Security and Medicare suffer from funding problems because tax revenue is failing to keep pace 
with the increasing benefits. Seniors also tend to require greater, more expensive levels of 
healthcare that put an upward pressure on costs for all. Further, some studies have found 
evidence of modest slowing in economic growth as populations age because of lower labor force 
participation rates and savings rates (e.g. Bloom, Canning, and Fink 2011). These national fiscal 
realities are well documented, but the implications of these demographic changes may also 
impact local governments and have other effects on society. 
Local governments may not be prepared for the aging population. A survey administered 
by the MetLife Foundation in 2010 found that only 17% of local communities had a strategic 
plan in place for older adults (MetLife Foundation 2011). The same report cited that the top 3 
challenges that local governments face in planning for the aging population are funding 
shortages, transportation, and housing. While markets may respond to the changing 
demographics over time, unprepared local governments may face a crisis if they do not begin to 
make plans now. 
With these basic facts, the purpose of this paper is to predict where older households will 
live in the future. Specifically, I simulate how the age distribution of the population across 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) will change as the number of older households rise. Will 
Florida, Arizona, and other traditional retirement communities continue to attract the largest 
number of older households? I use a residential sorting model developed by Bayer, Keohane, and 
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Timmins (2009) to estimate the utility associated with living in different cities for two cohorts of 
households: households with heads under 65 years old (younger households) and households 
with heads 65 and older (older households). The model accounts for differences in household 
incomes across metropolitan areas as well as the long-run psychological costs of living away 
from one’s birth place. I then use these estimates to simulate predictions of where these 
households will live in the year 2030. Ultimately, I will predict which cities will age the most. 
Conventional wisdom tells us that older adults, retirees in particular, favor moving to places with 
nice weather and abundant sunshine, but rising housing prices in these locations may hinder 
many households from moving to these areas. The simulations will answer questions about 
which areas will continue to attract older households as their numbers increase and what new 
retiree destinations may emerge as the overall U.S. population ages.  
Overall, all but eight MSAs in the simulation experience increases in the number of older 
households. As expected, the highest gains occurred in the largest MSAs in the Northeast (New 
York City, Boston, Washington, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh), around the Great Lakes (Chicago, 
Detroit, and Cleveland), on the West coast (Phoenix, Tucson, San Diego, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Portland, and Seattle), and in Texas (Dallas and Houston). Surprisingly, the largest 
percentage increases were concentrated in California and New York, excluding New York City. 
MSAs in Arizona (Flagstaff, Yuma), New Mexico (Albuquerque and Santa Fe), California 
(Visalia, Merced, Modesto, Stockton, Fresno, Redding, and Chico), Oregon (Eugene and 
Portland), Washington (Spokane, Bellingham, Seattle, and Yakima), South Carolina (Charleston, 
Augusta, and Myrtle Beach) , Illinois (Bloomington, Decatur, Springfield), and New York 
(Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, and Jamestown) along with Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, 
Washington, and St. Louis, experienced large gains in the share of older households. MSAs in 
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Florida have mostly modest gains in the number of older households, the percent change in older 
households, and the change in the proportion of older households. This suggests that Florida will 
remain a popular place for older households. However, its relative importance may diminish in 
the future. The results suggest that MSAs on the west coast, particularly in California, and 
upstate New York will age more than other areas of the United States. 
The population in a city can age through either its existing residence advancing in years 
or older households migrating into the city. I calculate the net migration for each MSA by 
removing the households that did not move in the simulation. The highest net migration of older 
households were from MSAs in the western portion of the Northeast (Buffalo, Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, Albany, Scranton), smaller MSAs in the Carolinas (Goldsboro, Wilmington, 
Greenville, Myrtle Beach), MSAs in Florida (West Palm Beach, Sarasota, Tampa, Fort Myers, 
Naples, Daytona Beach), smaller MSAs in Texas (Beaumont, Brownsville, Tyler), MSAs in 
southern Arizona (Tucson and Phoenix), and most MSAs in California (Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, Fresno, etc.). Large MSAs bordering the Atlantic Ocean in 
the Northeast (New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, and Boston) and along the Great 
Lakes in Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin (Detroit, Chicago, Green Bay, and Milwaukee) as 
well as a large number of Southern cities (Atlanta, Raleigh, Charlotte, Atlanta, Birmingham, 
Chattanooga, Nashville, Little Rock, New Orleans, Jackson, Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans) 
had the highest out-migration of older households. 
 The remainder of this paper begins with background and overview of the related 
literature. Section 3 discusses the proposed methodology while section 4 details the data used to 
estimate the model. Using the data as a backdrop, section 5 discusses the econometric 
21 
 
implementation of the model. The results of the model are presented in section 6, and the 
simulations are discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Background And Related Literature 
A household’s migration pattern most often follows the life cycle4,5. Households are most 
likely to move when they experience a major life change such as a new job, marriage, the birth of 
a child, retirement, increasing health care needs, or the death of a spouse. Upon retirement, 
households often have more freedom to seek places that fit their amenity preferences because 
much of the household’s income is no longer tied to a job or location. This freedom to move 
diminishes as the household’s members age or their health declines.  
Conventional wisdom, endless lists of top retirement communities6, and research tells us 
that older adults, specifically younger, healthier retirees, seek places with nice weather 
(Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf 2000) and more sunlight, but most people prefer good weather 
(Rappaport 2007). In addition to weather, retirees may also consider a location’s relative cost of 
living (Graves and Knapp 1988; Graves and Waldman 1991a; Fournier, Rasmussen, and Serow 
1988; Cebula and Clark 2013; Gabriel and Rosenthal 2004); crime rate (Stimson and McCrea 
2004; Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf 2000); public spending and taxes (Cebula and Clark 2013; 
Conway and Houtenville 1998; Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf 2000; Conway and Rork 2013; 
Onder and Schlunk 2010; Conway and Rork 2012); access to transportation networks; access to 
high quality health care (Karner and Dorfman 2012); access to restaurants, theatres, movie 
theatres, parks, and golf courses; and cleaner air7.  
                                                          
4
 See Berkoz and Dokmeci (2000), Nijkamp, Van Wissen and Rima (1993), and Clark and Onaka (1983) for 
examples. 
5
 Rossi (1955) was the first to incorporate the life course into mobility decisions. 
6
 See (Bortz and Max 2014; Brandon 2012; MarketWatch 2014) 
7
 Work in epidemiology suggests that populations over 65 years old are more sensitive to air pollutants than working 
age populations (Gouveia and Fletcher 2000; Fischer et al. 2003; Lee, Son, and Cho 2007; Cakmak, Dales, and 
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In a recent study, Chen and Rosenthal (2008) developed a set of the quality of life and 
quality of business indicators. To estimate the relative attractiveness of locations to retirees and 
workers, the authors regressed the difference between the log share of retirees in a location and 
the log share of workers in the same location on the quality of life and quality of business 
indicators. Their results suggest that retirees are attracted to areas with higher quality of life but 
repelled from areas with improving quality of business8. To address whether shifts in population 
may be driving the quality of life and business9, the authors examined changes in the quality of 
life and quality of business for households that migrated between 1995 and 2000. The results 
suggest that households begin to move away from locations with high quality of business to 
locations with high quality of life beginning in their 50s and peaking in their 60s. 
Previous literature has also looked at where older adults historically migrate. Longino 
and Bradley (2003) analyzed both the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Their study found that Florida 
remained at the top of retirement destination state followed by Arizona and California, but the 
gap between Florida and the number two state shrank between 1990 and 2000. Nevada also 
entered the top 10 retirement destinations for the first time in 2000. In terms of the net number of 
retirement migration, the top three are Florida, Arizona, and North Carolina. A more recent study 
by Conway and Rork, examine how elderly migration has changed since 200010 (2013). Their 
results suggest that changes in the elderly migration rate are inconclusive, but the authors also 
note that the rankings by their elderly net immigration rate for Nevada and Florida have fallen 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Vidal 2007). Some studies did not find that the elderly were directly more sensitive to air pollutants, but they did 
find that health problems that may be more likely to occur in the elderly are associated with greater sensitivity to air 
pollution (Zanobetti, Schwartz, and Gold 2000). 
8
 An earlier study by Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004) also found that retirees are repelled from places with high quality 
of business but attracted to places with high quality of life and low cost of living. 
9
 Rosenthal and Strange (2004) show how changes in population affect quality of business and quality of life 
indirectly through agglomeration economies and consumer choices. 
10
 See Feinstein and McFadden (1989) for another example of earlier elderly migration estimates and projections of 
U.S. elderly migration projections and Rogers (1988) for an international comparison. 
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from number 1 and 3, respectively, in 2000 to number 11 and 8 in 2010 while Georgia, Idaho, 
and the Carolinas have risen in the rankings. My main contribution to this literature is to use 
microdata to help predict the areas that will see large increases in the number of older 
households. To my knowledge, this is the first study to attempt to make such prediction in this 
manner. 
3. Methodology11 
3.1 Overview 
 I estimate a partially-dynamic, additive random utility model of residential sorting 
developed by Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009) in a conditional logit framework. To identify 
location choice differences between younger and older households, I take the simplest approach 
and estimate the model separately for the two cohorts. This allows the marginal utility of income, 
the long-run psychological cost parameters, and the mean utility of MSAs to differ between the 
cohorts. While I cannot compare the magnitude of the estimated parameters for each cohort, I 
can contrast the relative MSA ranks between the two cohorts using the estimated mean utilities.  
3.2 Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009) model of residential sorting 
 The methodology follows the model of residential sorting by Bayer, Keohane, and 
Timmins (2009)12 closely. Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins, henceforth BKT, made at least two 
key contributions. First, they showed that the traditional hedonic model biases the estimates of 
the marginal willingness to pay for a local amenity when what they call “mobility costs” is 
positive and vary with location. Their “mobility costs” represent the long-run psychological costs 
of a head of household living in a location outside of his or her birthplace; it is not a short run 
                                                          
11
 The description of the model largely follows Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009). 
12
 The BKT model is similar to the logit specification described in Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinson, Pakes (1995). 
While the conditional logit model has a number of strict assumptions, its convenience makes it a popular estimation 
model. 
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moving cost resulting from moving from one location to another13. Therefore, I will henceforth 
refer to these costs as long-run, psychological costs. When long-run costs are positive, the cost of 
moving must be compensated either through lower housing rents, higher wages, or a 
combination of the two. Therefore, the housing price and wage effects underestimate the value of 
a marginal change in an amenity. That is, the amenity minus the mobility cost is captured in the 
housing price and wage effects. Their second main contribution deals with instrumenting for 
each community’s air quality which is not the emphasis of this paper14.  
 The BKT model is estimated in two stages, but this paper focuses on the first stage15. The 
first stage recovers a housing price-adjusted baseline utility for each location independent of 
long-run costs and income, and the second stage decomposes these baseline utilities into the 
marginal indirect utilities of local amenities (or dis-amenities). The model begins with 
households maximizing their utility by choosing location j, consumption of numeraire good C, 
and housing H subject to a budget constraint: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝐶,𝐻,𝑋𝑗} 𝑈(𝐶, 𝐻, ; 𝑋𝑗, 𝑀𝑗)  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐼𝑗 = 𝐶 +  𝜌𝑗𝐻 
( 1 ) 
where 𝐼𝑗 is income in location j; the price of the composite good C is normalized to one; 𝜌𝑗 is a 
housing price index in location j; and 𝑀𝑗 is a long-run cost that is described in section 5. Indirect 
utility equals a constant ?̅? ≡ 𝑉(𝐼𝑗 , 𝜌𝑗; 𝑋𝑗 , 𝑀𝑗) in equilibrium because individuals would move if 
they could achieve a higher utility in another location16. The traditional hedonic approach of 
                                                          
13
 Households pay pecuniary costs to move; households that move have to pay for moving help or miss time 
working to move.  I also believe that short-run psychological costs are important. Households who change cities 
may pay a psychological cost of leaving a familiar place where they may have built a social network.0 However, I 
cannot account for these costs in the current model as a household’s last location is endogenous to their current 
location. Keenan and Walker (2011) develop a dynamic migration model that can account for return moves. 
14
 BKT use pollution from distant sources to instrument for local air pollution. 
15
 I will use the second stage in future research to see how older and younger households differ in their valuation of 
specific amenities.   
16
 Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins compare this traditional hedonic model to their proposed model to show that he 
absence of mobility costs bias the estimates of the marginal willingness to pay for amenities.  
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totally differentiating ?̅? cannot be used to incorporate long-run costs because utility cannot be 
constant across locations when individuals are born in different places. 
 To resolve this problem, BKT suggest taking a step back by explicitly modeling the 
location decision prior to choosing the composite commodity and housing services. The intuition 
is that households first select a location (i.e. MSA) and then decide their housing and 
consumption bundle second based on this location choice. To implement this, I continue to 
follow their model by assuming the following utility function for household i in location j: 
𝑈𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐶𝑖
𝛽𝑐𝐻𝑖
𝛽𝐻𝑋𝑗
𝛽𝑋𝑒𝑀𝑖,𝑗+ 𝜂𝑖,𝑗+𝜉𝑗 ( 2 ) 
where 𝜉𝑗 captures unobserved characteristics of location j; 𝜂𝑖,𝑗 describes the household 
idiosyncratic part of utility independent of long-run costs; and 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 measures the long-run cost of 
not living in the location where the head of household i was born. Households maximize 
equation (2) subject to their budget constraint 𝐼𝑗 = 𝐶 +  𝜌𝑗𝐻. After solving the demand for 
housing 𝐻𝑖,𝑗
∗ 17, the following indirect utility is derived: 
𝑉𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐼𝑖,𝑗
𝛽𝐼𝑒𝑀𝑖,𝑗 +𝑀𝑖,𝑗
𝑆𝑅−𝛽𝐻 ln(𝜌𝑗)+𝛽𝑋 ln(𝑋𝑗)  𝜂𝑖,𝑗+𝜉𝑗 , 𝛽𝐼 ≡ 𝛽𝐶 + 𝛽𝐻 
( 3 ) 
 One of the benefits of their model is that the marginal willingness to pay is equal to the marginal 
rate of substitution between 𝑋𝑗 and income
18
.  
Finally, I take the log of equation (3) to derive their estimation equation for step 1. This 
yields the following: 
𝑙𝑛 𝑉𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖,𝑗 +  𝑀𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜂𝑖,𝑗 ( 4 ) 
                                                          
17
 See appendix 1 for steps to solve for  Hi,j
∗ . 
18
 This is expressed in the following equation: 
𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 =
(
𝛽𝑋
𝑋𝑗
)
(
𝛽𝐼
𝐼𝑖𝑗
)
= (
𝛽𝑋
𝛽𝐼
) (
𝐼𝑖𝑗
𝑋𝑗
). 
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where   
𝛿𝑗 = −𝛽𝐻𝑙𝑛𝜌𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑗 +  𝜉𝑗 ( 5 ) 
𝛿𝑗 symbolizes the mean, or baseline, utility of location j given income, long-run costs, and a 
mean of zero for the idiosyncratic error; it contains all individual-constant attributes of location j 
that individuals care about. It represents attributes such as weather, pollution, recreational 
amenities, natural amenities, and housing prices19. Since I do not observe the income that 
households would earn in all locations in practice, I estimate 𝐼𝑖,𝑗 by decomposing it as a predicted 
mean 𝐼𝑖,𝑗 and an idiosyncratic error term, 𝜀𝑖,𝑗
𝐼 . Substituting this term into equation (4) gives the 
following: 
ln Vi,j = δj + βIlnÎi,j +  Mi,j + νi,j ( 6 ) 
where 
 
𝜈𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜂𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽𝐼𝜀𝑖,𝑗
𝐼  ( 7 ) 
Assuming that 𝜈𝑖,𝑗 are independently and identically distributed type I extreme value and given 
the results in McFadden (1974), equation (6) can be estimated using the conditional logit (CL)  
model where the probability that household i chooses in location j is: 
𝑃(𝑙𝑛 𝑉𝑖,𝑗  ≥ 𝑙𝑛 𝑉𝑖,𝑘∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗) =
𝑒𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖,𝑗+ 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 +δj
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝐼𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖,𝑢+ 𝑀𝑖,𝑢+δ𝑢𝐽𝑢=1
 
( 8 ) 
This probability also represents the share of the population that lives in location j. 𝛿𝑗’s are 
estimated from equation (8) using maximum likelihood and represent the indirect utilities for 
each location independent of income and mobility costs. The second stage disentangles the local 
amenities that drive the mean utility of a MSA by estimating equation (5). 
                                                          
19
 In future work, I plan on decomposing δj into the  
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4. Data 
4.1 Primary Data 
This study utilizes the census 1% microdata sample from the 2010 American Community 
Survey provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Ruggles et al. 2010). 
The data contains information on location, demographics, income, and residence of a household 
and its members. The unit of analysis is households over the age of 25 because location decisions 
are made at the household level. Each household takes on the characteristics of its head. That is, 
the head of the household’s age, education level, marital status, birth location, and current 
location are assigned to the entire household. For simplicity, I drop individuals who lived in 
group quarters such as college dormitories, prisons, and mental institutions, because individuals 
in group quarters are often in these areas temporarily, and many are there involuntarily. While I 
only loose about 80,000 observations (approximately 6% of the sample), the downside is that I 
remove some older adults in nursing homes. Because the psychological costs of living outside a 
head’s birth location cannot vary across locations20, I have to drop all households with foreign 
born heads as each MSA in the choice set are outside of the head’s birth location. I also drop 
households when their metropolitan area is unidentified in the data due to privacy concerns. 
After weighting the data, I am left with a little over 66.5 million households which is 
approximately 71% of all households living in MSAs in 2010 Census (93,924,511) and 57% of 
all households in the United States in the 2010 Census (116,716,291). The full sample is 
summarized in panel A of table 1.   
 
 
                                                          
20
 Estimating the conditional logit model requires within household variation across locations for the independent 
variables. 
28 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the IPUMS data 
  Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variable Panel A: Full Weighted Sample (66,590,500 observations) 
Log of HH Inc. HH 11.022 0.616 7.59 14.08 
Married Head 0.481 0.500 0 1 
White Head 0.834 0.372 0 1 
Age Head 52.639 16.106 26 95 
65 and Older Head 0.233 0.423 0 1 
HS Drop. Head 0.085 0.279 0 1 
HS Diploma Head 0.249 0.433 0 1 
Some College Head 0.239 0.426 0 1 
Assoc. Degree Head 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Bach. Degree Head 0.210 0.408 0 1 
Adv. Degree Head 0.134 0.341 0 1 
Moved HH 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Moved States HH 0.015 0.122 0 1 
Moved MSA HH 0.021 0.144 0 1 
  Panel B: Younger HH Weighted Sample (51,059,402 observations) 
Log of HH Inc. HH 11.048 0.641 7.04 14.08 
Married Head 0.499 0.500 0 1 
White Head 0.820 0.384 0 1 
Age Head 45.759 10.829 26 64 
65 and Older Head 0.000 0.000 0 0 
HS Drop. Head 0.062 0.241 0 1 
HS Diploma Head 0.226 0.418 0 1 
Some College Head 0.248 0.432 0 1 
Assoc. Degree Head 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Bach. Degree Head 0.232 0.422 0 1 
Adv. Degree Head 0.139 0.345 0 1 
Moved HH 0.127 0.333 0 1 
Moved States HH 0.017 0.130 0 1 
Moved MSA HH 0.024 0.153 0 1 
  Panel C: Older HH Weighted Sample (15,531,098 observations) 
Log of HH Inc. HH 10.765 0.577 8.54 13.98 
Married Head 0.423 0.494 0 1 
White Head 0.878 0.327 0 1 
Age Head 75.257 7.714 65 95 
65 and Older Head 1.000 0.000 1 1 
HS Drop. Head 0.159 0.366 0 1 
HS Diploma Head 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Some College Head 0.209 0.406 0 1 
Assoc. Degree Head 0.047 0.211 0 1 
Bach. Degree Head 0.140 0.347 0 1 
Adv. Degree Head 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Moved HH 0.043 0.202 0 1 
Moved States HH 0.008 0.088 0 1 
Moved MSA HH 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Source: Ruggles et al (2010) 
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 The mean log household income is 11.022 ($55,126) per year with a standard deviation 
of 0.616 ($56,981)21. Almost half (47.8%) of the household heads were married, and 80% of 
them were white. The average age of householder was just over 50 years old which clearly 
demonstrates the Baby Boomers generation aging toward retirement. Interestingly, a little over 
20% of the household heads in the sample are 65 years old and older which is quite higher than 
the 13% of the population over 65. This anomaly makes sense because household heads tend to 
be older than the average household member, and the youngest household head is 25 years old. 
The percent of household heads with less than a high school diploma, a high school diploma, 
some college, an associate’s degree, a bachelor’s degree, and an advanced degree are 12%, 24%, 
23%, 8%, 20%, and 13%, respectively. Finally, approximately 13% of the sample moved 
between 2009 and 2010, but only 1.8% and 2.6% changed states or MSAs, respectively.22
 
Panels B and C of table 1 show the summary statistics for the young and old cohorts, 
respectively. On average, younger households earn more, are more educated, are more likely to 
be married, and less likely to be white than older households. Young households are also much 
more likely to move within a MSA and between a MSA. 
4.2 Geography 
The microdata from IPUMS provide the household location in 2000 public use microdata 
areas (PUMAs). I aggregate the PUMAs into metropolitan areas using the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSA) or Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) as defined in 
                                                          
21
I estimate the income equations using the log of household income. To adjust for negative values, I rescale income 
by adding the minimum income to each household’s income. 
22
In future work, I plan on using data from the 2000 Census to test for cohort effects. The 2000 Census data and the 
2010 ACS are some important differences. The two most important are the questions asked and the timeframe that 
the questions refer. The questions vary slightly between the ACS and the 1990 and 2000 long form decennial 
Census. For example, the ACS asks where an individual lived 1 year ago while the decennial Census asks where the 
individual lived 5 years ago. The other major difference is that the ACS is conducted throughout the year and asks 
about the previous 12 months while the decennial Census asks about the previous calendar year. This can 
significantly affect the way the two surveys measure annual income.  
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1999 by the Office of Management and Budget23
,24. The PUMAs do not map perfectly into MSAs 
because MSAs are defined using county borders while PUMAs may cross county borders. 
Subsequently, I only assign households to a MSA if I know they reside in the MSA with 
certainty25. In the end, I use 243 MSAs in the analysis which are listed in Appendix A. 
5. Econometric Implementation 
5.1 Estimation of Income by location 
The model requires household income for each location choice, but the data only 
provides what a household makes in its current location. Economically, households, particularly 
those with workers, would expect to earn heterogeneous incomes in each city because each 
location has distinct characteristics, such as the cost of living and amenities (and disamenities), 
that affect wages. Older households may earn differentiated incomes in different locations 
because public benefits vary by state. Econometrically, the conditional logit model requires that 
all explanatory variables vary over location j and disallows household characteristics that only 
vary over i. In essence, location invariant independent variables drop out of the logit estimation. 
Therefore, I need to measure predicted household income for each household in each MSA. This 
is done in two steps. First, I estimate a MSA-specific, log-linear regressions of household income 
on household head attributes. Second, I predict household income for each household in each 
MSA using these estimates. 
                                                          
23
 The Missouri Census Data Center provides cross-walks between different geographies. 
24
 I will simply refer to these as MSAs. When I discuss specific MSAs, I will use the first city listed in the MSA 
name to refer to the whole MSA. 
25
 In future research, I will improve upon the geographic assignment to increase the scope of  the study in two ways. 
First, I will combine MSAs that share a PUMA. Second, I will expand the borders of an MSA if it contains a PUMA 
that overlaps with a rural area. I also want distinguish whether a household lives in the central city or suburb of an 
MSA. IPUMS provides an indicator for whether a household resides in the central city of an MSA, but many of the 
PUMAs are not classified as either. I am exploring other possibilities to assign central city status including the 
population density, number of businesses per square mile, distance to city town hall, and density of public 
transportation. 
31 
 
I use the following log-linear income model to estimate how household income changes 
by household characteristics: 
𝑙𝑛𝐼 𝑖,𝑗 =  𝛼0,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛼𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑,𝑗 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒,𝑗𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒,𝑗𝑊𝐻𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛼𝐴𝐺𝐸,𝑗 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒2,𝑗 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖
2 + 𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒65,𝑗 𝐴𝑔𝑒65𝑖
+ 𝛼𝐻𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑗𝐻𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑖
+ 𝛼𝑆𝑂𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿,𝑗𝑆𝑂𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖 +  𝛼𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐺,𝑗𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛼𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐸𝐺,𝑗𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐺,𝑗𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖
+ 𝛼𝑃1,𝑗,𝑡𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐸𝐷𝑈) + 𝛼𝑃2,𝑗,𝑡𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐸𝐷𝑈
2) + 𝛽𝐼𝜀𝑖,𝑗
𝐼  
( 9 ) 
𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐸𝐷) is Dahl’s (2002) semi-parametric controls for non-random sorting:  
𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐸𝐷𝑈)
=  𝐻𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐻𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃) + 𝐻𝑆𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑖
⋅ 𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐻𝑆𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷) + 𝑆𝑂𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝑆𝑂𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿)
+ 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖) + 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖
⋅ 𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐷𝐸𝐺) + 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖 ⋅ 𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐺𝑖) 
( 10 ) 
  
𝑃(𝑅𝐵, 𝑅𝐷|𝐸𝐷𝑈) denotes the probability of an individual with education level EDU is born in 
Census Region 𝑅𝐵 and moves to Census Region 𝑅𝐷. That is, it controls for self-selection of 
higher educated individuals moving to locations with higher returns to education. The estimates 
from equation (9) are then used to generate the predicted incomes for each household in each 
location, 𝐼𝑖𝑗
26.  
5.2 Long-run Psychological Moving Costs 
The final piece required to estimate the first stage is a proxy for mobility costs. These 
costs are not financial and therefore, do not appear in the budget constraint. Instead, the costs are 
                                                          
26
 I am making a several implicit assumptions about income that are not necessarily true in the real world. First, I am 
estimating household income as purely a function of the attributes of the head of the household; households with 
two income earners are the obvious violation of this assumption Second, I am assuming the younger and older 
household’s incomes behave the same. Older households are more likely to have a greater portion of their income 
fixed across locations (except possibly from tax differences). This is one reason why they often migrate to high 
amenity, low-cost of living areas. I am working to relax these assumptions in a future version. 
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purely psychological. The long-run psychological costs measure the cost to live outside of the 
household head’s birth state, division, or region using the following equation: 
𝑀𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜔𝑆𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝑆 + 𝜔𝐷𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝐷 + 𝜔𝑅𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝑅  ( 11 ) 
where 𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝑆  equals one if location j is outside of household i's birth state and zero otherwise, 𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝐷  is 
one if location j is outside household i's birth census division and zero otherwise, and 𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝑅  equals 
one if location j is outside household i's birth census region and zero otherwise. We expect the 
long-run costs of each to decline as the scope geographic area increases. That is, we expect the 
parameters of 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 to be negative and for 𝜔𝑆 < 𝜔𝐷 < 𝜔𝑅
27. 
5.3 Estimation 
 I estimate the model separately for two age cohorts: households with heads less than 65 
years old and households with heads 65 years old and older. The parameters for equation ( 11 ) 
are estimated in the first stage along with the marginal indirect utility of income and location 
aging-in-place utilities 𝛿𝑗 using the following likelihood function:  
𝐿(𝜔𝑆, 𝜔𝐷 , 𝜔𝑅 , 𝛽𝐼, 𝛿) = ∏ ∏ [
𝑒𝑀𝑖,𝑗+𝛿𝑗+𝛽𝐼 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑗)
∑ 𝑒𝑀𝑖,𝑘 +𝛿𝑘+𝛽𝐼 ln(𝐼𝑖,𝑘)𝐽𝑘=1
]
𝜒𝑖,𝑗
.
𝐽
𝑗=1𝑖
 
( 12 ) 
where 𝜒𝑖,𝑗 is one if household i chooses location j and 0 otherwise.  
 Specifically, I estimate the parameters and aging-in-place utilities by nesting the 
contraction mapping technique conceived by Berry (1994) into a likelihood maximization 
algorithm. The contraction mapping recovers the 𝛿𝑗
′𝑠 given an initial guesses of the parameters 
(𝜔𝑆
𝑞 , 𝜔𝐷
𝑞 , 𝜔𝑅
𝑞 , 𝜓𝑀𝑆𝐴
𝑞 , 𝜓𝐷
𝑞 , 𝜓𝑅
𝑞 , 𝛽𝐼
𝑞) by matching the predicted shares of individuals in each MSA to 
the actual shares. I normalize the delta values by setting 𝛿𝑗 for Yuma, AZ to zero. Assuming that 
                                                          
27
 I could also model costs of moving away from the spouse’s and children’s birthplace. This may allow me to see 
part of the locational history of some of the families. 
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𝜈𝑖,𝑗 is independently and identically distributed type I extreme value and given initial guess of 
parameters and aging-in-place utilities [𝛿𝑗
𝑚,𝑞]
𝑗=1
𝐽
, the probability that individual i chooses 
location j is the following: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝑚,𝑞 =
𝑒𝛽𝐼
𝑞
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖,𝑗+ 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 
𝑞
+𝑀𝑖,𝑗
𝑆𝑅,𝑞
+δj
𝑚,𝑞
∑ 𝑒
𝛽𝐼
𝑞
𝑙𝑛𝐼
𝑖,𝑢
𝑞
+ 𝑀
𝑖,𝑢
𝑞
+𝑀
𝑖,𝑗
𝑆𝑅,𝑞
+δ𝑢
𝑚,𝑞
𝐽
𝑢=1
 
( 13 ) 
where the m subscript shows the iteration for recovering the 𝛿𝑗′𝑠 and the q subscript denotes the 
iteration for finding the remaining parameters. The purpose of equation ( 14 ) is to predict the 
share of population who choose each location which is given by: 
?̂?𝑗
𝑚,𝑞 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝑚,𝑞
𝑖
 
( 15 ) 
Letting 𝜎𝑗 indicate the actual share of households choosing location j in the data, the 𝛿𝑗
′𝑠 that 
equate observed and predicted shares are recovered by the following iterative procedure: 
𝛿𝑗
𝑚+1𝑞 = 𝛿𝑗
𝑚,𝑞 + (ln 𝜎𝑗 − ln ?̂?𝑗
𝑚,𝑞). ( 16 ) 
 The recovered 𝛿𝑗
′𝑠 given the guess of the parameters are then used in the following 
maximum likelihood equation:  
𝐿(𝜔𝑆
𝑞 , 𝜔𝐷
𝑞 , 𝜔𝑅
𝑞 , 𝛽𝐼
𝑞 , 𝛿∗,𝑞) = ∏ ∏ [𝑃𝑖,𝑗
∗,𝑞]
𝜒𝑖,𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1𝑖 . 
( 17 ) 
where 𝜒𝑖,𝑗 is one if household i chooses location j and 0 otherwise. New values of 
(𝜔𝑆
𝑞+1, 𝜔𝐷
𝑞+1, 𝜔𝑅
𝑞+1, 𝛽𝐼
𝑞+1) and the recovered  [𝛿𝑗
𝑚,𝑞]
𝑗=1
𝐽
 are used until equation ( 18 ) is 
maximized at (𝜔𝑆
∗, 𝜔𝐷
∗ , 𝜔𝑅
∗ , 𝜓𝑀𝑆𝐴
∗ , 𝜓𝐷
∗ , 𝜓𝑅
∗ , 𝛽𝐼
∗,  [𝛿𝑗
∗]
𝑗=1
𝐽
). In summary, the following steps are 
taken to recover the parameters in the first stage: 
1. Make an initial guess of the parameters (𝜔𝑆
𝑞 , 𝜔𝐷
𝑞 , 𝜔𝑅
𝑞 , 𝛽𝐼
𝑞) and recover the corresponding 
𝛿𝑗
′𝑠 using equations ( 19 ), ( 20 ), and ( 21 ). 
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2. Use the initial (𝜔𝑆
𝑞 , 𝜔𝐷
𝑞 , 𝜔𝑅
𝑞 , 𝛽𝐼
𝑞) and corresponding recovered 𝛿𝑗
′𝑠 to calculate the 
likelihood of the observed data given by equation ( 22 ). 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 to recover the parameters (𝜔𝑆
∗, 𝜔𝐷
∗ , 𝜔𝑅
∗ , 𝛽𝐼
∗,  [𝛿𝑗
∗]
𝑗=1
𝐽
) that maximize 
equation ( 23 ). 
Table 2. Income regression for Atlanta 
Variable Coef. St. Err. P-Value 
Constant 10.14290 0.04943 0.00000 
Married 0.41542 0.00888 0.00000 
Female -0.08360 0.00865 0.00000 
White 0.14639 0.00904 0.00000 
Age 0.02045 0.00186 0.00000 
Age Squared -0.00019 0.00002 0.00000 
65 and Older -0.12072 0.01834 0.00000 
High school dropout -0.15070 0.01672 0.00000 
Some College 0.13112 0.01281 0.00000 
Associates Degree 0.16417 0.01792 0.00000 
Bachelor Degree 0.39861 0.01428 0.00000 
Advanced Degree 0.54499 0.01710 0.00000 
    Observations 
  
14,252 
R-squared     0.394 
Dep. Var.: Log of annual household income 
 
6. Sorting Results 
6.1 Household Income Estimation 
The results from the income regression of equation ( 24 ) mostly follow conventional 
wisdom. On average, married households earn more than single households; households with 
female heads earn slightly less than households with male heads while households with white 
heads earn slightly more than other races. The results also suggest that households earn more as 
they age which may result from work experience, but the earnings growth tends to diminish with 
age. Finally, we see that household heads that dropped out of high school earn less than high 
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school graduates, and earnings increase as the head of household’s education level rises. The 
results for Atlanta are presented in table 228. 
6.2 Estimates from the Sorting Model 
Using the predicted incomes estimates based on the results from the MSA-specific 
income regressions, I estimate the residential sorting model using the procedure outlined in 
section 5.3. Table 3 shows the results from the first stage estimation of equation ( 16 ) by age 
cohort.  
As expected the marginal utility of income is positive for both age groups. The long-run 
psychological costs of not living in one’s birth state also have the correct sign, but we 
unexpectedly find that 𝜔𝐷 >  𝜔𝑅. Under conventional standard errors, the parameters are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Table 3. Residential sorting results 
Variable Under 65 years old 65 and older 
 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Marginal Utility of Income (𝛽𝐼) 3.0870*** 0.031969 2.9610*** 0.05004 
Long-run Physc. Costs 
         State (𝜔𝑆) -2.6115*** 0.0050251 -2.5628*** 0.00849 
     Division (𝜔𝐷) -0.5223*** 0.0060437 -0.6193*** 0.01003 
     Region (𝜔𝑅) -0.9835*** 0.0051552 -0.7801*** 0.00843 
*** p < .01, ** p  < .05, * p < .1 
    
To illustrate the results from the estimated mean utilities, I use them to rank the 
desirability of each MSA for younger and older households. Table 4 reports the top ten MSAs 
ranked by mean utility for both older and younger households. Younger and older households 
rank MSAs similarly, but this is expected as both household types value amenities. MSAs in the 
Southwest and Florida rank high for older households most likely for their natural amenities such 
                                                          
28
 The results for the remaining MSAs are available from the author. 
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as weather. MSAs in the Pacific Northwest, coastal MSAs in the Northeast, MSAs bordering the 
Great Lakes, MSAs in North Carolina, and MSAs in Colorado are also ranked high for older 
households. For both cohorts, larger MSAs dominate the top 25, and smaller cities in the, 
especially land-locked MSAs in the Midwest, Southeast, and Northeast, tend to be ranked the 
lowest. Los Angeles, CA; New York City; Phoenix, AZ; Philadelphia; Tampa, FL; San 
Francisco; Portland, OR; Seattle, WA; Boston; and Dallas, TX make up the top 10 for older 
households. The top 10 for younger households are New York City; Los Angeles, CA; Phoenix, 
AZ; Philadelphia; Atlanta, GA; Portland, OR; Dallas, TX; Seattle, WA; Chicago, IL; and Tampa, 
FL. Surprisingly, many traditional retiree cities in Florida are further down on the list for older 
households with Orlando, Miami, West Palm Beach, Sarasota, Jacksonville, Fort Myers, and 
Melbourne ranked 21, 22, 24, 27, 36, and 42, respectively. Other MSAs in the Sun Belt, such as 
Atlanta (15); Tucson, AZ (16); Houston, TX (17); Las Vegas (19); and San Diego (20), were 
ranked in the top 20 for older households. 
Table 4. Top 10 MSAs ranked by mean utilities (𝛿) 
Panel A: Top 10 for Older Households 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 3.32096828 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 3.315929583 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 2.879711686 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 2.573941631 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2.534203074 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 2.49021256 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 2.455673492 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 2.449092495 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 2.389214317 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 2.253129361 
Panel B: Top 10 for Younger Households 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 3.735485428 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 3.403939149 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 3.145991487 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 3.048074711 
Atlanta, GA 2.976338757 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 2.948411355 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 2.932753648 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 2.916591682 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 2.845610395 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2.818008388 
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Because of the similarities between the MSA rankings of older and younger households, I 
calculate the difference between the rankings29 for each MSA by cohort to illustrate the variation 
in rankings between the cohorts. These differences are reported in table 530 and figure 231.  
 
Table 5. MU rank for each MSA by HHs age cohort 
  
Older HH 
Rank 
Younger 
HH Rank 
Diff. in 
Rank 
Panel A: MSAs that Older Households Prefer 
Naples, FL 121 191 -70 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 108 178 -70 
Chico-Paradise, CA 99 165 -66 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 168 233 -65 
Punta Gorda, FL 86 150 -64 
Yakima, WA 149 213 -64 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 111 174 -63 
Yuma, AZ 127 188 -61 
Modesto, CA 90 147 -57 
Ocala, FL 62 119 -57 
Panel B: MSAs that Younger Household Prefer 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 226 156 70 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 225 161 64 
Fayetteville, NC 203 143 60 
Savannah, GA 167 113 54 
Columbus, GA-AL 178 126 52 
Tallahassee, FL 146 95 51 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 162 115 47 
Madison, WI 191 144 47 
Lincoln, NE 177 131 46 
El Paso, TX 132 87 45 
Note: The difference is: Rank of Older Households - Rank of Younger Households. A negative value means that 
older households preferred the MSA more relative to younger households while younger households prefer MSAs 
with a positive value.  
 
A negative value means older households ranked the MSA higher relative to younger households 
while a positive value indicates that older households ranked the MSA lower than younger 
households. In general, MSAs in California, coastal Florida, Arizona, Washington, and the 
                                                          
29
 Rank Difference = MSA RankOld − MSA RankYoung  
30
 Appendix A contains tables that report the same information for all MSAs as the top and bottom ten tables in 
tables. 
31
 Appendix B contains full-page, color maps that duplicate the information for all gray-scale maps in the text of 
Chapter 1. I recommend that you view those as they are easier to read and contrast differences between MSAs. 
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Northeast tend to be ranked higher by older households. We would expect that MSAs that are 
ranked higher by older households to also attract the most households that are older as the 
population ages, but these rankings do not tell the whole story. To investigate where older 
households will live in the future, I run simulations to project the population for each MSA in 
2030. These simulations are explored in the next section. 
 
Figure 2. Difference in MSA rank between older and younger HHs 
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7. Simulations 
7.1 Overview of Simulation 
I run two population simulations to predict how the age profile of MSAs will change as 
the population ages. The first simulation, which I will refer to as the aging-in-place simulation, 
takes the population age distribution as given and does not allow household sorting. The second 
simulation, henceforth the sorting simulation, allows households to move as their utility for each 
MSA changes with age. The population dynamics are the same for both simulations. Each head 
of household is aged two periods of ten years. I calculate the probability of a household head 
dying over each ten year period using the Social Security Administration’s Actuarial Life 
Table32. A household is removed from the sample when its head is predicted to pass away33. I 
then replace the youngest cohort of households that aged from 26 to 35 years old to 36 to 45 
years old with the 2010 sample for 26 to 35 year olds. To account for additional household 
growth, I let the number of households increase by a conservative one percent every 10 years.  
Table 6 illustrates the population dynamics under both simulations. The simulations start 
with 66,590,500 households; 15,531,098 (23.3%) have household heads 65 years old and over, 
and 51,059,402 (76.7%) have heads between 26 and 64 years old. By 2030, the simulation has 
69,002,238 of which 24,357,770 (35.3%) are 65 and over and 44,644,468 (64.7%) are under 65. 
Over the 20 year period, the number of older households increases by approximately 57% which 
is below the projected 80% increase in the number of older adults, but I wouldn’t expect the 
number of older households to increase as fast as the number of adults. Finally, the number of 
                                                          
32
 Found at the following web address http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html. 
33
 This simplification will cause an overestimation of the number of households dropping from the simulation 
because households do not always disappear when the head dies. Younger households are more affected by this 
simplification because someone within the household is more likely to take over as head than in an older household. 
I am working on an improvement that allows a household to take on the characteristics of a spouse, if present, when 
the household dies to help mitigate some of the unrealistic household reductions. 
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younger household shrinks in the simulation because the model ignores immigration and birth 
rates are below the population replacement rate in the United States.  
 
Table 6. Population dynamics in the simulations 
Variable Younger Households Older Households Total Households 
Number HH in 2010 51,059,402 15,531,098 66,590,500 
% of HH in 2010 76.7% 64.7% - 
Number HH in 2030 44,644,468 24,357,770 69,002,238 
% of HH in 2030 64.7% 35.3% - 
Change in Number of HH -6,414,934 8,826,672 2,411,738 
Change in % of HH -12.56% 56.83% 3.62% 
Note: The Total Population Dynamic is the same for the aging-in-place and sorting simulations. Each head of 
household is aged two periods of ten years. A household is removed from the sample when its head is predicted to 
pass away. I then replace the younger households that aged from 26 to 35 years old to 36 to 45 years old with 
themselves. To account for additional household growth, I let the number of households increase by a conservative 
one percent every 10 years. 
 
Table 734 and figure 3 report the number of older households living in each MSA in 
201035. Large MSAs have the greatest number of older households with New York City, Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, San Francisco, Detroit, Boston, Dallas, and Tampa 
in the top ten. The proportions of older households in each MSA in 2010 shown in Table 8 and 
Figure 4 tell a slightly different story. Florida MSAs take 9 of the top ten spots. The top ten are 
Punta Gorda, FL; Naples, FL; Sarasota, FL; Ocala, FL; West Palm Beach, FL; Fort Myers, FL; 
Barnstable, MA; Fort Pierce, FL; Daytona Beach, FL, and Lakeland, FL.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 The tables in the text will show the top and bottom 10 MSAs for the variable in question. Tables with results for 
all MSAs can be found in Appendix A. 
35
 Appendix A Table 3 shows the total older population, total younger population, and the ratio of the MSAs 
population that is 65 and older in 2010 for all MSAs in the analysis 
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Table 7. Number of older HHs in 2010 
Panel A: Top 10 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 1,203,082 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 780,789 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 556,853 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 487,202 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 481,714 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 397,991 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 384,361 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 374,892 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 296,884 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 254,674 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Laredo, TX 5,785 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 6,493 
Iowa City, IA 7,042 
Bryan-College Station, TX 7,355 
Jacksonville, NC 7,624 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 7,720 
Hattiesburg, MS 8,244 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 8,367 
Sioux City, IA-NE 8,523 
Jackson, TN 8,554 
 
Figure 3. Number of Older HHs in 2010 
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Table 8. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older in 2010 
Panel A: Top 10 
Punta Gorda, FL 48.38% 
Naples, FL 47.35% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 43.90% 
Ocala, FL 41.52% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 39.36% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 38.54% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 38.10% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 37.38% 
Daytona Beach, FL 34.58% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 32.82% 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Anchorage, AK 12.29% 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 15.52% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 15.90% 
Atlanta, GA 16.90% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 17.29% 
Laredo, TX 17.61% 
Provo-Orem, UT 18.14% 
Colorado Springs, CO 18.18% 
Jacksonville, NC 18.22% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 18.23% 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older in 2010 
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The age-in-place model predicts what happens if households age in place, and the sorting 
simulation allows households to change locations based on their predicted utility. After each 10 
year period, the sorting simulation updates each household’s income and assigns a mean utility 
for each MSA based on the head of the household’s age. When a household head reaches 65 
years old, they are assigned the mean utility for older households. Based on the updated incomes 
and mean utilities, I predict the probability of a household living in each MSA using equation ( 
25 ), simulate the idiosyncratic preferences, and assign households to MSAs. We expect some 
households to change locations upon reaching 65 years old because their probabilities of 
choosing different MSAs change with changes in their relative utilities. 
7.2 Results of Sorting Simulation 
This section discusses the results from the sorting simulation and the differences between 
2010 and 2030. The numbers of older households in 2030 for each MSA is reported in figure 5 
and table 9, and figure 6 and table 10 show the proportion36 of households that are older in each 
MSA in 2030 in the sorting simulation. The top ten cities in terms of older households in 2030 
remained roughly the same as in 2010. They are, with their 2010 rank in parenthesis, Los 
Angeles (2), New York City (1), Chicago (3), San Francisco (6), Washington (5), Detroit (8), 
Dallas (9), Philadelphia (4), Cleveland (11), and Boston (8). In 2030, Los Angeles had the most 
older households in the simulation at 1,578,813, and the Iowa City had the smallest number of 
older households at 5,995. Florida MSAs dominate the top ten MSAs by the proportion of older 
households in 2030 with some surpassing over 50% of households having heads over 64 years 
old. While the patterns in 2030 seem similar to those in 2010, the differences between the years 
are more pronounced when we examine the changes between the two years. 
                                                          
36 Proportion of Older Households =
# HH 65 and Over in MSA
Total # HH in MSA
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Figure 5. Number of older HHs in 2030 under the sorting simulation
 
Table 9. Number of older HHs in 2030 under the sorting simulation  
Panel A: Top 10 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 1,578,813 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 1,430,803 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 848,847 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 757,172 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 654,073 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 583,516 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 546,742 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 501,871 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 468,625 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 453,350 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Iowa City, IA 5,995 
Anchorage, AK 7,527 
Sioux Falls, SD 7,651 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 8,356 
Bryan-College Station, TX 9,967 
La Crosse, WI-MN 10,550 
Houma, LA 10,607 
Rochester, MN 11,690 
Sioux City, IA-NE 11,702 
Laredo, TX 11,833 
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Figure 6. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older in 2030 under the sorting simulation 
 
Table 10. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older in 2030 under the sorting simulation 
Panel A: Top 10 
Naples, FL 57.70% 
Punta Gorda, FL 57.18% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 55.93% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 50.86% 
Yuma, AZ 50.36% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 49.32% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 48.79% 
Ocala, FL 48.46% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 47.95% 
Anniston, AL 47.78% 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Anchorage, AK 19.50% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 22.98% 
Columbia, MO 23.50% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 23.70% 
Iowa City, IA 23.92% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 25.40% 
Portland, ME 26.39% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 26.51% 
Green Bay, WI 26.56% 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 26.57% 
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Tables 11 and 12, complemented by figures 7 and 8, show the changes in the number37 of 
older households and the changes in the proportion of all US Households that are older in each 
MSA38, respectively. On average, MSAs gained 36,324 older households between 2010 and 
2030; Los Angeles gained the most at 798,024, and the most lost was 5,689 by Portland, ME. 
Only eight MSAs had fewer older households in 2030 than in 2010, and twenty-one MSAs 
gained over 100,000 older households. Most of the largest gains occurred in big cities located in 
the Northeast, around the Great Lakes, and the Pacific coast. Figure 8 and table 12 essentially 
show the changes in the distribution of all older households in the US. Clearly, additional older 
households will live in west coast MSAs, especially in California, and MSAs in the western half 
of the Northeast. Most of the Midwest and MSAs on the eastern side of the Northeast have fewer 
older households in 2030. The most striking result is that Florida also seems to be losing some of 
its importance to older households. 
Table 11. Change in Number of older HHs under the sorting simulation 
Panel A: Top 10 Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 798,024 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 359,181 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 291,994 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 249,858 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 227,721 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 214,726 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 199,155 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 180,835 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 172,359 
San Diego, CA 160,458 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Portland, ME -5,689 
Lincoln, NE -3,337 
Anchorage, AK -2,974 
Sioux Falls, SD -2,316 
Des Moines, IA -2,001 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN -1,175 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -1,147 
Iowa City, IA -1,047 
Rochester, MN 839 
Cedar Rapids, IA 902 
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 ΔHH2030 = HH2030 − HH2010 
38
 ΔPropUSHHO652030 =
HH Over 65 in MSA in 2030
Sum of All HH in US Over 65 in 2030
−
HH Over 65 in MSA in 2010
Sum of All HH in US Over 65 in 2010
 
47 
 
Table 12. Change in % of All U.S. HH that are older in an MSA under the sorting simulation 
Panel A: Top 10 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 1.45% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 0.55% 
Rochester, NY 0.35% 
Syracuse, NY 0.34% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 0.33% 
San Diego, CA 0.30% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 0.29% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.27% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 0.26% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.24% 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) -1.87% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) -1.08% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) -0.55% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) -0.42% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -0.41% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -0.33% 
Kansas City, MO-KS -0.22% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL -0.14% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL -0.13% 
Tulsa, OK -0.11% 
 
Figure 7. Change in number of Older HHs under the sorting simulation 
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Figure 8. Change in % of All US HHs that are Older under the sorting simulation 
 
Figure 9 and table 13 summarize the percent change39 in older households. The average 
percent change in number of older households in the twenty year period was 64.7% which is 
below the predicted growth rate of 80.7% for older people. Forty-two MSAs had the number of 
older households more than double between 2010 and 2030. MSAs in the Northeast, particularly 
New York state, California, and Texas, made up the majority of the MSAs with extreme aging. 
MSAs in Florida only had modest increases in the percent change of older households because 
they had a large number of older households to begin with in 2010. 
                                                          
39%ΔHH2030 =
ΔHH2030
HH2010
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Table 13. Percent change in Number of older HHs  
Panel A: Top 10 
Dothan, AL 302.75% 
Jamestown, NY 250.24% 
Glens Falls, NY 238.02% 
Syracuse, NY 190.29% 
Goldsboro, NC 189.31% 
Utica-Rome, NY 188.99% 
Binghamton, NY 173.38% 
Rochester, NY 159.30% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 150.50% 
Sharon, PA 149.64% 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Portland, ME -29.58% 
Anchorage, AK -28.32% 
Sioux Falls, SD -23.24% 
Lincoln, NE -17.59% 
Iowa City, IA -14.87% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN -12.33% 
Des Moines, IA -7.26% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -0.83% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 3.01% 
Cedar Rapids, IA 5.02% 
 
Figure 9. % Change in Older HHs under the sorting simulation 
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It is also interesting to examine the changes in the proportion40 of households in a MSA 
that are older; these changes are summarized in table 14 and figure 10. The share of older 
households increases for all MSAs in the period even though some MSAs have fewer older 
households in 2030. MSAs that lost older households had even more young households move 
out. At a 3.1% increase, Houma, LA (26.3% of households are older in 2010 and 29.4% in 2030) 
had the smallest increase in the proportion of older households; Sioux City, IA-NE had the 
largest increase in the simulation at 21.7% (25.8% in 2010 and 47.5% in 2030). The average 
change was an 11.8% increase. MSAs in the Arizona (Flagstaff, Yuma), New Mexico 
(Albuquerque and Santa Fe), California (Visalia, Merced, Modesto, Stockton, Fresno, Redding, 
and Chico), Oregon (Eugene and Portland), Washington (Spokane, Bellingham, Seattle, and 
Yakima), South Carolina (Charleston and Myrtle Beach) , Georgia (Athens, Augusta, and 
Savannah), Illinois (Bloomington, Decatur, Springfield), and New York (Syracuse, Rochester, 
Buffalo, and Jamestown) along with Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington, and St. 
Louis, experienced the largest gains in the share of older households. Florida MSAs only had 
modest gains in the proportion of older households because these MSAs have higher starting 
proportions. Most of the cities Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan also only see 
moderate increases in the share of older households.  
                                                          
40ΔProp652030 = Prop652030 − Prop2010 
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Table 14. Change in the proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older  
Panel A: Top 10 
Sioux City, IA-NE 21.72% 
Anniston, AL 21.15% 
Alexandria, LA 19.05% 
Florence, AL 18.64% 
Gadsden, AL 17.93% 
Yakima, WA 17.79% 
Yuma, AZ 17.69% 
Topeka, KS 17.63% 
Santa Fe, NM 17.44% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 17.42% 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Houma, LA 3.08% 
Columbia, MO 3.17% 
Iowa City, IA 5.07% 
Tallahassee, FL 5.36% 
Portland, ME 5.51% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 5.69% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 5.81% 
Lincoln, NE 5.92% 
Pensacola, FL 6.10% 
Dover, DE 6.31% 
 
Figure 10. Change in % of Older HHs under the sorting simulation 
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7.3 Sorting vs. Aging-in-Place 
A MSA’s population can age one of two ways. Households already in the MSA stay as 
they age or additional older households migrate to the city. Many households that are older do 
not move which makes “aging in place” important. While my model picks up both movers and 
stayers, the patterns of household movers are the most interesting. In this sub-section, I compare 
the results from the sorting and aging-in-place simulations by subtracting the aging-in-place 
results from the sorting simulation. Recall that the aging-in-place simulation disallows moving 
between MSAs for households while the sorting simulation allows households to stay in their 
locations or move. By netting out the aging-in-place simulation, I am able to capture net 
migration. 
Figure 11 shows the net migration41 of older households between 2010 and 2030. One 
hundred, forty MSAs gained an average of 19,156 older households through migration, and one 
hundred, three lost an average of 26,038 older households through migration. The top ten in-
migration MSAs and top 10 out-migration MSAs are presented in table 15. Los Angeles gained 
the highest number of older households from migration while New York City lost the most. In 
general, older households moved out of large MSAs bordering the Atlanta Ocean in the 
Northeast (New York City, Philadelphia, Washington, and Boston) and along the Great Lakes in 
Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin (Detroit, Chicago, Green Bay, and Milwaukee) as well as a 
large number of Southern cities (Atlanta, Raleigh, Charlotte, Atlanta, Birmingham, Chattanooga, 
Nashville, Little Rock, New Orleans, Jackson, Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans). Older 
households moved to MSAs in the western portion of the Northeast (Buffalo, Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, Albany, Scranton), smaller MSAs in the Carolinas (Goldsboro, Wilmington, 
Greenville, Myrtle Beach), MSAs in Florida (West Palm Beach, Sarasota, Tampa, Fort Myers, 
                                                          
41
 Net Migration in MSA = # HH in MSA under sorting − # HH in MSA under aging-in-place 
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Naples, Daytona Beach), smaller MSAs in Texas (Beaumont, Brownsville, Tyler), MSAs in 
southern Arizona (Tucson and Phoenix), and most MSAs in California (Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, San Diego, Sacramento, Fresno, etc.).  
 
Figure 11. Net migration of older HHs 
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Table 15. Net migration of older HHs 
Panel A: Top 10 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 394,922 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 128,928 
Syracuse, NY 83,472 
Rochester, NY 82,437 
Pittsburgh, PA 80,964 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 80,748 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 76,248 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 69,178 
San Diego, CA 66,755 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 65,627 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) -360,655 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) -246,967 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) -214,133 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -162,528 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) -143,340 
Atlanta, GA -135,143 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) -80,251 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -79,821 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) -71,661 
Kansas City, MO-KS -61,334 
Note: Net Migration is calculated by subtracting the number of HHs that aged in place from the number of HHs in 
the Sorting Simulation 
 
Finally, I examine the changes in the proportion of households that are older due to 
migration by netting out the effect of “aging in place”. The share of older households can change 
on two dimensions: changes in the number of older households and changes in the number of 
younger households. That is, the share of older households can increase through either an 
increase in older households or a decrease in younger households. Therefore, some MSAs may 
have gained older households but experienced a decline in the share of older households because 
of a larger increase in younger households. Figure 12 and table 16 summarize these results. One 
hundred, sixteen MSAs see the share of older households increase due to migration while the 
share of older households falls due to migration in one hundred, twenty-seven. Of the MSAs 
with net in-migration, the average gain was 3.9% while the average loss for the MSAs that had a 
decrease in the share of older households due to migration was -2.8%. Yuma, AZ had the largest 
increase in the share of older households by far with migration accounting for a 20.6% increase. 
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The share of older households in Anchorage, AK fell by 13.5% due to migration which is the 
largest fall in the simulation. Fewer general patterns emerge than in the results from figure 11 
partly because the share of older households also depends on the migration of younger 
households. Almost all of the MSAs in the Northeast, excluding New York City; Albany, NY; 
and Scranton, PA, have declines in the share of older households. MSAs in the western portion 
of New York and Pennsylvania such as Buffalo, NY, saw increases in the number of older 
households due to migration, but the share of older households fell due to high in-migration of 
younger households as well. The share of older households also fell in large MSAs in Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota and many of the MSAs in the South which is expected because these 
MSAs had net out-migration of older households. MSAs in Florida follow a similar pattern as 
figure 11. Those that gain older households have a slight increase in the share of older 
households while MSAs that lose older households have declines in the share of older 
households. Most of the MSAs in California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington have 
increases in the proportion of older households. Notable exceptions are San Francisco, CA; 
Bakersfield, CA; and Flagstaff, AZ which all attracted large numbers of younger households.  
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Table 16. Change in proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older due to migration 
Panel A: Top 10 
Yuma, AZ 20.57% 
Alexandria, LA 13.10% 
Laredo, TX 12.08% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 11.81% 
Bloomington, IN 10.71% 
Yakima, WA 10.36% 
Anniston, AL 9.82% 
Greenville, NC 9.73% 
Florence, AL 9.21% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 8.94% 
Panel B: Bottom 10 
Anchorage, AK -13.47% 
Portland, ME -11.03% 
Santa Fe, NM -10.23% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT -8.53% 
Dover, DE -8.31% 
Decatur, AL -7.35% 
Tallahassee, FL -7.19% 
Jackson, MI -7.02% 
Columbia, MO -6.65% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -6.55% 
Note: Net Migration is calculated by subtracting the number of HHs that aged in place from the number of HHs in the Sorting Simulation 
 
 
Figure 12. Change in % of Older HHs due to Net Migration 
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8. Conclusion 
The number of older households is increasing dramatically as the Baby Boom generation 
continues to age and retire. This paper examines the location preferences of older adults through 
a residential sorting model. The sorting model estimates household-constant attributes of 
location j that are relevant to household utility, the marginal utility of income, and the marginal 
cost of living outside a household head’s birth location for old and young households. The 
results confirm that older and younger households value have heterogeneous location 
preferences. 
The estimates from the sorting model are then used to run simulations that predict where 
households will live in 2030 based on their age. As the households age, their income and mean 
utility for each MSA are updated, and they select a location based on the new relative utilities of 
each MSA. The number of older households declines in only 8 of the 243 MSAs, but the share 
of households in a MSA that are older increases for all MSAs. MSAs in California and upstate 
New York gain the largest amount of older households while New York City, Philadelphia, 
Washington, Chicago, Detroit have the largest decreases. 
MSAs in the Arizona (Flagstaff and Yuma), New Mexico (Albuquerque and Santa Fe), 
California (Visalia, Merced, Modesto, Stockton, Fresno, Redding, and Chico), Oregon (Eugene 
and Portland), Washington (Spokane, Bellingham, Seattle, and Yakima), South Carolina 
(Charleston and Myrtle Beach) , Georgia (Athens, Augusta, and Savannah), Illinois 
(Bloomington, Decatur, and Springfield), and New York (Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, and 
Jamestown) along with Philadelphia, Cleveland, Detroit, Washington, and St. Louis, had the 
largest gains in the proportion of households that are older. While MSAs in Florida continue 
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have high concentrations of older households, the results suggest that their relative importance 
is taking a backseat to cities such as Los Angeles and Buffalo.  
 When I remove the impact of households aging in place, some of the same patterns 
discussed above emerge. Californian MSAs, upstate New York MSAs, and MSA on the coast of 
Florida along with Cleveland and Pittsburgh experience the largest in-migration of older 
households. The MSAs with the largest out-migration of older households were Boston, New 
York City, Philadelphia, Washington, Atlanta, Detroit, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Raleigh, 
Charlotte, Minneapolis, and Seattle. 
  While these patterns of older household migration are interesting, the next step in this 
research agenda is to begin looking at the details of what is driving these location decisions. 
Specifically, I will decompose the mean utilities by regressing the mean utilities on various 
local amenities. This will allow me to estimate the differences between older and younger 
households in the marginal willingness to pay for specific local amenities. Further, I will be able 
to simulate how changes in a city’s amenities will change its attractiveness to different 
households. 
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Chapter II 
Age and the Motivations for Charitable Giving 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The United States population is aging rapidly as the Baby Boomer generation began 
turning sixty-five years old in 2011. As figure 1342 illustrates, demographers expect major shifts 
in the populations for ages 50 to 64 and 65 and older. In 2010, 58.8 million people (19% of the 
total population) in the United States were between 50 and 64 years old, and over 40.2 million 
(13%) people in the United States were over the age of 65 (Howden and Meyer 2011). By 2025, 
the Census Bureau projects that the size of the over 65 population will surpass the size of the 
aged 50-64 population (U. S. Census Bureau 2014). In 2060, the U.S. will have almost 100 
million residents over 65 or roughly 23.6% of the population. According to the same projections, 
the population between 50 and 64 years old will total approximately 71.6 million people and 
account for only about 17.2% of the population. Many older households rely significantly on 
Social Security (SS) benefits. In fact, Social Security payment increases significantly reduced 
poverty rates among the elderly from 1967 to 2000 (Engelhardt and Gruber 2004). 
Unfortunately, SS as we know it may not continue forever. The Congressional Budget Office 
projects that outlays will exceed noninterest revenues by 12% on average over the next decade 
and projects that under current law the combined trust fund of disability insurance (DI) and the 
Old-Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) will be exhausted in fiscal years 2031 (Congressional 
Budget Office 2013). If the trust fund balance falls to zero and benefits exceed income as 
projected, federal law requires that Social Security payments be reduced. Although the above 
                                                          
42
 2010 data is from the U.S. Census Bureau (2011), and the population projections are from U.S. Census Bureau, 
Population Division (U. S. Census Bureau, Population Division 2014). 
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scenario is unlikely, it seems reasonable to assume that SS beneficiaries will see reduced 
payments in the future as the population ages. This scenario could significantly alter the needs of 
older households and the goals of many charities. 
 
Figure 13. Population Projections for ages 50-64 and 65 and older 
 
 
Literature has shown that charitable giving has an inverse u-shape relationship with age 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2011; List 2004). A person’s charitable giving increases as he or she 
ages but then declines at older ages, typically between sixty-five and seventy-five years old. 
These demographic shifts and fiscal realities combined with potentially lower aggregate 
charitable giving due to aging may put more pressure on private charities to help prevent low 
income households who rely on SS benefits from falling into poverty while their available 
diminish due to lower donations from population aging. 
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Another branch of the charitable giving literature examines the donor’s motivation for 
giving. Ultimately, the literature proposes two primary mechanisms for donations: concern for 
benefits to others (pure altruism) and concern for benefits to self (impure altruism). In this 
chapter, I use data from a large scale field experiment described in recent manuscript by List, 
Murphy, and Price (2015) that was designed to directly disentangle pure and impure altruism 
through messaging to a large population of potential donors. In the experiment, postcards with 
different messaging asking households to donate a portion of their 2014 Alaskan Permanent 
Fund Dividend (PFD) to an eligible charity were mailed in the last week of December of 2013. 
The postcard contained one of two messages randomly assigned based on the household’s zip 
code. One message emphasized the to concern for benefits to others (“Make Alaska Better for 
Everyone”) while the other appealed to the concern for benefits to self (“Warm Your Heart”). A 
third group who did not receive a postcard served as the control. 
Using the results from this randomized field experiment, I extend the analysis by 
estimating the heterogeneous treatment effects for each treatment by age cohort. The age cohorts 
are the following: Young are under 19 years old; Middle Aged are 19 to 49 years old; Mature are 
50 to 64 years old; and Older are 65 years old and older. These cohorts largely follow List (2004)  
with the exception of breaking the oldest cohort used by List into two to account for the 
demographic shift of an aging population.  
Examining the effect on average donations, I find limited treatment heterogeneity in the 
“Warm Your Heart” message, but no age cohort is affected heterogeneously by the “Make 
Alaska Better for Everyone” message. The results indicate that individuals between the ages of 
50 and 64 years old increase average donations more than any other age cohort in response to the 
“Warm Your Heart” message, but the statistical difference between the Mature and Older cohorts 
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disappears when controlling for whether the individual gave in 2013. Further, the heterogeneity 
in response by the Mature cohort is exclusively driven by the intensive margin, people who give 
donating larger gifts, on average, instead of increasing the number of total donors. Finally, 
individuals under 19 years old give less on average compared to other age cohorts when they 
receive the message emphasizing impure altruism. That is, they are less persuaded to give by a 
message reminding them that donating could make them feel good about themselves than other 
ages. While this chapter focuses on age as being the main driver of any heterogeneous treatment 
effects, a generational effect is also a plausible explanation, and one could even argue that 
differences in generations is the driving factor. Unfortunately, age and generational effects can 
only be separated using a long panel data set. With this caveat, the discussion will focus on the 
age effects. 
2. Related Literature 
2.1. Charitable Giving and Age 
Psychologists, sociologists, and economists have long studied the link between age and 
charitable giving. The consensus is that philanthropy increases on both the intensive and 
extensive margin with age, but the majority of studies that allow for quadratic trends find that 
giving tends to decrease at higher ages, typically between 65 and 75 (Wiepking and James 2013; 
Bekkers and Wiepking 2011)43. Many of the early studies found the giving increased with age 
(Feldstein and Clotfelter 1976; Feldstein and Taylor 1976; Boskin and Feldstein 1977; Clotfelter 
1980)44, but they ignored quadratic effects. These studies may also suffer from omitted variable 
bias by ignoring variable such as wealth and financial stability. 
                                                          
43
 See Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) for a review of the literature. 
44
 Feldstein and Cotfelter (1976) used a national survey of the income, assets, and savings conducted in 1963 and 
1964 to estimate how charitable giving correlated with income, age, children, and savings among other things; their 
results found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between age and giving. Feldstein and Taylor 
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One of the first studies to estimate a quadratic relationship found that charitable giving of 
alumni increased with age but begins to level off and decline as the donor approaches 65 years 
old (Okunade, Wunnava, and Walsh 1994). A more recent study by Wu, Huang, and Kao (2004) 
used data from the Survey on Family Income and Expenditures in Taiwan and found that 
households in metropolitan areas with heads over the age of 65 were less likely to give after 
controlling for income, marital status, education, and household size. Andreoni (2006) found that 
the propensity to donate and average conditional donations begin to decline for individuals over 
75 years old using U.S. data. A number of other studies have confirmed the quadratic 
relationship between age and giving with observational data including Belfield and Beney 
(2000), Simmons and Emanuele (2004), and Wiepking and James (2013). 
A potential remedy for the omitted variable bias mentioned above is to allow for 
randomization in a lab or field experiment. One of the earliest of such studies used a field 
experiment to examine how giving varies with age; it found that the elderly donated more 
frequently to a cause, but their donations tended to be lower than middle-aged adults (Midlarsky 
and Hannah 1989). A more recent paper used three different field experiments45 to study the link 
between aging and pro-social preferences46 where one of the experiments allows for partially 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1976) used the 1970 Treasury Tax File and found that taxpayers over 65 years old gave 56 % more than younger 
tax payers with the same income and wealth. 
45
 The first experiment used one-shot and multiple-shot public goods games and found that people over the age of 49 
gave more than subjects in younger cohorts, and a higher percent (over 35%) of those over 49 contributed the social 
optimal amount compared to of persons between 19 and 49 years old (17%) and under 19 (12%). Further, no 
members of the older cohort free rode completely or nearly completely. Finally, age remains a factor in contributing 
to the public good even after controlling for income, gender, education, trial, and individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. The second experiment used a university fundraiser that is more applicable to the realm of charitable 
giving than the public goods game described above and also allows for the opportunity to partially distinguish 
between age and cohort effects. A letter and brochure were sent to 2,000 heads of households in central Florida to 
raise money for a new university environmental policy center. The results suggest that men and women over 49 gave 
more often and higher amounts than men and women under 49, but the age effect was stronger for men. The third 
experiment used data from a gameshow that closely mimics the prisoner’s dilemma game; the results show that 
more mature people choose to cooperate more often than their younger counterparts. 
46
 Pro-social preferences are voluntary behavior that helps others. Charitable giving is a subset of pro-social 
behavior. 
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distinguishing between cohort and age effects (List 2004). The results of the aforementioned 
study found a direct link between age and both the probability of giving and the amount of gifts, 
but the oldest cohort was defined broadly as over 49 years old and quadratic effects were not 
included. Contrary to this finding, another study using a field experiment to investigate different 
contribution mechanisms found that people over 65 were less likely to give (Landry et al. 2006). 
The evidence shows that age and charitable giving have a concave relationship, giving 
increases up till an age between 65 and 75 when it begins to decline (Wiepking and James 2013), 
and the most logical sequential question is why this is the case. Few studies directly address this 
question, but Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) suggest that religion, marital status, income, and 
other variables correlated with age may drive the relationship between age and giving. This 
could reconcile some of the differences between the observational and experimental results. The 
only study that directly tests why charitable giving falls at the oldest age is Wiepking and James 
(2013) who hypothesized that declining health or cognitive abilities may drive a disposition to 
charitable giving down. The proposed mechanisms through which declining health affects 
charitable giving are the increasing share of income going to health costs, decreasing religious 
services attendance, decreasing egocentric networks, giving through alternative means (e.g. 
charitable bequests), leaving assets to dependents or other family, and a loss of cognitive ability. 
The empirical results indicate the decreasing religious participation mediates the impact of age 
on giving significantly, and cognitive abilities has a small mediating factor as well suggesting 
that these are the mechanisms that age works through to reduce charitable giving at the oldest 
ages. 
Two additional explanations for the quadratic relationship with aging are generational 
effects and life-cycle considerations (Meer and Rosen 2013). Meer and Rosen (2013) argue that 
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the decline in giving at older ages is the result of nearing death instead of just aging. They find 
that the giving decline at the oldest ages may in reality be an increase in giving when taking the 
approach to death into account. Further, they find little decline in giving for individuals who die 
quickly from health conditions, and the elderly reduce giving more sharply than the younger 
prior to death. One could also argue that the age-giving profile is the artifact of generational 
differences. A long panel is necessary to completely separate generational and age effects. 
However, the age-giving profile has been relatively stable over decades and across generations 
which suggests that more than generational effects are at play here. 
2.2. Motivations for Giving 
As outlined above, the motivations for charitable giving can be broadly defined as either 
a benefit to self or a benefit to others. Benefits to others from charitable giving is caring about 
the benefactors of the good or service provided by the charity47 (Becker 1974) or, in the public 
goods literature, the total amount of the public good provided (Hochman and Rodgers 1969; 
Kolm 1969)48. This pure altruism implies that an additional dollar from public funds, or other 
private donors, totally crowds out a dollar of private funds from another donor because 
individuals only care about the provision of the public good and not the source of funding. While 
literature does find evidence of some crowding out, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly 
rejects total crowd-out (Abrams and Schitz 1978; Kingma 1989; Khanna, Posnett, and Sandler 
                                                          
47
 Becker wrote the utility function for person i  would be the following: 
 
Ui = Ui (xi, xj (=
Ij + hi
pj
)), 
 
where hi is individual i's charitable giving and  xj is the well-being of the recipients of the charitable giving. 
48
 The well-being of person i is described by the following: 
 
Ui = U(xi, G), 
where xi is the consumption of the private good and G is the total provision of the public good from all individuals. 
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1995; Okten and Weisbrod 2000; Payne 1998; Payne 2001; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002; Simmons 
and Emanuele 2004; James Andreoni 1993; James Andreoni and Payne 2011; Bolton and Katok 
1998; Chan et al. 2002), and some literature even suggests a crowd-in effect where government 
grants can attract private donations through signaling (Heutel 2014; Okten and Weisbrod 2000). 
The lack of evidence supporting pure altruism (James Andreoni 1988; James Andreoni 2006) 
lead researchers to look for other reasons individuals donate to private charities.  
The next logical explanation is that individuals receive a benefit to self from their 
individual contribution. These benefits to self can be as simple as receiving a direct benefit or 
gift for a donation such as better seats at a college football game or public recognition for their 
gift, but a more general explanation is needed because these direct benefits mostly go only to the 
largest donors (J. Andreoni 2001). While a number of alternative explanations49 have been 
proposed, Andreoni’s (1989; 1990) model of warm-glow giving, or impure altruism, has gained 
the most traction over the years. Warm glow occurs when individuals receive a direct benefit 
from their donation independent of the gift’s effect on the charity’s output50. That is, the act of 
giving makes a person feel good about themselves. In addition to the evidence contradicting total 
crowd-out, other studies support the idea of warm glow (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2010; 
Crumpler and Grossman 2008; Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart 2007). One major flaw of most 
crowd-out studies is that they test the measure at a single giving level from others. Ottoni-
Wilhelm et al (2014) run an experiment with a low and high level of giving-by-others and find 
97 percent and 82 percent crowd-out for low and high level of giving-by-others, respectively. 
                                                          
49
 These include religious duty, social pressure from friends or colleagues, or as a signal of social status or social 
identity (James Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). 
50
 An individual’s contribution to a public good enters their utility function: 
 
Ui = U(xigi, G), i = I, … , N 
 
where xi is consumption of the private good, gi is the i’s contribution to the public good, and G = ∑ gii . 
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Using the experimental results to drive a structural model, the authors find that altruism is more 
important than warm-glow. Therefore, it would seem that donors are motived by some 
combination of pure and impure altruism. 
In this literature review, I have established two stylized facts. First, people give to 
charities to help someone, make themselves feel good, or a combination of these two 
motivations. Second, charitable giving seems to be directly or indirectly related to age. A logical 
question is then: do the motivations for giving change with age (or the life-cycle)? While I do not 
have a theoretical prediction, I believe a number of observations will help make the case. A 
number of implications arise because older households are either in retirement or nearing 
retirement. First, their incomes may become less flexible as they shift their primary source of 
income toward investment and pension income. Second, their social networks may change by 
shrinking or increasing social connections. A shrinking social network would decrease the 
likelihood of being asked to give, reduce the utility costs of shame for not giving, and lessen the 
need to build a positive social image through donating. On the contrary, a larger social network 
will have the opposite effect. Many people’s social network is their work-place, and retiree with 
this tendency may become less connected to others upon retirement. Further, the decrease in 
attendance of religious services of older individuals, as Wiepking and James (2013) suggested 
for overall giving, could reduce social networks and, consequently, the benefits to self from 
giving. However, retirees often have more time on their hands which could open doors to 
building new social networks. If we believe people donate to charities to build their social image 
as some literature has suggested, this could have a major effect on charitable giving. The 
psychology literature also has theories that our lives follow stages. For example Erik Erikson’s 
psychoanalytic theory has 8 psychosocial stages. In his theory, people between the ages of 40 
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and 64 are characterized as caring who ask questions such as “Is my life significant?” while older 
individuals are characterized by wisdom and ask questions such as “Am I happy with the life I 
lived?” (Crain 2011). Evidence also exists that older individuals risk profiles differ by age. For 
example, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2007) conducted a field experiment in Denmark to elicit 
how risk attitudes change over demographic differences and find support that risk aversion 
decreases as a person ages, particularly after 40 years old. Bellante and Green (2004) also find 
decreasing relative risk aversion among the elderly using survey data. With all this in mind, I 
believe that the question of how the main drivers of charitable giving differ by age is an 
empirical one. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Alaska’s Permanent Fund and Pick, Click, Give 
 In 1976, Alaskan voters passed a constitutional amendment to establish a Permanent 
Fund51 for the state that requires that no less than 25 percent of all mineral revenue be saved for 
future generations. As of June 29, 2015, the fund’s market value of over 53.5 billion dollars52 
was invested in a diverse portfolio managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, an 
independent state agency. Only earnings in the reserve may be spent by the legislature, including 
distributions to the public, while the rest much be saved. After a two-year court battle, the 
Permanent Fund began distributing an annual dividend based on specific eligibility requirements; 
the first Permanent Fund Dividends (PFD) of $1,000 was sent to Alaskan residents in 1982. As it 
stands today, a resident qualifies for a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) if she or he files an 
application prior April 1, was a resident for the full prior calendar year (January 1 – December 
31) and plans to remain in Alaska indefinitely. The dividends are distributed in early October. 
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 See http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm.  
52
 The market value can be found at http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/home/index.cfm.  
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The average dividend since 1982 has been $1,098, but the dividend has been an average of 
$1,237 since 2009. Figure 14 shows the dividend amounts for 2009 through 2014. In 2014, our 
analysis year, the dividend was $1,884. 
 
Figure 14. Amount of Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend 
 
 
 In 2009, the Charitable Contribution program, cleverly called “Pick.Click.Give53” was 
introduced to allow Alaskans to donate all or part of their PFD to eligible non-profit agencies of 
their choice. Only Alaskans who file for their PFD online are eligible to give through 
Pick.Click.Give. Table 1 illustrates the substantially growth of the Charitable Contribution 
program since its start. In 2009, only 5,046 of the 471,094 online applicants (1.07%) gave a total 
of $544,350 through the program. The average donation was just $1.16 for eligible applicant and 
$107.88 for those that gave any amount. By 2014, almost 27,000 people, a fivefold increase over 
2009, donated a total of $3,131,800 or a 575 percent more than in 2009. The average donation 
and average conditional donation increased by 400 percent and 9 percent, respectively. 
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 See http://www.pickclickgive.org/ for more details. 
$0.00
$200.00
$400.00
$600.00
$800.00
$1,000.00
$1,200.00
$1,400.00
$1,600.00
$1,800.00
$2,000.00
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Source: Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation 2014 
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/dividend/dividendamounts.cfm  
 
70 
 
Table 17. Summary of the Pick.Click.Give program 
 
Year 
Eligible  
Donors Donors 
% 
Eligible 
Gave 
Total 
Donation ($) 
Avg. 
Donation 
($) 
Avg. Cond. 
Gift ($) 
2009 471,094 5,046 1.07% 544,350 1.16 107.88 
2010 514,201 9,279 1.80% 902,625 1.76 97.28 
2011 523,678 18,279 3.49% 1,558,725 2.98 85.27 
2012 527,391 22,660 4.30% 2,399,050 4.55 105.87 
2013 529,318 25,461 4.81% 2,502,700 4.73 98.30 
2014 541,617 26,610 4.91% 3,131,800 5.78 117.69 
Source: Users calculations based on data provided by Pick.Click.Give. 
Notes: Residents are eligible to give only if they applied for their Permanent Fund Dividend electronically. The % 
Eligible that gave is simple the number of eligible donors divided by the number of donors. The Average Donation 
is Total Donations divided by Eligible Donors, and the Average Conditional Gift is Total Donations divided by the 
number of donors. 
 
Figure 15. Postcard for the Others Treatment  
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Description of the Experiment 
 In conjunction with Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend Charitable Giving Program, List, 
Murphy, and Price designed a natural field experiment to test the saliency of pure and impure 
altruism. As part of Pick.Click,Give’s annual marketing campaign, they randomly allocated 
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households by zip code54 into a control group or one of two treatment groups. One treatment 
group received a postcard the last week of December with a slogan “Make Alaska better for 
everyone: Share your PFD” designed to emphasize benefits to others while the second treatment 
group received a postcard with a message reading “Warm your heart: Share your PFD” to 
accentuate benefits to self. Figures 15 above and Figure 16 below show the postcard for the 
Others treatment and Self treatment, respectively.  
 
Figure 16. Postcard for the Self Treatment 
 
 
The 2014 data from Pick.Click.Give is summarized in table 18. Table 18 is divided into 4 
panels. Panel A summarizes the full sample while Panels B, C, and D show summaries for the 
control, the Others treatment, and the Self treatment, respectively. The first column of each panel 
represents all ages while the remaining columns are split into the following age cohorts: Young 
(Under 19 year old), Middle Aged (19 to 49 years old), Mature (50 to 64 years old), and Older 
(65 years old and older). We will focus on panel A first. Overall, the program raised 3,131,800 
dollars for non-profits in Alaska with 158,700 dollars (5.07%) from individuals under 19 years 
                                                          
54
 The designers were forced to randomize at the zip code level due to privacy laws that prevented the state from 
disclosing finer geographic information. 
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old, 1,267,250 dollars (40.46%) from individuals 19 to 49 years old, 1,167,600 dollars from 
individuals 50 to 64 years old, and 538,250 dollars (17.19%) from individuals 65 years old and 
older. Of the 541,617 individuals who applied for their Permanent Fund Dividend online, 26,610 
individuals, or 4.91 percent, gave an average charitable gift of $117.29 which means that the 
average donation for all eligible individuals was $5.7855.  
The propensity to donate, the average gift, and the average conditional gift were almost 
always higher for older age cohorts56. The lone exception is that older individuals were about 5% 
less likely (6.965% vs. 7.335%) to give then those in the Mature cohort. Young individuals 
compared to all the other age cohorts were significantly less likely to give, gave less per 
individual, and donated smaller amounts when they did give confirming the results from List 
(2004) that the young are more selfish than their elders. Individuals in the Middle Aged cohort 
were twice as likely to donate as an individual in the Young cohort (4.941% vs. 2.343%) while 
individuals in the Mature and Older cohorts are about three times more likely to give than an 
individual in the Young cohort (7.335% and 6.965% vs 2.342%). The Mature and Older cohorts 
are almost 48 and 41 percent more likely to give than the Middle Aged cohort (7.335% and 
6.695% vs. 4.941%), respectively.  
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 The $117.29 is the average donation conditional on the individual giving while the $5.78 is the average donation 
taking into account all individuals whether they gave or not. 
56
 The level of significance comparing age cohorts to each other for the Propensity to Donate, the Average Donation, 
and the Average Conditional Donation is at 1% using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum tests (Wilcoxon 1945; 
Mann and Whitney 1947) except the significance level for average donation between the Mature and Older cohorts 
was at the 5% level. 
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Table 18. Summary statistics of the Pick.Click.Give data 
Variables 
All 
Ages Young Middle Mature Older 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Registered Individuals 541,617 145,637 236,944 112,029 47,007 
# of Donors 26,610 3,412 11,707 8,217 3,274 
Propensity to Donate (%) 4.91 2.34 4.94 7.33 6.96 
Total Donations ($1,000s) 3,131.8 158.7 1,267.3 1,167.6 538.3 
Average Donation ($) 5.78 1.09 5.35 10.42 11.45 
     Std Dev. ($) (54.282) (10.167) (50.335) (75.917) (83.490) 
Avg. Conditional Donation ($) 117.69 46.51 108.25 142.10 164.40 
     Std Dev. ($) (216.342) (47.960) (200.361) (244.691) (273.782) 
% Gave in 2013 4.49 1.82 4.34 7.15 7.11 
% Gave any prior year 6.32 2.61 6.17 9.94 9.83 
Avg Age 35.131 9.302 33.519 56.619 72.075 
% Female 49.66942 48.58518067 50.19709159 49.95759862 49.68196206 
Med. HH Income in Zip ($1,000s) 74.79 74.48 74.75 75.86 73.42 
 
Panel B: Control 
Registered Individuals 171,001 46,907 73,304 35,850 14,940 
# of Donors 7,552 971 3,240 2,382 959 
Propensity to Donate (%) 4.42 2.07 4.42 6.64 6.42 
Total Donations ($1,000s) 807.4 41.1 321.8 291.8 152.7 
Average Donation ($) 4.72 0.88 4.39 8.14 10.22 
     Std Dev. ($) (46.292) (7.624) (44.203) (61.406) (74.871) 
Avg. Conditional Donation ($) 106.91 42.28 99.31 122.50 159.25 
     Std Dev. ($) (193.917) (32.540) (186.520) (206.777) (252.301) 
% Gave in 2013 4.15 1.66 3.98 6.67 6.74 
% Gave any prior year 5.80 2.33 5.64 9.22 9.32 
Avg Age 35.142 9.413 33.586 56.620 72.014 
% Female 49.40 48.45 50.01 49.43 49.34 
Med. HH Income in Zip ($1,000s) 70.97 71.07 71.16 70.94 69.84 
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Variables 
All 
Ages Young Middle Mature Older 
 
Panel C: “Make Alaska Better for Everyone”/Others treatment 
Registered Individuals 187,433 52,208 82,563 36,573 16,089 
# of Donors 8,498 1,140 3,779 2,510 1,069 
Propensity to Donate (%) 4.53 2.18 4.58 6.86 6.64 
Total Donations ($1,000s) 976.5 53.9 414.2 337.8 170.6 
Average Donation ($) 5.21 1.03 5.02 9.24 10.60 
     Std Dev. ($) (51.063) (9.283) (48.744) (70.581) (80.3611) 
Avg. Conditional Donation ($) 114.91 47.28 109.61 134.58 159.57 
     Std Dev. ($) (211.920) (41.973) (201.134) (236.088) (271.087) 
% Gave in 2013 4.04 1.64 3.91 6.58 6.77 
% Gave any prior year 5.76 2.42 5.64 9.14 9.30 
Avg Age 34.403 9.122 33.176 56.646 72.170 
% Female 49.84 48.75 50.27 50.31 50.05 
Med. HH Income in Zip ($1,000s) 66.47 66.29 66.59 66.83 65.55 
 
Panel D: “Warm Your Heart”/Self Treatment 
Registered Individuals 183,183 46,522 81,077 39,606 15,978 
# of Donors 10,560 1,301 4,688 3,325 1,246 
Propensity to Donate (%) 5.76 2.80 5.78 8.40 7.80 
Total Donations ($1,000s) 1,348.0 63.8 531.2 538.0 215.0 
Average Donation ($) 7.36 1.37 6.55 13.58 13.45 
     Std Dev. ($) (63.559) (12.967) (56.710) (90.958) (93.583) 
Avg. Conditional Donation ($) 127.65 49.00 113.32 161.80 172.51 
     Std Dev. ($) (193.917) (60.677) (208.636) (273.105) (291.422) 
% Gave in 2013 5.25 2.18 5.11 8.13 7.79 
% Gave any prior year 7.36 3.11 7.18 11.33 10.83 
Avg Age 35.867 9.392 33.807 56.592 72.036 
% Female 49.75 48.53 50.29 50.11 49.63 
Med. HH Income in Zip ($1,000s) 86.09 86.09 85.56 87.94 84.21 
 
The average donation is almost five times and ten times higher for the Middle Aged and 
Mature cohorts compared to the Young cohort ($5.35 and $10.42 vs. $1.09), and the Older 
cohort’s average donation is over ten times higher than the Young cohort ($11.45 vs. $1.09). 
Further, the Mature cohort donates almost twice as much on average than the Middle Aged 
cohort ($10.42 vs. $5.35), and the Older cohort donates approximately 114 percent and 9.8 
percent more than the Middle and Mature cohorts ($11.45 vs. $5.35 and $10.42), respectively. 
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 As expected, the average conditional donations follow a very similar pattern as the 
average donation. The donors in the Middle Aged cohort donate about 133 percent more than the 
donors in the Young cohort ($46.51 vs. $108.25). The average conditional gift of the Mature is 
approximately 32 percent higher than the average conditional gift of the Middle Aged ($142.10 
vs. $108.25). Members of the Older cohort who donated gave approximately 253 and 52 percent 
more than the Younger and Middle cohorts ($164.50 vs. $46.51 and $108.25). Finally, the 
average conditional donations for the Mature and Older cohorts are $142.10 and $164.40, 
respectively, or almost 16% higher for the Older cohort. 
 The raw data largely agrees with the literature that giving increases with age, but I do not 
find that the average gift falls at higher ages. Older individuals that donated gave more on 
average than their younger counterparts.  However, they were less likely to give then those aged 
50 to 64 years old. Therefore, the higher average gifts of the Older cohort are the result of larger 
gifts from fewer people when compared to the Mature cohort. 
The summary statistics for the full sample and each age cohort are given in panels B, C, 
and D of table 18 for the control, Others treatment, and Self treatment. In addition to Table 1, 
Figures 17, 18, and 19 also show the average donation, propensity to donate, and the average 
conditional donation for each treatment-age-cohort pair. First, I will briefly discuss the results 
from the original experiment by comparing treatments effects for all ages using the first column 
of table 18. The average donation for all ages were $4.72, $5.21, and $7.36 for the control 
groups, Others treatment (10% more than control), and Self treatment (56% more than control 
and 41% more than the others treatment), respectively57. When I break the treatment effects into 
the intensive (average conditional gift) and extensive margins (propensity to give), I find that the 
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 The statistical significance are the following: Control vs. Others, p <  .1; Control vs. Self, p <  .01; and Others 
vs. Self, p <  .01. 
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differences between the others treatment and the control is mostly driven by 7.5 percent larger 
average conditional gifts from the others group ($114.91 vs. $106.91), but the extensive margin 
also plays a role as the Others treatment gave approximately 2.7 percent more often than the 
controls (4.5% vs. 4.4%)58. In contrast, both the extensive and intensive margin drives the 
differences between the Self treatment and both the Others treatment and the control. Individuals 
who received the “Warm your heart” message gave almost 31 and 27 percent (5.8% vs. 4.4% and 
4.5%) more often and 19 and 11 percent more ($127.65 vs $106.91 and $114.91) than the control 
and the others treatment group59. 
 
Figure 17. Average Donations by Treatment and Age Cohort 
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 The difference between the others treatment and control is significant at the p <  0.1 level for the propensity to 
give and p <  .01 for the average conditional gift. 
59
 Both differences are significant at the p < .01 level. 
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Figure 18. Propensity to Donate by Treatment and Age Cohort 
 
 
Figure 19. Average Conditional Donations by Treatment and Age Cohort 
 
  
Panel A of table 18 establishes that the propensity to donate and the donation amounts 
increases with age and suggests that the treatments increase donations, but this paper is about 
whether age cohorts have heterogeneous treatment effects from the messaging. While 
randomization was not specifically designed to test for heterogeneous treatment effects by age, 
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the mailing zip code randomization should be sufficient as the size of each cell is large. Further, 
the number of registered individuals, average ages, and the percentage that is female are fairly 
balanced for age cohorts across treatment assignment. One significant caveat must be given here. 
These simple tests in differences in means cannot tease out the effect of age and the treatment 
from the effect of the interaction of age and treatment. When looking within a treatment across 
age cohorts, I cannot distinguish between the effect of age alone and the interaction of age and 
the treatment. I also cannot distinguish between the effect of the treatment alone and the 
interaction of treatment and age when I am comparing within age cohort across treatments. In 
essence, any differences in means could be driven by age, the treatment, the interaction, or a 
combination of these factors.  
While the non-parametric tests60 of the raw data show some evidence of heterogeneous 
treatment effects, their results are largely uninformative as they don’t allow the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables and do not explicitly separate the effects of age, treatment, and 
the interaction of treatment and age. Further, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum tests 
(Wilcoxon 1945; Mann and Whitney 1947) tests mean little with large data sets as many tests 
will return as statistically significant merely due to the size of the data set. The next section 
describes the main regression methodology designed to separate the effect of age, the treatments, 
and their interaction.  
3.3 Methodology 
 Since the treatments were randomized according to an individual’s mailing zip code in 
2013, treatment assignment is close to exogenous. Therefore, cross sectional linear regressions 
similar to those found in Landry et al. (2006; 2010) are sufficient to estimate the heterogeneous 
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 The results from the non-parametric tests are available from the author. 
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treatment effects61. The basic setup to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects on average 
donations is the following: 
𝐿𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛿 + (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗)𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝜎𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ( 26 ) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑗 is the contribution amount from the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ individual in the 𝑗𝑡ℎ zip code, 𝑍𝑖𝑗 is a vector of 
treatment indicators (control is excluded category), and 𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of other covariates that 
may include observable characteristics of potential donors (age, gender, whether the individual 
gave the prior year). In particular, 𝑍𝑖𝑗 and can be represented the following way: 
𝑍𝑖𝑗 = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 .
 
( 27 ) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a vector indicating the age cohort that an individual belongs using the middle aged (20 
to 49 years) as a reference age cohort. It can be represented by the following: 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 19 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔)
2 𝑖𝑓 19 𝑡𝑜 49 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑑)
3 𝑖𝑓 50 𝑡𝑜 64 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒)
4 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 64 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟) 
 
( 28 ) 
The overall treatment effect for a cohort is represented by adding the average treatment effect, 𝛿, 
to the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and age cohort, 𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒. For example, the 
full treatment effect for those 65 and older is 𝛿 + 𝛼4. 
Further, I can divide the effect on average donations into an extensive (propensity to 
give) and extensive (average gift conditional on giving) margin. The intensive margin uses 
equation ( 29 ) but limits the sample to only individuals who gave something. The extensive 
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 Although the data is a panel, panel methods may not be appropriate for this analysis. Since a fixed effects model  
would be the appropriate panel method, we would be unlikely to find any significant effects. The heterogeneous 
effects would be identified by individuals that changed age categories between 2013 and 2014, and we would not 
expect to see a significant change in individual behavior after aging one year. A long panel with treatment 
interventions occurring at different points in time would be most appropriate, but such data collection would be 
prohibitively costly. 
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margin can be estimated by only changing the dependent variable of equation ( 30 ) to an 
indicator for giving any amount. This linear probability model is the following: 
𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛿 + (𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 × 𝑍𝑖𝑗)𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝜎𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ( 31 ) 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑗 equals 1 if the household gave and 0 otherwise.  
I run five different specifications for each model. First, I simply estimate the treatment 
effects without including any additional controls, and then I add the indicators for each age 
cohort to model 2. Model 3 adds the treatment-age-cohort interactions to test for heterogeneous 
treatment effects. Finally, I add an indicator for whether a household gave in 2013 to Model 4 
and the same indicator along with an indicator for whether the individual was female in Model 5. 
The standard errors are clustered at the zip code level to account for unobservable heterogeneity 
at the zip code level in all models and specifications. I then use Wald tests to assess the 
significance of heterogeneous treatment effects. 
 
4. Results 
The results for the regressions on the average donation are reported in table 1962. They 
largely confirm List, Murphy, and Price (2015) result that individuals who were mailed the 
“Warm Your Heart” message gave more, on average, than the control group and individuals who 
were sent the “Make Alaska Better for Everyone” message. In particular, average donations 
increased by $2.64 (72 percent) for the Self treatment group compared to the control group’s 
average donation of $4.72 under specification (1). This result holds, albeit at smaller differences 
as control variables
63
 are added to the regression. While the coefficient on the Others treatment is 
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 Note that if I do not discuss the results of the Wald tests of significance between coefficients directly in my 
comparisons below you can assume that significance level is 𝑝 < .05. 
63
 Control variables include age, the interaction of the treatment with age, whether a household gave in the previous 
year, and gender depending on the specification. 
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not statistically significant from zero, the difference between it and the Self treatment coefficient 
is significant at the 𝑝 < 0.05 level for specifications one and two. 
 
Table 19. Regression results on average donations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES donation donation donation donation donation 
            
Others 
Treatment 0.4885 0.5892 0.6275 0.6956 0.6957 
 
(0.873) (0.844) (0.929) (0.572) (0.572) 
Self Treatment 2.6372*** 2.5193*** 2.1628** 1.1560** 1.1561** 
 
(0.779) (0.737) (0.859) (0.563) (0.563) 
Young 
 
-4.2072*** -3.5145*** -1.4356*** -1.4363*** 
  
(0.371) (0.483) (0.327) (0.327) 
Mature 
 
5.0583*** 3.7499*** 1.3528*** 1.3523*** 
  
(0.439) (0.411) (0.413) (0.413) 
Older 
 
6.1115*** 5.8330*** 3.3727*** 3.3721*** 
  
(0.535) (0.689) (0.591) (0.592) 
Others*Young 
  
-0.4702 -0.5198 -0.5198 
   
(0.855) (0.622) (0.622) 
Others*Mature 
  
0.4694 0.4848 0.4852 
   
(0.732) (0.615) (0.615) 
Others*Older 
  
-0.2481 -0.3470 -0.3467 
   
(1.081) (0.953) (0.953) 
Self*Young 
  
-1.6676** -1.1317* -1.1318 
   
(0.762) (0.578) (0.578) 
Self*Mature 
  
3.2815*** 2.9887*** 2.9889*** 
   
(0.784) (0.735) (0.735) 
Self*Older 
  
1.0675 1.1353 1.1353 
   
(1.295) (1.218) (1.218) 
Gave in 2013 
   
89.2856*** 89.2933*** 
    
(3.662) (3.670) 
Female 
    
-0.0557 
     
(0.116) 
Constant 4.7213*** 4.2810*** 4.3896*** 0.8318*** 0.8593*** 
 
(0.459) (0.475) (0.509) (0.298) (0.305) 
      Observations 541,617 541,617 541,617 541,617 541,617 
R-squared 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.120 0.120 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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I find no statistical evidence that the “Make Alaska Better for Everyone” message 
increases average donations as a whole or within each age cohort. However, the results show 
limited heterogeneity for the “Warm Your Heart” message. When I include the treatment-age-
cohort interactions (columns 3, 4, and 5 of table 19), the average treatment effect for the Self 
treatment falls from $2.52 in the second specification to between $1.16 and $2.17 depending on 
the control variables included. The decrease in the average treatment effect may be attributed to 
the inclusion of age-cohort-treatment interactions. I can test for heterogeneity in treatment effects 
between age groups directly by comparing the coefficients on the interaction between treatment 
group and age cohort in table 19. That is, I test for whether one age group is impacted more by 
one treatment compared to the other age groups.   
Each age cohort receives a marginal increase or decrease in average donations as a result 
of the “Warm Your Heart” message, but many of changes are statistically insignificant. I use the 
last specification in table 19 for interpreting the marginal effect of each treatment by age group 
on average donations. The interaction coefficients of treatment and age cohort (𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒) in 
equation ( 23 ) are reported in table 2064. This analysis will focus on the differences between the 
Mature cohort and the other three cohorts since the Mature cohort includes most of the aging 
Baby Boomer generation; figure 20 also provides a visualization of the interaction comparisons 
for the Mature cohort. Comparing the Self treatment to the control, the Mature cohort gives 
$4.12, $2.99, and $1.85 more on average than the Young, Middle Aged, and Older cohorts, 
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 The results from Table 20 can be used for any cohort comparison. For example, I could compute how the Self 
treatment effect differs for the Middle Aged and Older cohorts by subtracting $1.8536 from $2.9889 to find that the 
Mature cohort gives $1.1353 more than the Older cohort, on average. These results along with their statistical tests 
are available upon request from the author. 
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respectively
65
. Table 20 also reports the results of Wald tests for statistical significance. The 
heterogeneous response to the Self treatment for the Young and Middle Aged compared to the 
Mature are statistically significant at the 1% level, but the treatment heterogeneity between the 
Mature and Older cohorts is not quite statistically significant at the 10% level
66
. In addition to 
these findings, the Young cohort (< 19) gives significantly less than the Middle Aged and Older 
cohorts under the Self treatment. The Wald tests in Table 20 also clearly show no significant 
treatment effect heterogeneity by age group for the Others treatment when compared to the 
control. Finally, the differences in donations between the Self treatment and Others treatment are 
$3.12 (𝑝 < 0.01), $2.50 (𝑝 < 0.01), and $1.02 (insignificant) higher for the Mature compared 
to the Young, Middle Aged, and Older cohorts, respectively.  
 
Table 20: Wald Tests of Interaction Coefficients (𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒) for average donations 
Comparison Others vs Control Self vs Control Self vs Others 
<19 vs 20 to 49 -0.5198 -1.1318* -0.612* 
<19 vs 50 to 64 -1.005 -4.1207*** -3.1157* 
<19 vs 65+ -0.1731 -2.2671* 2.4402 
20 to 49 vs < 19 0.5198 1.1318* 0.612 
20 to 49 vs 50 to 64 -0.4852 -2.9889*** -2.5037 
20 to 49 vs 65+ 0.3467 -1.1353 -1.482 
50 to 64 vs  < 19 1.005 4.1207*** 3.1158*** 
50 to 64 vs 20 to 49 0.4852 2.9889*** 2.5037*** 
50 to 64 vs 65+ 0.8319 1.8536 1.0217 
65+ vs <19 0.1731 2.2671* 2.094 
65+ vs 20 to 49 -0.3467 1.1353 1.4821 
65+ vs 50 to 64 -0.8319 -1.8536 -1.0217 
Note: This table presents the marginal effects of the interaction between treatments and age cohort and was 
calculated using column 5 of table 19. The significance level was calculated using Wald tests. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Prior to controlling for giving in 2013, the results in table 19, column 3 show that the Mature cohort increases 
average donations by $4.95 (𝑝 < 0.01), $3.28 (𝑝 < 0.01), and $2.21 (𝑝 < 0.1) when compared to the Young, 
Middle Aged, and Older cohorts in response to the “Warm Your Heart” message. 
66
 The difference has a p-value of 0.1011. 
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Figure 20: The Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Average Donation by Age 
 
 
For illustration purposes I assume that the point estimates are all statistically significant. I 
can then calculate the marginal effect of each treatment by age cohort67; the results are 
summarized in table 21 and figure 21. The most striking result is that the marginal effect of the 
“Warm Your Heart” message is 80, 250, and 20,600 percent higher for the Mature cohort ($4.14) 
than the Older ($2.29), Middle Aged ($1.16), and Young ($0.02) cohorts68. The heterogeneity 
within the Others treatment is much less pronounced and statistically insignificant in all 
comparisons. In conclusion, the results further show limited heterogeneity within the Self 
treatment but no heterogeneity for the Others treatment when compared to the control. The next 
logical question to ask is how much the two treatments differ overall from each other. 
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 For example the marginal effect of the “Warm Your Heart” message on the Mature cohort is the sum of the 
coefficient on the Self treatment and the coefficient on “Self*Mature”: 
1.1561 + 2.9889 = 4.145 
68
 Only the difference between the Mature and Older cohorts is statistically insignificant with a p-value of 0.1011. 
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Table 21: Marginal Effects of Treatment on Average Donations by Age 
Comparison Others vs Control Self vs Control Self vs Others 
< 19 0.1759 0.0243 -0.1517 
20 to 49 0.6957 1.1561** 0.4603 
50 to 64 1.1809 4.145*** 2.9641*** 
65+ 0.349 2.2914* 1.9424 
Note: The marginal effects are calculated by adding 𝛿 and 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒  coefficients in table 19 for each age cohort. The 
statistical significance was determined using Wald Tests. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Figure 21: The Marginal Effect of treatments on the Average Donation by Age 
 
 
Again table 19 tells us that Mature individuals that received the “Warm Your Heart” 
message donated statistically significant larger amounts, on average, than Mature individuals that 
received the “Make Alaska Better for Everyone” postcard, and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 𝑝 < 0.01 level for all the relevant specifications69. While the coefficient on the 
interaction between the Others treatment and the Mature cohort is imprecisely estimated, the 
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 In fact, the Mature cohort who received the Self treatment donate statistically significantly more on average than 
all other cohorts that received the Others treatment. 
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average donation of mature individuals that received the Self treatment was $2.50
70
 higher than 
the similarly aged individuals who received the Others treatment. The marginal effect of each 
treatment for Mature individuals under both treatments can be found in table 21 and figure 21. 
Mature individuals give 250 percent more on average under the Self treatment ($4.14) compared 
to the Others treatment ($1.18). Assuming that every Mature individual that did not receive the 
Self treatment actually did (72,423 people), the amount given to charities through 
Pick.Click.Give would have increased by approximately $250,00071. Another glance at figure 21 
might make you wonder about the difference between treatments for the Older cohort because 
the marginal effect for the “Warm Your Heart” message is $2.29 and $0.35 for the “Make Alaska 
Better for Everyone” treatment. Surprisingly, this difference is statistically insignificant, but it 
suggests that Older individuals may respond more to giving incentives geared toward benefits to 
self. Since we found some evidence for treatment heterogeneity for the “Warm Your Heart” 
message, the next section examines if the differences occur on the extensive or intensive margin. 
4.2 Extensive vs. Intensive Margin 
 Tables 22 and 23 present the results for the propensity to donate (extensive margin) and 
the average gift conditional on giving (intensive margin), respectively. Overall, the “Warm Your 
Heart” message increases the probability of giving but has mixed effects on the average 
conditional gift. The results in table 22 clearly show that the Self treatment increases the 
probability of giving. Without any additional controls, individuals who receive this treatment are 
approximately 1.35 percentage points more likely (or 30.5 percent) to donate. Table 23 shows a 
consistent positive impact from the Self treatment on the average conditional gift, but the impact 
                                                          
70
 $2.99- $0.49 
71
 35,850 additional people from the Control group would donate $4.15 ($1.1561+$2.9889) more on average plus 
36,573 more people from the Others group who donate $2.96 ($1.1561+$2.9889-$0.6957-$0.4852) more on average 
for a total of over $250,000 more. 
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turns statistically insignificant when I add the age-treatment interactions. The first specification 
of table 23 implies a $20.74 (19.3 percent) increase in the average conditional donation for the 
“Warm Your Heart” message over the control. The “Make Alaska Better for Everyone” message 
was statistically indistinguishable from the control in both the intensive and extensive margin. 
Table 22. Regression results on propensity to donate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES donor donor donor donor donor 
            
Others Treatment 0.0012 0.0017 0.0016 0.0021 0.0021 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self Treatment 0.0135*** 0.0128*** 0.0136*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Young 
 
-0.0257*** -0.0235*** -0.0080*** -0.0079*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mature 
 
0.0238*** 0.0222*** 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Older 
 
0.0203*** 0.0200*** 0.0016 0.0017 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Others*Young 
  
-0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 
   
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Others*Mature 
  
0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 
   
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Others*Older 
  
0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001 
   
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self*Young 
  
-0.0064** -0.0024 -0.0024 
   
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self*Mature 
  
0.0039 0.0017 0.0017 
   
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self*Older 
  
0.0002 0.0007 0.0007 
   
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.0442*** 0.0444*** 0.0442*** 0.0177*** 0.0141*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gave in 2013 
   
Yes Yes 
Female 
    
Yes 
      R-squared 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.411 0.411 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23. Regression results on the average conditional donation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES donation donation donation donation donation 
            
Others Treatment 8.0039 9.0938 10.2991 10.5781 10.6221 
 
(10.412) (10.161) (10.746) (10.359) (10.258) 
Self Treatment 20.7413** 20.9381** 14.0080 13.0214 13.0287 
 
(8.515) (8.200) (9.983) (9.695) (9.704) 
Young 
 
-61.4370*** -57.0373*** -53.6044*** -56.2795 
  
(3.943) (6.693) (6.755) (6.869) 
Mature 
 
33.9180*** 23.1888*** 18.7583*** 18.5269*** 
  
(4.506) (6.479) (6.559) (6.576) 
Older 
 
56.5364*** 59.9412*** 54.7054*** 54.0426*** 
  
(7.029) (8.281) (8.280) (8.219) 
Others*Young 
  
-5.2944 -6.0301 -5.9805 
   
(9.947) (10.060) (9.924) 
Others*Mature 
  
1.7805 2.6890 2.7339 
   
(7.630) (7.637) (7.650) 
Others*Older 
  
-9.9885 -10.1410 -10.4235 
   
(11.092) (11.086) (11.089) 
Self*Young 
  
-7.2832 -7.8027 -7.5628 
   
(8.870) (8.879) (8.956) 
Self*Mature 
  
25.2944** 26.6706*** 26.5754*** 
   
(9.893) (9.812) (9.856) 
Self*Older 
  
-0.7504 0.2782 -0.0034 
   
(17.650) (17.449) (17.469) 
Constant 106.9055*** 96.9272*** 99.3133*** 80.1996*** 92.0359*** 
 
(6.248) (6.414) (6.928) (6.598) (7.174) 
Gave in 2013 
   
Yes Yes 
Female 
    
Yes 
      R-squared 0.002 0.026 0.027 0.032 0.034 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Prior to controlling for past gifts and treatment heterogeneity (Model 2), the results in 
table 22 suggest that the Older individuals were 4.6 and 2 percentage points more likely to give 
than the Younger or Middle Aged but 0.35 percentage points less likely to give than the 
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individuals aged 50 to 64 years old. While the direction of these results largely hold as I add 
more controls, the magnitude of the age effects diminishes. Using the fifth specification, I find 
that the Mature cohort are the most likely to donate, and Young individuals are the least likely. 
The Older cohort is more likely to give than the Young, less likely to give than the Mature, and 
just as likely to give as the Middle Aged. All differences are statistically significant at the 
𝑝 < .01 level except for the difference between the Mature and Older groups. Unfortunately, 
these differences are not very economically significant as most result in a less than 1 percentage 
point increase in donors.  
The average donation for those who gave increased with age in all relevant specifications. 
Using the final specification, the Middle Aged, Mature, and Older donors increased their average 
donation size by $56.28, $74.81, and $110.32 compared to the Young cohort, respectively. 
Tables 2272 and 23 together show that the propensity to give increases with age until individuals 
reach the Older cohort, but the average conditional donation monotonically increases with age. 
The former statement confirms the findings in previous literature, but the latter does not. 
 Finally, the heterogeneous treatment effects for the “Warm Your Heart” message are 
solely driven by individuals donating larger amounts and not by more individuals donating. 
The treatment effects on the probability of giving do not systematically differ by age cohorts for 
either treatment compared to the control or between the two treatments. The results presented in 
table 22, columns 3, 4, and 5 show little evidence that for heterogeneous treatment effects for the 
Mature cohort, or any other age cohort for that matter, on the extensive margin. The Wald tests 
comparing the coefficients do find significant differences (𝑝 < .05) between the Young cohort 
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The results also suggest that an individual that gave in 2013 is 66 percentage points more likely to donate again in 
2014 than those that did not. Finally, females are also more likely to give than males, but the effect is less than 1 
percentage points.  
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and Middle Aged cohort as well as the Young and Mature cohorts, but these differences largely 
disappear when I add additional controls. Further, I find no statistical differences within any age 
cohorts between the two treatments. Therefore, the heterogeneous treatment effects for the 
“Warm your heart” message must be coming through on the intensive margin. 
Table 24 and figure 22 highlight the differences in the intensive margin for the Self 
treatment. Donors in the Mature cohort gave $34.14 (624%), $26.58 (204%), and $26.57 (204%) 
more, on average, than Young (𝑝 < 0.01), Middle Aged (𝑝 < 0.01), and Older donors (𝑝 <
0.1), respectively, when they lived in a zip code that was mailed the “Warm Your Heart” 
postcard. As expected, the donors living in zip codes that received the “Make Alaska Better for 
Everyone” did not have statistically significant difference in donation amounts overall or within 
age cohorts. Finally, Mature donors in the Self treatment gave $23.84 higher amounts, on 
average, than Mature donors in the Others treatment which is the only significant difference 
between the two treatments within a single age cohort. 
 
Table 24: Wald Tests of Interaction Coefficients (𝛼𝐴𝑔𝑒) for average conditional donations 
Comparison Others vs Control Self vs Control Self vs Others 
50 to 64 vs  < 19 8.7144 34.1382*** 25.4238** 
50 to 64 vs 20 to 49 2.7339 26.5754*** 23.8416*** 
50 to 64 vs 65+ 13.1574 26.5788* 13.4214 
Note: This table presents the marginal effects of the interaction between treatments and age cohort and was 
calculated using column 5 of table 23. The significance level was calculated using Wald tests. These are only the 
results for comparing the Mature cohort to the other cohorts. The results for the comparison between all age cohorts 
are available by request to the author. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 22: The Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Average Conditional Donation by Age 
 
 
4.3 Giving Simulation 
 In order to gain a deeper understanding of the potential impact of the treatments and the 
changing demographics, I calculate several back of the envelope simulations with the caveat that 
these are for descriptive purposes only. For this illustration, I ignore statistical significance and 
take the point estimates as precise. First, I calculated the proportion of the population in each age 
cohort and treatment pair that applied for their PFD online using the Pick.Click.Give data and 
population estimates from the Census Bureau (2014). I then used state population projections by 
age and treatment from the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (2014) for Alaska 
and calculated an estimated number of people that will apply for their PFD online using the ratio 
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in the first step73. The final step used the coefficient estimates in table 19, column 3 to predict 
total giving for each age cohort under 4 simulations using the years 2014 and 203274.  
 The first simulation estimates total donations under the normal treatments using the 2014 
treatment exposure ratios for each age-treatment cell, and the second predicts the amount in the 
absence of any treatment. The final two simulations are designed to show the overall impact of 
the “Warm Your Heart” message. The third simulation predicts total donations if the “Warm 
Your Heart” message was given to all Mature individuals to measure the heterogeneous 
treatment effect for this group. Last, I estimate total giving if the “Warm Your Heart” message 
was sent to all individuals in Alaska. Table 25 summarizes the results of total donations under 
each scenario. Panel A of table 25 lists the results for 2014, and panel B shows the 2032 results. 
While I list the relative effects for each cohort in columns 2 through 5 of table 25, I will focus 
the discussion on the overall effect in the first column.  
 Unsurprisingly, total donations under normal treatments (Simulation 1) almost perfectly 
predict total giving in the raw data in 2014. In the absence of the treatments (Simulation 2), total 
donations fall by about 571 thousand dollars (18 percent) in 2014. By simply sending all 
individuals in the mature cohort who applied for their PFD online (an additional 72,423 people) 
the “Warm Your Heart” postcard, total donations increased by over 350 thousand dollars (11 
percent) or an additional $4.89 per individual when compared to the first simulation. Finally, 
sending every household in the sample (358,434 people) the “Warm Your Heart” postcard 
increased total donations by over 24 percent (774 thousand dollars) compared to simulation 1. 
This is an additional $2.16 per additional person receiving the Self postcard. Overall, the results 
of these simulations for 2014 tell us that charities in Alaska would have raised significantly more 
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 This method more than likely under predicts the number of households that will sign-up online as this number has 
been rising steadily each year. 
74
 The year 2032 was the closets Alaskan population projection available for around 20 years from 2014. 
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money had the “Warm Your Heart” message been sent to all households, but it may have been 
more cost effective to only send the postcard to individuals in the Mature cohort. 
 
Table 25. Summary of giving simulations ($1,000s dollars) 
Variables All Ages Young Middle Mature Older 
 
Panel A: 2014 
1 - Normal Treatments 3,131.80 158.70 1,267.25 1,167.60 538.25 
2 - No Treatments 2,559.93 127.45 1,040.09 911.86 480.53 
3 - Treatments - All Mature receive 
"Warm" message 3,485.98 158.70 1,267.25 1,521.78 538.25 
4 - All Ages get "Warm" message 3,906.28 199.57 1,552.55 1,521.78 632.38 
 
          
 
Panel B: 2032 
1 - Normal Treatments 5,094.16 272.89 1,869.14 1,296.12 1,656.00 
2 - No Treatments 4,243.90 219.16 1,534.09 1,012.23 1,478.42 
3 - Treatments - All Mature receive 
"Warm" message 5,487.32 272.89 1,869.14 1,689.28 1,656.00 
4 - All Ages get "Warm" message 6,268.00 343.17 2,289.95 1,689.28 1,945.60 
Sources: The simulations were calculated using the Pick.Click.Give data, data from the U.S. Census Bureau 2014, 
and data from Alaska's Department of Labor and Workforce Development (2014).  
 
Comparing the simulations between 2014 and 2032 suggests that total donations should 
be expected to increase simply from a larger population that is also aging. If the experiment were 
repeated in 2032, total donations would be almost 2 million dollars more (62 percent increase 
over 2014). Even in the absence of intervention total giving would increase by over 1.6 million 
dollars by 2032 compared to the second simulation results from 2014. In 2032, the “Warm Your 
Heart” message increases donations by even more than in 2014 because of the larger and older 
population. Repeating the same experiment in 2032 would have raised an additional 850 
thousand dollars compared to about 572 thousand dollars in 2014. Because of the smaller relative 
size of the Mature cohort, sending the message emphasizing benefits to self to every household 
in the Mature cohort would raise 393 thousand dollars more, but this is only 9 percent more than 
merely repeating the same 2014 experiment which is smaller than the 11 percent increase in total 
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donations in 2014 under the same simulation. The difference between sending all households the 
“Warm Your Heart” message also conforms to a similar pattern. In conclusion, the simulations 
show that the “Warm Your Heart” message increases total donations in both 2014 and 2032. In 
absolute terms, much more money is raised in 2032 than 2014 under every scenario as the result 
of a larger, older population; however, the simulation results also suggest that the aging 
population dampens the effects of the Self treatment on total donations in 2032. 
 The results above show that Mature cohort are the only age cohort who were 
heterogeneously affected by the Self treatment while no heterogeneity existed for the Others 
message. The Baby Boomer generation makes up the Mature cohort. Historically, Baby Boomers 
have been very generous with their money and time. Moving forward the most important 
question is if the Mature cohort has a greater response to the Self message because of their age or 
their identity as a generation. One argument against generational effects is that the relationship 
with age and giving has been relatively stable through time which would suggest that actual age 
and life experience drives given patterns more so then generational effects. Unfortunately, I 
cannot completely rule out generational effects without a long panel of data with treatments that 
varied through time. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study combines the literature on the relationship between charitable giving and age 
with the literature examining the motivations for giving. To my knowledge, it is the first to test 
whether the drivers of giving differ by age. I use the results from a randomized field trial 
designed to distinguish between pure and impure altruism (List, Murphy, and Price 2015). The 
field experiment randomly assigned households by zip code into a control or one of two 
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treatments. The first treatment was mailed a post card with the message “Make Alaska Better for 
Everyone” to elicit the benefits to others motivation for giving, and the second treatment group 
was sent a postcard that emphasized the benefits to self with a message reading “Warm Your 
Heart.” I then divided the individuals into four age cohorts: Young (under 19 years old), Middle 
Aged (19 to 49 years old), Mature (50 to 64 years old), and Older (65 years old and older) and 
used regression analysis to explore any treatment heterogeneity. That is, are people of different 
ages motivated to give for different reasons? 
The results found only some evidence that the drivers of charitable giving differ by age 
when the individual was sent the “Warm Your Heart” message and no evidence of heterogeneity 
for individuals sent the “Make Alaska Better for Everyone” message. In particular, people 
between 50 and 64 years old gave between $4.12 and $4.94 more on average in response to the 
benefits to Self treatment than the Young and between $2.99 and $3.28 more than Middle Aged 
cohorts under the same treatment. I also find that individuals 65 and older donate between $1.85 
and $2.21 less when receiving the “Warm Your Heart” message than Mature individuals, but the 
difference of $1.85 is not statistically significant. In addition, these results are entirely driven by 
larger donations (intensive margin) as opposed to more people donating (extensive margin). I 
find no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects for the message emphasizing benefits to 
others. Finally, the Mature cohort responds more positively to the “Warm Your Heart” message 
compared to the “Make Alaska Better for Everyone” postcard. Overall, the results suggest that 
the benefits to self is the primary motivator for charitable giving, and the Mature cohort, who are 
from the Baby Boomer generation, are driven to donate more by benefits to self than other age 
cohorts.  
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As I mentioned in the text, these results cannot definitively distinguish between age and 
generational effects. If the results for the Mature cohort are actual driven by being part of the 
Baby Boom generation, the implications of my results may change dramatically. Therefore, this 
should be a fruitful area for future research. Further, my analysis only examined the two most 
basic drivers of charitable giving, but these drivers have many components that I am unable to 
examine. For instance, the benefits to self could be driven by social pressures (e.g. DellaVigna, 
List, and Malmendier 2012; Knutsson, Martinsson, and Wollbrant 2012), social identity (e.g. 
Kessler and Milkman 2014), or social image (e.g. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009; Lacetera and 
Macis 2010). Finally, the charitable giving literature has also shown that various mechanisms 
such as seed money (e.g. James Andreoni 1998; A. List and Lucking‐Reiley 2002), charitable 
auction-s (e.g. Goeree et al. 2005; Engers and McManus 2007), lotteries (e.g. Morgan 2000; 
Morgan and Sefton 2000; Apinunmahakul and Devlin 2004; Landry et al. 2006; Lange, List, and 
Price 2007), and matching grants (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 2003; Karlan and List 2007) tend to 
increase the probability and amount of giving. Another future area of research is measuring how 
age interacts with these mechanisms that charities use in practice. 
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Chapter III 
Consequences of Local Homestead Exemptions in Georgia: A Proposal
75
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, Cobb County has made headlines for its generous homestead exemption 
from the education property tax for seniors over the age of 62, at a time when schools budgets 
have been severely squeezed76. However, Cobb's exemption is only the most generous exemption 
on a continuum of Georgia's counties. While Cobb offers a 100% exemption for all seniors over 
the age of 62, other counties offer exemptions at higher ages, or with income tests, or for only a 
portion of the assessed value. Other districts have no exemptions at all.  
We will explore the impact of these homestead exemptions on the demographic makeup 
of each jurisdiction. Seniors living even in modest homes receive a subsidy, relative to younger 
households, of $1,000 or more annually in a jurisdiction such as Cobb. We would expect this 
subsidy to attract seniors to such jurisdictions, or prevent them from leaving, relative to control 
jurisdictions. Using school-district-level Census data since 1970 along with the history of such 
exemptions, we will test for such demographic "sorting."  
Second, but more speculatively, we will consider the impact of these laws on the levels of 
housing capital. According to the "new view" of the property tax, the incidence of the tax falls in 
part on capital (Zodrow 2001). The national average level of the property tax lowers the returns 
to capital, while above-average property taxes in a particular jurisdiction will lead to lower 
equilibrium levels of housing capital and be capitalized into lower land values, ceteris paribus. 
Since the education exemption shrinks the tax base, we would expect it to have such effects. 
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 Much of this chapter was adapted from Mickey, Banzhaf, and Patrick (2015). 
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 See, e.g., Downey (2013) and Davis (2010). 
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More broadly, we would expect the equilibrium ratio of housing consumption for seniors to 
younger households to be higher in jurisdictions with such exemptions compared to control 
counties. We will test for sorting effects and heterogeneous housing consumption by age using a 
difference-in-difference-in-differences model previously used in demographic transition 
(Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008) and property tax (Banzhaf and 
Lavery 2010) contexts.  
 
2. Related Literature 
2.1 The Tiebout Hypothesis and Older Households 
Charles Tiebout’s (1956) seminal article suggesting that people “vote with their feet” by 
moving to communities with their optimal mix of taxes and public goods created a whole 
literature on sorting behavior of households. Researchers have examined sorting in the context of 
income (e.g. Epple and Sieg 1999; de Bartolome and Ross 2003; Finney, Goetzke, and Yoon 
2011), race (e. g. Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008; Banzhaf and Walsh 2013) environmental 
quality (e.g. Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; Cameron and McConnaha 2006; Greenstone and 
Gallagher 2008; Kahn 2009; Been and Gupta 1997), and other local public goods.  
A branch of this “sorting” literature examines how location decisions change through the 
life-cycle of households, particularly at older ages and in retirement. That is, households often 
move when they experience a major life change such as a new job, marriage, the birth of a child, 
retirement, increasing health care needs, or the death of a spouse. Further, these same life 
changes influence where they move. Older households typically have the most freedom in their 
location decisions because they are less compelled to seek higher wages. One of the earliest 
applications of the Tiebout model to retiree location decisions was by Graves and Waldman 
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(1991b) who found the retirees are more likely to move to areas where local public goods are 
capitalized more into lower wages than higher land prices which confirms an earlier theoretical 
model developed by Graves and Knapp (1988).  
Much of the existing literature on retiree location preferences is in the context of 
migration77, and it attempts to answer question such as where do elderly households move, why 
they moved, and the reasons why they choose particular destinations. These questions, 
particularly the where they move and why they move there, fit nicely into Tiebout’s “voting with 
your feet” framework. Conventional wisdom is that retirees seek places with mild weather (e.g. 
D. E. Clark, Knapp, and White 1996; Conway and Houtenville 1998; Conway and Houtenville 
2003; Whisler et al. 2008; Karner and Dorfman 2012), more sunlight, and a relatively low cost of 
living (e.g. Fournier, Rasmussen, and Serow 1988; Cebula 1993), but people of all ages prefer to 
live in low cost of living areas with nice weather (e. g. Rappaport 2007). In addition to weather, 
retirees may be more likely to prefer to live in places with other natural amenities (e.g. Poudyal, 
Hodges, and Cordell 2008), low crime (e.g. Conway and Houtenville 1998; Duncombe, Robbins, 
and Wolf 2000; Whisler et al. 2008); access to quality health care (D. E. Clark, Knapp, and 
White 1996; Karner and Dorfman 2012); and cleaner air. Finally, local tax and expenditure 
policies may also play an important role in the location decision of older households. A number 
of studies examine various local tax and spending policies including state death, estate, and 
inheritance taxes (Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf 2000; Conway and Houtenville 2003; Conway 
and Rork 2004; Conway and Rork 2006), property taxes (Shan 2010), elderly-specific tax 
exemptions (Conway and Houtenville 2003; Conway and Rork 2008a; Conway and Rork 2008b; 
Onder and Schlunk 2010; Conway and Rork 2012), and other local spending considerations 
(Conway and Houtenville 2003; Farnham and Sevak 2006). No consensus has been reached in 
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the literature about the sorting effects of such policies. Since this paper examines property tax 
exemptions for the elderly, I will focus on articles that specifically examine property taxes as 
well as older-specific tax exemptions for older households. 
An early study by Conway and Houtenville (1998) looked at the effect of the share of 
total state and local taxes raised by property taxes, among others things, on in-migration and out-
migration of older households and found that higher shares of property taxes were associated 
with higher out-migration They also unexpectedly found a positively correlation between the 
property tax variable and in-migration78. Gale and Heath (2000) amend Conway and 
Houtenville’s model to allow for the endogeneity of elderly migration and state fiscal policy. 
Their results suggest that the higher property taxes reduce net in-migration when the endogeneity 
is explicitly modeled. One major flaw in these studies is the use of migration variables at the 
state level79 whereas much of the property tax variation happens within a state in local 
jurisdictions. Further, sorting tends to occur more at geographic level smaller than states.  
Three recent studies used Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), albeit from different 
time periods, to analyze questions regarding sorting as a result of property taxes. Farnham and 
Sevak (2006) were the first to use the household-level panel data to test for Tiebout sorting. They 
restricted the analysis to households that recently became empty-nesters and found that cross-
state movers lowered their exposure to property taxes but local movers do not because of within 
state fiscal constraints on local jurisdictions. Seslen (2005) examined the effect of property taxes 
on the decision of older households to downsize using a panel of households and found little 
evidence of property taxes influencing the decision to move or liquidate their housing. 
Unfortunately, the two prior studies failed to account for the potential endogeneity problem of 
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 Two similar study by Houtenville and Conaway (2001; 2003) found similar results for property taxes. 
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 Duncombe, Robbins, and Wolf (2000) are an exception as they use county-to-county. 
101 
 
both property taxes and mobility decisions being driven by some unobserved factor. Shan (2010) 
used more recent data from the HRS than Farnham and Sevak (2006) and Seslen (2005) that 
allowed her to address the endogeneity issue by instrumenting for property tax payments with 
variation in state-provided property tax relief programs. She finds that higher property taxes raise 
mobility of older households. In particular, the results suggest that a 100 dollar increase in 
property taxes increases the mobility rate by 9 percent for elderly.  
While the above studies examine the impact of property tax levels on older household 
mobility, we are the first, to our knowledge, to examine how property tax exemptions for older 
households at the local level affect the location decisions. However, we are not the first to study 
the effects of elderly tax breaks on location decisions. Older households have typically received 
the most tax relief from income taxes80. Conway and Houtenville (2003) find that the effect of an 
income tax exemption for pension income is sensitive to the progressivity of the state tax code: 
the less progressive a state’s income tax code is the more likely it discourages out-migration and 
encourages in-migration. Some states also exempt certain items from sales tax which older 
households buy a more than younger households, on average; Onder and Schlunk (2010) found 
that older households are more likely to move to states with such exemptions. Finally, Conway 
and Rork (2012) provide the most careful and complete analysis of state tax breaks for older 
households and their location decisions; they find little evidence that older households move or 
leave a state as the result of such tax breaks.  
2.2 Housing Consumption 
 Basic economic theory predicts that when the price of a good falls the quantity demanded 
for the good increase. While housing is unlike other goods in many ways, the housing market is 
not immune to the law of supply and demand. The cost of housing is the largest purchase that 
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most households make, and it is also that most subsidized. Implicitly, the imputed rent of an 
owner-occupied home is not taxable. Explicitly, mortgage interest is deductible from income 
taxes at the federal level and in many states. These tax preferences for home-owners effectively 
lower the user cost of owning a home. This could lead to an increase on the extensive margin in 
the number of households owning a home and on the intensive margin in the size of the house, or 
amount of housing capital.  
 The impact of tax preferences for home ownership has been studied extensively. The 
closets line of literature to our study asks what the impact of the mortgage interest deduction has 
on the number of homes bought and the size of those homes81. Overall, Mills (1987) and Poterba 
(1992) find that both the mortgage interest deduction (MID) and property tax deduction increase 
housing consumption by 12 to 24 percent. The impact of the MID on home ownership rates 
(extensive margin) is somewhat mixed. Older studies find that the MID increases 
homeownership rates by 4 percent (Rosen and Rosen 1980) to 6.5 percent (Hendershott and 
Shilling 1980), but more recent studies find little or no evidence of the MID affecting 
homeownership rates (Glaeser and Shapiro 2003; Hanson 2012; Bourassa et al. 2013). With the 
exception of Hanson (2012), these studies do not consider the impact of the MID on the size of 
house. In this respect, Hanson (2012) finds a 10.9 to 18.482 percent increase in the size of the 
home purchased in response to the MID; this puts the increase in square footage of the average 
house as a result of the MID at 250 to 1,000 square feet, depending on the city (Hanson, 
Brannon, and Hawley 2014). 
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 There is also a small literature on the impact of the MID on the demand for mortgage debt. See Follain and 
Dunsky (1997), Ling and McGill (1998), and Hanson and Martin (2013). 
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 The range of results depends on the method used by Hanson. He utilized ordinary least squares, instrumental 
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With this in mind, local homestead exemptions can also have an impact, albeit small, on 
the user cost of home ownership. The key insight in this analysis is that different types of home 
owners may have heterogeneous user costs for the same house because of targeted local 
homestead exemptions. When the local homestead exemption is targeted toward a specific 
population (e.g. older households), the user cost of owning a home falls for this population 
relative to the population ineligible. The population benefitting from lower user costs of housing 
may respond by buying larger home just as homeowners buy larger houses as a result of the 
MID. In addition to analyzing a different policy variable, our study will examine the impact on a 
smaller geographic scale as most of the MID literature uses differences between state tax 
policies.  
3. Local Homestead Exemptions in Georgia83 
The State of Georgia provides homestead exemptions of property taxes based on a 
number of criteria and also allows local jurisdictions to implement their own homestead property 
tax exemptions. To become binding, these local exemptions must be approved by the state 
legislature, signed by the governor of Georgia, and then passed by a local referendum. While 
local jurisdictions can propose any exemption, many of the local homestead exemptions follow 
what the state government provides relatively closely. Therefore, it is important to understand 
both the state and local exemptions and how they interact.  
The data are organized around the following conceptual framework. If there were no 
exemptions, the total ad valorem property tax for a household type i living in jurisdiction j would  
be:  
 𝑇𝑖,𝑗 = (𝜏𝑗
𝑀𝑂 + 𝜏𝑗
𝐵)𝛽𝑗𝑉 ( 32 ) 
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In this expression, V is the fair market value, 𝛽 is the assessment ratio (generally 0.4 in Georgia), 
and the total tax rate, 𝜏, can be divided into two rates, a tax rate for bonds, 𝜏𝐵, and a tax rate on 
maintenance and operations, 𝜏𝑀𝑂. Incorporating various exemptions into Equation (1), the ad 
valorem tax for a household type i living in jurisdiction j is the following: 
𝑇𝑖,𝑗 = 𝜃𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑂𝜏𝑗
𝑀𝑂 (𝜙𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑂𝛽𝑗𝑉 − (𝛿𝑆,𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑂 + 𝛿𝐿,𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑂 )) + 𝜃𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 𝜏𝑗
𝐵 (𝜙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 𝛽𝑗𝑉 − (𝛿𝑆,𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 + 𝛿𝐿,𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 )) ( 33 ) 
This expression uses the following notation: 
𝜃 ∈ [0,1] is the amount the millage rate is prorated (0 being a full exemption),  
𝜙 is a proportionate adjustment to the assessment ratio,  
𝛿𝑆 is the dollar amount of the state exemption, which in some cases may differ by 
jurisdiction and individual, 
𝛿𝐿 is the dollar amount of an applicable local exemption.  
Using these definitions, 𝛽𝑗𝑉 is the assessed value, and 𝜙𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑂𝛽𝑗𝑉 − (𝛿𝑆
𝑀𝑂 + 𝛿𝐿,𝑖,𝑗
𝑀𝑂 ) is the net 
assessed value.  
We use equation ( 34 ) to build84 a database that provides unique information about state 
and local property tax data as it affects households. Until now, the only data available has been 
that from the Georgia Tax Digest85. The digest provides aggregate data on property tax revenues, 
number of assessed properties, and aggregate assessed values by jurisdiction. Default millage 
rates are also available since 1990. However, those data provide only a partial picture of the 
property tax landscape in Georgia. In particular, they do not provide data on the variability in 
homestead exemptions across local jurisdictions, nor do they provide data on such exemptions as 
they vary within a jurisdiction by individual characteristics include age, disability status, veteran 
status, and income. 
                                                          
84
 See Mickey, Banzhaf, and Patrick (2015) for a description of how the data set was built. 
85
 The digest can be found at http://dor.georgia.gov/county-ad-valorem-tax-digest-consolidated-summaries.  
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This unique data set provides this information for the state and for local jurisdictions 
from 1938 to 2013; however, the first local homestead exemption didn't appear on the books 
until 1948 in Muscogee County.  In practice, it covers an even longer period, as we verified that 
there were no state or local exemptions before 1938, at least back to 1913. Merged with data on 
millage rates, this database allow one to simulate how much property tax an individual 
household of a given demographic category would pay in property taxes in a given jurisdiction in 
a given year in a property with a specified assessed value (assuming the household takes 
advantage of all exemptions available). The local homestead exemptions data by jurisdiction, 
includes all counties, all school districts, and a select number of municipalities. A municipality 
was automatically included if it had an independent school district for at least one year after 
1990, was one of the 30 most populated cities in Georgia, or was one of the top 100 most 
populated cities and had no local homestead exemptions86. A small number of additional cities 
were also included. Appendix C contains a table 34 that shows the top 100 most populated cities 
in Georgia and indicates whether the city has ever had an exemption and whether it is coded in 
the database.  
The local homestead exemptions in Georgia vary across space and time. The state of 
Georgia does not limit the type, amount, or eligibility requirements of local homestead 
exemptions which lead to a wide variety of exemptions. The exemptions range from an 
exemption from the full value of the assessed value which can save thousands of dollars to a few 
thousand dollars off of the assessed value of a homestead which saves homeowners a few 
hundred dollars. For example, Cobb County exempts homeowners who are over 62 years old 
from all school property taxes. In 2013, the millage rate in Cobb County for school purposes was 
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 The laws for other cities have been gathered, but they have not been coded into the data. They are available from 
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18.9 mills. A homeowner who is over 62 years old with an assessed value of 100,000 dollars87 
would save approximately 1,890 dollars from the exemption. In contrast, Coweta County 
exempts homeowners who are 65 and older from 8,000 dollars of their assessed value for school 
purposes; with the 2013 millage rate of 18.59 they only save 148.72 dollars88. While tax 
jurisdictions often copy the state or each other, they adopt the jurisdictions at different points in 
time as well.  
4. Data and Methodology 
The basic methodology follows the empirical strategy outlined in Banzhaf and Lavery 
(2010) and also closely follows Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) and Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008). 
In particular, we will estimate the following difference-in-difference-in-differences model which 
identifies the effect of property tax exemptions for the elderly off of differences from pre- 
existing trends relative to control jurisdictions: 
Δ𝐷𝑗𝑡,𝑡−𝑇 = 𝛿𝐴𝐸𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑗𝑡−𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ( 35 ) 
 
where Δ𝐷𝑗𝑡,𝑡−1 is the change between t and 𝑡 – 𝑇 in dependent variable of interest
89, AE is the  
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 The home is valued at $250,000. In the absence of the full exemption and ignoring other exemptions the 
household may be eligible, the homeowner would pay the following:  
Ti,j = τj
MO (βjV − (δS,i,j
MO + δL,i,j
MO)) + τj
B (βjV − (δS,i,j
B + δL,i,j
B )) 
Ti,j = 0.0189(. 4 ∗ 250,000) = $1,890 
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 With the $8,000 exemption, a homeowner 65 and older would pay the following property tax for school purposes 
in Coweta County: 
Ti,j = τj
MO (βjV − (δS,i,j
MO + δL,i,j
MO)) + τj
B (βjV − (δS,i,j
B + δL,i,j
B )) 
Ti,j = 0.01859(. 4 ∗ 250,000 − 8,000) = $1,710.28 
Without the exemption and ignoring other exemptions the household could be eligible, the same household would 
pay the following in Coweta County: 
Ti,j = τj
MO (βjV − (δS,i,j
MO + δL,i,j
MO)) + τj
B (βjV − (δS,i,j
B + δL,i,j
B )) 
Ti,j = 0.01859(. 4 ∗ 250,000) = $1,859 
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 T is ten years for the data using the decennial Censuses (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000). Beginning in 2005, the 
Census Bureau discontinued the decennial long-form in favor of a yearly survey called the American Community 
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treatment variable, 𝛼𝑗 is a jurisdiction fixed effect, 𝛽𝑡 is a time trend, 𝑿𝑗𝑡−1 is a vector of lagged 
demographic and location controls, and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 is a normally distributed error. We will cluster the 
standard errors at the school district level to account for within school district correlation of the 
error and estimate each model with and without population weighting. 
 We will use at least two different dependent variables for the sorting results, and one 
dependent variable to estimate the effect on housing consumption by older households. The ideal 
variable to estimate the sorting effects is the change (and percentage change) in the number of 
home-owning households with heads 65 years old and older (older households). We are also 
interested in how the proportion of older households90 changes in levels and percentage terms in 
a jurisdiction as the results of an older-household exemption. While this ratio may seem 
redundant to using the number of older households, it could give us at least two additional 
insights. First, it will help us distinguish between a school district being relatively attractive to 
just older households from being attractive to all household types. Second, it could be possible 
that a school district is losing households, but older households are leaving at a slower rate than 
younger households because of a tax exemption. Changes in population levels would not capture 
this subtle effect, but the proportion of older households may.  
 We can also adjust the definitions of the dependent variables two different ways. The first 
adjustment we can make is to the demographic variable used in the dependent variable. Since 
owner-occupied houses are the target group of these local homestead exemptions, our ideal 
variable is owner-occupied households with heads 65 and older. As a robustness check, we will 
use the total population number of individuals 65 and over living in owner-occupied houses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Survey. The American Community Survey accounts for roughly 1% of the population. Therefore, we may need to 
use either a  3-year or 5-year release. I used T to reflect that the time period may not always be 1 years. 
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 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠 =
𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑠
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Finally, the total population 65 and older regardless of tenure will be used to look at the effect on 
the whole population. Second, we will want to test for the sensitivity of using different age 
cutoffs. Sixty-five seems to be the ideal cutoff because the majority of age-targeted exemptions 
begin at that age, but many jurisdictions also have exemptions beginning at 62 years old while 
other exemptions begin at 70 years old. We also need to be concerned about households moving 
to a jurisdiction prior to being eligible for a local homestead exemption in anticipation of 
eligibility which makes using younger age cutoffs important. We will explore these differences; 
unfortunately, the actual cutoffs we use will be limited by the demographic data available.  
 The second question that this paper addresses is essentially whether older households will 
consume more housing than younger households as a result of local age-related homestead 
exemptions. Therefore, the natural dependent variable to use is changes (and percentage 
changes) in a ratio of housing consumption by age, or a proxy for housing consumption for older 
households to younger households. Reported house values may be a logical proxy for housing 
consumption, but this could be misleading if the two household types report house value 
differently. Another proxy candidate is the number of rooms or the number of bedrooms in a 
house.  
 Note that we haven’t said much about the policy variable of interest; this is because the 
nature of local homestead exemptions complicates things. Recall that no two exemptions are 
exactly alike since Georgia allows its jurisdictions to create their own homestead exemptions 
with little oversight or stipulation. The intensity of the exemption can vary widely from a few 
thousand dollars off the assessed value to a complete property tax exemption, and the eligibility 
requirements for income differ significantly between school districts. In addition to the 
variability in the intensity of the actual exemption, the total amount of the exemption also 
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depends on the millage rate applied by that jurisdiction. A complete exemption is worth more in 
a jurisdiction with a high property tax rate opposed to a jurisdiction with a much lower property 
tax rate. In light of these issues, we will use three separate treatment variables. First, we will use 
a simple binary indicator that equals unity if the jurisdiction has a local homestead exemption for 
older households and 0 otherwise. Second, we will calculate an index for the typical millage rate 
paid by residents of a school district to estimate the typical savings amount for residents resulting 
from homestead exemptions, and the final treatment will use the actual millage rates for each 
jurisdiction from the Georgia tax digest to find typical savings from the relevant exemptions. We 
will have to restrict the analysis to 1990 to 2013 for the final treatment variable because of data 
constraints. 
 The unit of analysis will be at the school district level. Conveniently, a constitutional 
amendment was passed in Georgia in 1945 that effectively limited the number of school districts. 
It prohibited the creation of new municipal-controlled school districts except through the 
consolidations of county school districts and grand-fathered municipal districts or other county 
systems. Therefore, we do not have to worry about school districts splitting in the sample. 
Unfortunately, this did not prevent school district boundaries from expanding or contracting 
through annexation and consolidations, and we will need to account for these changes in the 
analysis.  
 Finally, we need to control for a how the population and districts changed economically 
and socially through time by adding controls. We will want to control for the characteristics of 
the population living in each district by controlling for the average education levels, race, 
employment, marriage outcomes, tenure decisions, home values, and average rent depending on 
the specification and dependent variable of interest. We will also want to control for 
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improvements in school quality, crime rates, pollution, and other location characteristics at the 
school district even though the school district fixed effect will control for any unobserved spatial 
amenities that are time invariant.  
 One major concern of estimating models of this kind is reverse causality. Our story is that 
the generous property tax exemptions attracted older households to the places that have them. In 
contrast, it is plausible that older households lobby the government for local homestead 
exemptions after moving to a certain community because of some other idiosyncratic reason. We 
may want to estimate to use lagged treatment effects to make sure that location decisions are 
happening after new local homestead exemptions. 
 We will use aggregate decennial Census for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 and 
data from American Community Survey for years starting in 2005 for our analysis. The National 
Historical Geographic Information System (Minnesota Population Center 2011) possess most, if 
not all the variables, that we desire from the Census Bureau. I am in the process of gathering the 
necessary data. 
5. Next Steps 
While much of the heavy lifting of creating the homestead exemption database has been 
completed, this project is still in its infancy. The next steps are to gather demographic and 
location data from the Census Bureau and the National Historical Geographic Information 
System. The most difficult part will be keeping the geographic units constant by accounting for 
boundary changes. The Census Bureau releases Geographic Change Notes for Georgia91 and the 
Boundary and Annexation Survey92 that will help with this task, but I’m afraid that we will need 
to manually reconcile the boundaries for the relevant years in ArcGIS. 
                                                          
91
 This can be found at https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/bndrychange/changenotedisplay.php.  
92
 The Boundary and Annexation Survey can be found at http://www.census.gov/geo/partnerships/bas.html.  
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In addition to tweaking our econometric model to fit the available data, we need to 
finalize the measurement of our treatment variables. Our data will span the years 1970, 1980, 
1990, 2000, and 2010, but the homestead exemptions change between these years as well. We 
will need to find the best way to represent such changes along with the intensity and 
heterogeneity of eligibility requirements (i.e. the type of income relevant to the exemption). 
Once our data, model, and treatment effects are finalized, we will be ready to begin the analysis. 
As with any project in the early stages, this work is preliminary and subject to change 
significantly in the next coming months as we delve deeper into the data and methodology. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 This work examines the heterogeneity between older and younger persons in the context 
of location choice and charitable giving. The first essay explores the heterogeneity in location 
preferences for older and younger households and uses these differences to simulate how the age 
distribution of the population across cities will change as the total number of older adults rises 
overall. The results suggest that MSAs on the west coast, particularly in California, and upstate 
New York will age more than other areas of the United States. MSAs in Florida have mostly 
modest gains in the number of older households, and their relative importance may diminish in 
the future. The highest net migration of older households were from MSAs in the western portion 
of the Northeast, smaller MSAs in the Carolinas, MSAs in Florida, smaller MSAs in Texas, 
MSAs in southern Arizona, and most MSAs in California. I see a number of areas for future 
research. The most obvious is to add to the literature exploring why older households choose 
different locations than the younger household by regressing the mean utility on local amenities. 
One amenity that I would be particularly interested in is air quality. Second, this study focuses on 
location choices between cities, but sorting within cities may be even more important. I can 
extend the current model to allow for some within city estimation.  
The second essay examines how the motivations for giving vary for different ages. While 
my results show that individuals of all ages respond the same if the benefits to others are 
emphasized, I find limited treatment heterogeneity by age group when benefits to self are 
highlighted. The results indicate that individuals between the ages of 50 and 64 years old 
increase average donations more than any other age cohort in response to the “Warm Your 
Heart” message, but the result isn’t robust to all specifications. Further, the heterogeneity that I 
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do find comes through the intensive margin exclusively. The results from back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest that charities in Alaska would have raised significantly more money had 
they reminded more people about how good it feels to donate to a good cause. One major 
weakness of the analysis in this essay is the inability to distinguish between age and generation 
effect, and I see a bright future for this question. 
The final essay is joint work with H. Spencer Banzhaf and Carlianne Patrick and is still in 
the development phase. Local homestead exemptions in Georgia vary by generosity and 
eligibility, and many are targeted to older households. We will explore the impact of these 
exemptions, particularly exemptions targeting older households, on the demographic makeup of 
each jurisdiction. We would expect these subsidies to attract seniors to such jurisdictions (or 
prevent them from leaving), relative to control jurisdictions. Second, we will consider the impact 
of these laws on the levels of housing capital by testing whether the equilibrium ratio of housing 
consumption for seniors to younger households is higher in jurisdictions with such exemptions 
compared to control districts. We will test for such demographic "sorting” and heterogeneous 
housing consumption by age with a difference-in-difference-in-differences model. As part of this 
project, we created a historical database of local homestead exemptions in Georgia that cover 
from 1913 to 2013 and contains all school districts and counties along with the state’s largest 
municipalities. To our knowledge, this is the first of its kind, and we hope it opens the door to 
additional research in addition to the questions we propose here. 
Overall, this work illustrates that the heterogeneity between the older and younger 
persons is significant in many instances, and these heterogeneities should play an important role 
in policy-making. Understanding of different household types respond to policy is important for 
policymakers to avoid many of the unintended consequences that economists discuss.  
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Appendix A 
Full Results for MSAs in Chapter I 
 
Table 26. List of MSAs used in the analysis of Chapter 1 
Code MSA Name Region Division 
40 Abilene, TX South WSC 
120 Albany, GA South SATL 
160 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY Northeast MATL 
200 Albuquerque, NM West MNT 
220 Alexandria, LA South WSC 
240 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA Northeast MATL 
280 Altoona, PA Northeast MATL 
320 Amarillo, TX South WSC 
380 Anchorage, AK West PAC 
450 Anniston, AL South ESC 
460 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI Midwest ENC 
480 Asheville, NC South SATL 
500 Athens, GA South SATL 
520 Atlanta, GA South SATL 
580 Auburn-Opelika, AL South ESC 
600 Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC South SATL 
640 Austin-San Marcos, TX South WSC 
680 Bakersfield, CA West PAC 
740 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA Northeast NE 
760 Baton Rouge, LA South WSC 
840 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX South WSC 
860 Bellingham, WA West PAC 
870 Benton Harbor, MI Midwest ENC 
880 Billings, MT West MNT 
920 Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS South ESC 
960 Binghamton, NY Northeast MATL 
1000 Birmingham, AL South ESC 
1020 Bloomington, IN Midwest ENC 
1040 Bloomington-Normal, IL Midwest ENC 
1080 Boise City, ID West MNT 
1122 Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) Northeast NE 
1240 Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX South WSC 
1260 Bryan-College Station, TX South WSC 
1280 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Northeast MATL 
1320 Canton-Massillon, OH Midwest ENC 
1360 Cedar Rapids, IA Midwest WNC 
1400 Champaign-Urbana, IL Midwest ENC 
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Code MSA Name Region Division 
1440 Charleston-North Charleston, SC South SATL 
1520 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC South SATL 
1540 Charlottesville, VA South SATL 
1560 Chattanooga, TN-GA South SATL 
1602 Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) Midwest ENC 
1620 Chico-Paradise, CA West PAC 
1642 Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) Midwest ENC 
1660 Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY South ESC 
1692 Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) Midwest ENC 
1720 Colorado Springs, CO West MNT 
1740 Columbia, MO Midwest WNC 
1760 Columbia, SC South SATL 
1800 Columbus, GA-AL South ESC 
1840 Columbus, OH Midwest ENC 
1880 Corpus Christi, TX South WSC 
1922 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) South WSC 
1950 Danville, VA South SATL 
1960 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL Midwest ENC 
2000 Dayton-Springfield, OH Midwest ENC 
2020 Daytona Beach, FL South SATL 
2030 Decatur, AL South ESC 
2040 Decatur, IL Midwest ENC 
2082 Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) West MNT 
2120 Des Moines, IA Midwest WNC 
2162 Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) Midwest ENC 
2180 Dothan, AL South ESC 
2190 Dover, DE South SATL 
2240 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI Midwest WNC 
2290 Eau Claire, WI Midwest ENC 
2320 El Paso, TX South WSC 
2330 Elkhart-Goshen, IN Midwest ENC 
2360 Erie, PA Northeast MATL 
2400 Eugene-Springfield, OR West PAC 
2440 Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY Midwest ENC 
2520 Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN Midwest WNC 
2560 Fayetteville, NC South SATL 
2580 Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR South WSC 
2620 Flagstaff, AZ-UT West MNT 
2650 Florence, AL South ESC 
2670 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO West MNT 
2700 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL South SATL 
2710 Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL South SATL 
2720 Fort Smith, AR-OK South WSC 
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Code MSA Name Region Division 
2750 Fort Walton Beach, FL South SATL 
2760 Fort Wayne, IN Midwest ENC 
2840 Fresno, CA West PAC 
2880 Gadsden, AL South ESC 
2900 Gainesville, FL South SATL 
2975 Glens Falls, NY Northeast MATL 
2980 Goldsboro, NC South SATL 
2995 Grand Junction, CO West MNT 
3000 Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI Midwest ENC 
3080 Green Bay, WI Midwest ENC 
3120 Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC South SATL 
3150 Greenville, NC South SATL 
3160 Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC South SATL 
3240 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA Northeast MATL 
3280 Hartford, CT Northeast NE 
3285 Hattiesburg, MS South ESC 
3290 Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC South SATL 
3320 Honolulu, HI West PAC 
3350 Houma, LA South WSC 
3362 Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) South WSC 
3440 Huntsville, AL South ESC 
3480 Indianapolis, IN Midwest ENC 
3500 Iowa City, IA Midwest WNC 
3520 Jackson, MI Midwest ENC 
3560 Jackson, MS South ESC 
3580 Jackson, TN South ESC 
3600 Jacksonville, FL South SATL 
3605 Jacksonville, NC South SATL 
3610 Jamestown, NY Northeast MATL 
3620 Janesville-Beloit, WI Midwest ENC 
3660 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA South ESC 
3680 Johnstown, PA Northeast MATL 
3710 Joplin, MO Midwest WNC 
3720 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI Midwest ENC 
3760 Kansas City, MO-KS Midwest WNC 
3810 Killeen-Temple, TX South WSC 
3840 Knoxville, TN South ESC 
3850 Kokomo, IN Midwest ENC 
3870 La Crosse, WI-MN Midwest WNC 
3880 Lafayette, LA South WSC 
3920 Lafayette, IN Midwest ENC 
3960 Lake Charles, LA South WSC 
3980 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL South SATL 
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Code MSA Name Region Division 
4000 Lancaster, PA Northeast MATL 
4040 Lansing-East Lansing, MI Midwest ENC 
4080 Laredo, TX South WSC 
4100 Las Cruces, NM West MNT 
4120 Las Vegas, NV-AZ West MNT 
4280 Lexington, KY South ESC 
4320 Lima, OH Midwest ENC 
4360 Lincoln, NE Midwest WNC 
4400 Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR South WSC 
4420 Longview-Marshall, TX South WSC 
4472 Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) West PAC 
4520 Louisville, KY-IN Midwest ENC 
4600 Lubbock, TX South WSC 
4640 Lynchburg, VA South SATL 
4680 Macon, GA South SATL 
4720 Madison, WI Midwest ENC 
4800 Mansfield, OH Midwest ENC 
4880 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX South WSC 
4890 Medford-Ashland, OR West PAC 
4900 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL South SATL 
4920 Memphis, TN-AR-MS South WSC 
4940 Merced, CA West PAC 
4992 Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) South SATL 
5082 Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) Midwest ENC 
5120 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI Midwest WNC 
5160 Mobile, AL South ESC 
5170 Modesto, CA West PAC 
5200 Monroe, LA South WSC 
5240 Montgomery, AL South ESC 
5280 Muncie, IN Midwest ENC 
5330 Myrtle Beach, SC South SATL 
5345 Naples, FL South SATL 
5360 Nashville, TN South ESC 
5560 New Orleans, LA South WSC 
5602 New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) Northeast NE 
5720 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- South SATL 
5790 Ocala, FL South SATL 
5800 Odessa-Midland, TX South WSC 
5880 Oklahoma City, OK South WSC 
5920 Omaha, NE-IA Midwest WNC 
5960 Orlando, FL South SATL 
6015 Panama City, FL South SATL 
6080 Pensacola, FL South SATL 
118 
 
Code MSA Name Region Division 
6120 Peoria-Pekin, IL Midwest ENC 
6162 Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) South SATL 
6200 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ West MNT 
6280 Pittsburgh, PA Northeast MATL 
6400 Portland, ME Northeast NE 
6442 Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) West PAC 
6480 Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA Northeast NE 
6520 Provo-Orem, UT West MNT 
6560 Pueblo, CO West MNT 
6580 Punta Gorda, FL South SATL 
6640 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC South SATL 
6680 Reading, PA Northeast MATL 
6690 Redding, CA West PAC 
6720 Reno, NV West MNT 
6740 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA West PAC 
6760 Richmond-Petersburg, VA South SATL 
6800 Roanoke, VA South SATL 
6820 Rochester, MN Midwest WNC 
6840 Rochester, NY Northeast MATL 
6880 Rockford, IL Midwest ENC 
6895 Rocky Mount, NC South SATL 
6922 Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) West PAC 
6960 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI Midwest ENC 
6980 St. Cloud, MN Midwest WNC 
7000 St. Joseph, MO Midwest WNC 
7040 St. Louis, MO-IL Midwest ENC 
7120 Salinas, CA West PAC 
7160 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT West MNT 
7240 San Antonio, TX South WSC 
7320 San Diego, CA West PAC 
7362 San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) West PAC 
7460 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA West PAC 
7480 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA West PAC 
7490 Santa Fe, NM West MNT 
7510 Sarasota-Bradenton, FL South SATL 
7520 Savannah, GA South SATL 
7560 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA Northeast MATL 
7602 Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) West PAC 
7610 Sharon, PA Northeast MATL 
7620 Sheboygan, WI Midwest ENC 
7680 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA South WSC 
7720 Sioux City, IA-NE Midwest WNC 
7760 Sioux Falls, SD Midwest WNC 
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Code MSA Name Region Division 
7800 South Bend, IN Midwest ENC 
7840 Spokane, WA West PAC 
7880 Springfield, IL Midwest ENC 
7920 Springfield, MO Midwest WNC 
8000 Springfield, MA Northeast NE 
8050 State College, PA Northeast MATL 
8120 Stockton-Lodi, CA West PAC 
8140 Sumter, SC South SATL 
8160 Syracuse, NY Northeast MATL 
8240 Tallahassee, FL South SATL 
8280 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL South SATL 
8320 Terre Haute, IN Midwest ENC 
8400 Toledo, OH Midwest ENC 
8440 Topeka, KS Midwest WNC 
8520 Tucson, AZ West MNT 
8560 Tulsa, OK South WSC 
8600 Tuscaloosa, AL South ESC 
8640 Tyler, TX South WSC 
8680 Utica-Rome, NY Northeast MATL 
8780 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA West PAC 
8800 Waco, TX South WSC 
8872 Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) South SATL 
8920 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA Midwest WNC 
8940 Wausau, WI Midwest ENC 
8960 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL South SATL 
9040 Wichita, KS Midwest WNC 
9080 Wichita Falls, TX South WSC 
9140 Williamsport, PA Northeast MATL 
9200 Wilmington, NC South SATL 
9260 Yakima, WA West PAC 
9280 York, PA Northeast MATL 
9320 Youngstown-Warren, OH Midwest ENC 
9340 Yuba City, CA West PAC 
9360 Yuma, AZ West MNT 
Abbreviations: East North Central (ENC); East South Central (ESC); Middle Atlantic (MATL); Mountain (MNT); 
New England (NE); Pacific (PAC); South Atlantic (SATL); West North Central (WNC); West South Central (WSC) 
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Table 27. MSAs rankings by mean utility for the young and old and the difference in rank 
MSA 
MU for 
Older 
Rank 
for 
Older 
MU for 
Younger 
Rank 
for 
Young 
Rank 
Diff. 
Abilene, TX -0.2251 151 0.1563 167 -16 
Albany, GA -1.2765 230 -0.2230 206 24 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.1627 103 0.8783 96 7 
Albuquerque, NM 1.1887 37 1.8828 37 0 
Alexandria, LA -0.9869 220 -0.2339 208 12 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA -0.0425 130 0.4257 136 -6 
Altoona, PA -1.4893 238 -0.8945 241 -3 
Amarillo, TX -0.0941 136 0.4911 129 7 
Anchorage, AK -0.9018 213 -0.1887 203 10 
Anniston, AL -0.7963 201 -0.0558 192 9 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.1957 101 0.6324 118 -17 
Asheville, NC 0.1341 109 1.0442 82 27 
Athens, GA -0.3401 158 0.4413 134 24 
Atlanta, GA 2.0556 15 2.9763 5 10 
Auburn-Opelika, AL -1.0948 226 0.2382 156 70 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 0.4247 78 1.1610 74 4 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 0.7006 63 1.7068 41 22 
Bakersfield, CA 0.3892 83 0.7016 109 -26 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA -0.4345 168 -0.5858 233 -65 
Baton Rouge, LA 0.4859 76 1.0424 83 -7 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.3486 89 0.6828 112 -23 
Bellingham, WA -0.2344 152 0.2247 158 -6 
Benton Harbor, MI -0.7269 197 -0.3725 222 -25 
Billings, MT -0.2054 148 0.0232 186 -38 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS -0.3696 162 0.6646 115 47 
Binghamton, NY -0.6805 194 -0.0998 198 -4 
Birmingham, AL 0.7125 61 1.4865 53 8 
Bloomington, IN -1.1079 227 -0.2113 204 23 
Bloomington-Normal, IL -0.9010 212 -0.3949 224 -12 
Boise City, ID 0.9838 44 1.5721 50 -6 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 2.3892 9 2.7141 13 -4 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX -0.2613 154 0.4177 137 17 
Bryan-College Station, TX -1.5000 239 -0.4138 225 14 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.5008 74 1.1198 77 -3 
Canton-Massillon, OH 0.1523 106 0.7421 108 -2 
Cedar Rapids, IA -0.6073 187 -0.0051 190 -3 
Champaign-Urbana, IL -1.3435 233 -0.3672 219 14 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 0.1464 107 1.0809 80 27 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 1.4959 28 2.3812 19 9 
Charlottesville, VA -0.5315 180 0.2368 157 23 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 0.4860 75 1.1595 75 0 
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MSA 
MU for 
Older 
Rank 
for 
Older 
MU for 
Younger 
Rank 
for 
Young 
Rank 
Diff. 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 2.1789 11 2.8456 9 2 
Chico-Paradise, CA 0.2193 99 0.1725 165 -66 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 1.3634 33 2.0082 33 0 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY -1.0807 225 0.2079 161 64 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 1.8454 18 2.4252 17 1 
Colorado Springs, CO 0.8392 55 1.6829 44 11 
Columbia, MO -1.3871 235 -0.1258 200 35 
Columbia, SC 0.6458 66 1.4507 54 12 
Columbus, GA-AL -0.5161 178 0.5078 126 52 
Columbus, OH 0.8320 58 1.6922 42 16 
Corpus Christi, TX -0.5075 174 -0.0872 195 -21 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 2.2531 10 2.9328 7 3 
Danville, VA 0.2732 95 0.6287 120 -25 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL -0.4993 173 -0.1309 201 -28 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.8848 51 1.5893 48 3 
Daytona Beach, FL 0.8523 54 1.2058 72 -18 
Decatur, AL -0.5735 183 0.2578 155 28 
Decatur, IL -0.8394 206 -0.3580 218 -12 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 2.1649 13 2.6479 14 -1 
Des Moines, IA -0.3611 161 0.4429 133 28 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 2.0977 14 2.8067 11 3 
Dothan, AL 0.3900 81 1.1503 76 5 
Dover, DE -0.9102 214 -0.0878 196 18 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 0.0051 126 0.4005 139 -13 
Eau Claire, WI -0.6376 190 0.0467 179 11 
El Paso, TX -0.0653 132 0.9832 87 45 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN -0.3535 160 0.1418 169 -9 
Erie, PA -0.4499 169 0.2946 151 18 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 0.9008 50 1.3840 59 -9 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY -0.4926 172 0.1203 173 -1 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN -1.5425 240 -0.5721 232 8 
Fayetteville, NC -0.8198 203 0.3613 143 60 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 0.1536 105 0.7649 105 0 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT -0.6081 188 0.1864 163 25 
Florence, AL -0.1775 144 0.6642 116 28 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.2985 92 0.7831 104 -12 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 1.1971 36 1.2888 65 -29 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 0.2021 100 0.4283 135 -35 
Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.7774 199 0.0564 177 22 
Fort Walton Beach, FL -0.6233 189 0.0645 176 13 
Fort Wayne, IN 0.5403 72 1.2452 69 3 
Fresno, CA 0.8357 56 1.1098 78 -22 
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MSA 
MU for 
Older 
Rank 
for 
Older 
MU for 
Younger 
Rank 
for 
Young 
Rank 
Diff. 
Gadsden, AL -0.7895 200 -0.2187 205 -5 
Gainesville, FL 0.0139 124 0.8896 93 31 
Glens Falls, NY -1.2832 232 -0.8992 242 -10 
Goldsboro, NC -0.4768 171 0.1977 162 9 
Grand Junction, CO -0.1683 142 -0.0588 193 -51 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 0.5744 70 1.4212 55 15 
Green Bay, WI -1.0493 223 -0.4470 227 -4 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 1.5988 25 2.3842 18 7 
Greenville, NC -0.7049 196 0.1802 164 32 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 1.1061 43 1.8046 39 4 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 0.0518 119 0.7452 107 12 
Hartford, CT 0.2751 94 0.6919 110 -16 
Hattiesburg, MS -0.9961 221 0.0091 187 34 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 0.2493 97 0.8911 92 5 
Honolulu, HI 0.3975 80 0.9706 88 -8 
Houma, LA -1.4323 237 -0.7506 239 -2 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 1.9186 17 2.5904 15 2 
Huntsville, AL 0.0175 123 0.8406 99 24 
Indianapolis, IN 1.1715 40 1.9597 35 5 
Iowa City, IA -1.5691 241 -0.5103 229 12 
Jackson, MI -1.1527 228 -0.3190 214 14 
Jackson, MS 0.2656 96 1.2247 71 25 
Jackson, TN -1.0737 224 -0.2359 209 15 
Jacksonville, FL 1.2413 35 2.0354 30 5 
Jacksonville, NC -1.3720 234 -0.0792 194 40 
Jamestown, NY -0.6572 192 -0.3705 221 -29 
Janesville-Beloit, WI -0.8780 209 -0.3685 220 -11 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 0.5492 71 1.2500 68 3 
Johnstown, PA 0.0572 116 0.6855 111 5 
Joplin, MO -0.1275 140 0.5931 122 18 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 0.1809 102 0.9630 89 13 
Kansas City, MO-KS 1.4497 31 2.2098 25 6 
Killeen-Temple, TX -0.3430 159 0.4936 128 31 
Knoxville, TN 0.8355 57 1.6424 47 10 
Kokomo, IN -1.1537 229 -0.3560 217 12 
La Crosse, WI-MN -0.9643 218 -0.3828 223 -5 
Lafayette, LA -0.0838 134 0.5949 121 13 
Lafayette, IN -0.5567 182 0.0363 184 -2 
Lake Charles, LA -0.1980 147 0.3831 141 6 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 0.9725 46 1.2359 70 -24 
Lancaster, PA -0.4641 170 0.1531 168 2 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI -0.0425 129 0.8535 97 32 
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for 
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Rank 
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Laredo, TX -1.8584 243 -0.6011 234 9 
Las Cruces, NM -0.1011 139 0.5495 123 16 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 1.8248 19 2.2226 24 -5 
Lexington, KY -0.1860 145 0.6699 114 31 
Lima, OH -0.6870 195 -0.2526 210 -15 
Lincoln, NE -0.5157 177 0.4635 131 46 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 0.7441 59 1.5834 49 10 
Longview-Marshall, TX -0.3953 165 0.0413 182 -17 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 3.3210 1 3.4039 2 -1 
Louisville, KY-IN 0.9092 49 1.6593 45 4 
Lubbock, TX -0.2509 153 0.5044 127 26 
Lynchburg, VA 0.0407 120 0.4837 130 -10 
Macon, GA -0.1647 141 0.7896 103 38 
Madison, WI -0.6452 191 0.3591 144 47 
Mansfield, OH -0.8060 202 -0.3381 216 -14 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.2751 93 0.8991 91 2 
Medford-Ashland, OR 0.0564 117 0.2920 152 -35 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 1.1075 42 1.3493 61 -19 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 0.6770 64 1.5486 51 13 
Merced, CA -0.3895 164 -0.0886 197 -33 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 1.7287 22 2.1745 28 -6 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 0.9129 48 1.5015 52 -4 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 1.4954 29 2.1961 26 3 
Mobile, AL 0.6389 68 1.3736 60 8 
Modesto, CA 0.3143 90 0.3378 147 -57 
Monroe, LA -0.5884 184 0.2644 153 31 
Montgomery, AL -0.0882 135 0.8186 100 35 
Muncie, IN -0.7472 198 -0.1083 199 -1 
Myrtle Beach, SC 0.3110 91 0.7951 102 -11 
Naples, FL 0.0356 121 -0.0384 191 -70 
Nashville, TN 1.2696 34 2.2795 21 13 
New Orleans, LA 0.9796 45 1.7406 40 5 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 
(C) 3.3159 2 3.7355 1 1 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 1.1809 39 2.0340 31 8 
Ocala, FL 0.7067 62 0.6316 119 -57 
Odessa-Midland, TX -0.6023 186 -0.2267 207 -21 
Oklahoma City, OK 0.8804 52 1.6881 43 9 
Omaha, NE-IA 0.1055 113 1.0264 85 28 
Orlando, FL 1.7767 21 2.3635 20 1 
Panama City, FL -0.3712 163 0.2628 154 9 
Pensacola, FL 0.7313 60 1.3089 64 -4 
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Older 
Rank 
for 
Older 
MU for 
Younger 
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for 
Young 
Rank 
Diff. 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 0.1551 104 0.7617 106 -2 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 2.5739 4 3.0481 4 0 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 2.8797 3 3.1460 3 0 
Pittsburgh, PA 1.4663 30 1.9276 36 -6 
Portland, ME -0.5306 179 0.1218 172 7 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 2.4557 7 2.9484 6 1 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 0.8595 53 1.3282 63 -10 
Provo-Orem, UT 0.1249 112 0.9534 90 22 
Pueblo, CO 0.1272 110 0.3521 145 -35 
Punta Gorda, FL 0.3706 86 0.3156 150 -64 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 1.1689 41 2.1950 27 14 
Reading, PA -0.5077 175 -0.0015 189 -14 
Redding, CA 0.0822 115 0.1278 171 -56 
Reno, NV 0.3895 82 1.1020 79 3 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA -0.5149 176 -0.1413 202 -26 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 0.6321 69 1.3349 62 7 
Roanoke, VA -0.0944 137 0.3258 149 -12 
Rochester, MN -1.4046 236 -0.5591 231 5 
Rochester, NY 0.4740 77 1.0308 84 -7 
Rockford, IL 0.0539 118 0.5258 125 -7 
Rocky Mount, NC -0.3207 156 0.0923 175 -19 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 1.6724 23 1.8220 38 -15 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI -0.0555 131 0.6443 117 14 
St. Cloud, MN -0.3378 157 0.3323 148 9 
St. Joseph, MO -0.9435 217 -0.5194 230 -13 
St. Louis, MO-IL 1.5819 26 2.2756 22 4 
Salinas, CA -0.8349 205 -0.6940 237 -32 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 1.4244 32 2.1661 29 3 
San Antonio, TX 1.1837 38 1.9631 34 4 
San Diego, CA 1.7829 20 2.0189 32 -12 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 2.4902 6 2.4496 16 -10 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 0.1432 108 0.0498 178 -70 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 0.1268 111 0.0979 174 -63 
Santa Fe, NM -0.0114 128 0.3446 146 -18 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 1.5434 27 1.3997 58 -31 
Savannah, GA -0.4332 167 0.6719 113 54 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 0.3744 84 0.8886 94 -10 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 2.4491 8 2.9166 8 0 
Sharon, PA -0.8783 210 -0.4307 226 -16 
Sheboygan, WI -0.9395 216 -0.8089 240 -24 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 0.2326 98 0.8501 98 0 
Sioux City, IA-NE -0.5923 185 0.0400 183 2 
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Sioux Falls, SD -1.0244 222 -0.6987 238 -16 
South Bend, IN -0.0686 133 0.3997 140 -7 
Spokane, WA 0.9497 47 1.4102 57 -10 
Springfield, IL -1.2821 231 -0.4765 228 3 
Springfield, MO 0.3636 88 0.9987 86 2 
Springfield, MA 0.3701 87 0.8151 101 -14 
State College, PA -1.6461 242 -0.9229 243 -1 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.0889 114 0.2158 159 -45 
Sumter, SC -0.9767 219 -0.2609 211 8 
Syracuse, NY 0.4054 79 1.0472 81 -2 
Tallahassee, FL -0.1922 146 0.8846 95 51 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2.5342 5 2.8180 10 -5 
Terre Haute, IN -0.8453 207 -0.3352 215 -8 
Toledo, OH 0.3719 85 1.2635 66 19 
Topeka, KS -0.6763 193 0.2098 160 33 
Tucson, AZ 1.9644 16 2.2434 23 -7 
Tulsa, OK 0.6431 67 1.4185 56 11 
Tuscaloosa, AL -0.4287 166 0.4581 132 34 
Tyler, TX -0.2072 150 0.1721 166 -16 
Utica-Rome, NY -0.3090 155 0.0359 185 -30 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA -0.0997 138 0.4040 138 0 
Waco, TX 0.0083 125 0.3756 142 -17 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 2.1771 12 2.7502 12 0 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -0.9148 215 0.0442 181 34 
Wausau, WI -0.1747 143 0.1415 170 -27 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 1.6053 24 1.6563 46 -22 
Wichita, KS 0.5212 73 1.1891 73 0 
Wichita Falls, TX -0.8826 211 -0.6048 235 -24 
Williamsport, PA -0.8274 204 -0.2729 212 -8 
Wilmington, NC 0.0309 122 0.5273 124 -2 
Yakima, WA -0.2057 149 -0.2822 213 -64 
York, PA -0.5529 181 0.0454 180 1 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 0.6762 65 1.2629 67 -2 
Yuba City, CA -0.8748 208 -0.6848 236 -28 
Yuma, AZ 0.0000 127 0.0000 188 -61 
Note: This table reports the mean utility for each MSA by age cohort estimated with the residential sorting model. It 
also reports the difference in rank between the two age cohorts by subtracting the rank by the younger from the rank 
of the older. A negative value means that older households preferred the MSA more relative to younger households 
while younger households prefer MSAs with a positive value.  
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Table 28. Number of younger, older, and all ages in 2010 
MSA 
Younger 
HH in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Total HH 
in 2010 
Abilene, TX 27,511 10,890 38,401 
Albany, GA 31,301 9,375 40,676 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 221,233 68,063 289,296 
Albuquerque, NM 215,035 61,161 276,196 
Alexandria, LA 30,685 12,006 42,691 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 166,776 62,296 229,072 
Altoona, PA 35,174 13,760 48,934 
Amarillo, TX 58,731 15,948 74,679 
Anchorage, AK 74,947 10,501 85,448 
Anniston, AL 30,420 11,039 41,459 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 107,223 31,808 139,031 
Asheville, NC 72,443 24,971 97,414 
Athens, GA 35,578 9,865 45,443 
Atlanta, GA 1,153,963 234,606 1,388,569 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 31,922 8,367 40,289 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 126,389 36,718 163,107 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 376,479 71,157 447,636 
Bakersfield, CA 131,089 38,159 169,248 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 32,369 19,927 52,296 
Baton Rouge, LA 177,720 45,105 222,825 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 88,535 32,720 121,255 
Bellingham, WA 48,151 14,299 62,450 
Benton Harbor, MI 38,894 15,973 54,867 
Billings, MT 40,968 14,276 55,244 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 82,173 23,694 105,867 
Binghamton, NY 64,782 23,960 88,742 
Birmingham, AL 228,347 66,685 295,032 
Bloomington, IN 32,094 8,857 40,951 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 42,182 10,105 52,287 
Boise City, ID 142,965 35,883 178,848 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 1,182,840 374,892 1,557,732 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 53,571 17,274 70,845 
Bryan-College Station, TX 35,183 7,355 42,538 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 299,597 105,730 405,327 
Canton-Massillon, OH 108,439 40,218 148,657 
Cedar Rapids, IA 58,813 17,971 76,784 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 46,327 12,696 59,023 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 130,223 38,697 168,920 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 499,104 120,906 620,010 
Charlottesville, VA 44,321 13,928 58,249 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 118,814 44,139 162,953 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 1,991,169 556,853 2,548,022 
Chico-Paradise, CA 49,456 20,128 69,584 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 505,095 141,044 646,139 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 42,011 7,720 49,731 
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MSA 
Younger 
HH in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Total HH 
in 2010 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 770,923 253,899 1,024,822 
Colorado Springs, CO 155,950 34,662 190,612 
Columbia, MO 38,731 9,880 48,611 
Columbia, SC 166,329 41,785 208,114 
Columbus, GA-AL 45,585 13,578 59,163 
Columbus, OH 436,104 105,437 541,541 
Corpus Christi, TX 59,465 18,594 78,059 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 1,331,631 296,884 1,628,515 
Danville, VA 27,999 13,349 41,348 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 67,931 23,292 91,223 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 253,181 90,841 344,022 
Daytona Beach, FL 107,605 56,889 164,494 
Decatur, AL 38,917 14,989 53,906 
Decatur, IL 30,015 11,908 41,923 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 651,406 164,121 815,527 
Des Moines, IA 113,268 27,560 140,828 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 1,265,807 384,361 1,650,168 
Dothan, AL 40,041 13,601 53,642 
Dover, DE 36,527 11,932 48,459 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 56,924 20,068 76,992 
Eau Claire, WI 43,541 14,083 57,624 
El Paso, TX 107,274 27,225 134,499 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 44,651 13,899 58,550 
Erie, PA 72,009 24,791 96,800 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 90,136 30,426 120,562 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 75,323 23,276 98,599 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 40,295 9,531 49,826 
Fayetteville, NC 72,658 18,547 91,205 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 94,449 27,482 121,931 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 28,637 6,493 35,130 
Florence, AL 39,800 16,226 56,026 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 64,651 18,691 83,342 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 115,332 72,324 187,656 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 83,863 50,053 133,916 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 45,930 15,223 61,153 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 44,640 14,536 59,176 
Fort Wayne, IN 128,806 37,712 166,518 
Fresno, CA 169,178 52,303 221,481 
Gadsden, AL 26,604 10,735 37,339 
Gainesville, FL 51,760 15,350 67,110 
Glens Falls, NY 35,755 12,428 48,183 
Goldsboro, NC 31,315 10,145 41,460 
Grand Junction, CO 31,853 12,146 43,999 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 259,747 71,987 331,734 
Green Bay, WI 69,689 17,565 87,254 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 368,460 116,963 485,423 
Greenville, NC 40,506 11,351 51,857 
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Younger 
HH in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Total HH 
in 2010 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 232,870 76,665 309,535 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 179,026 63,207 242,233 
Hartford, CT 151,427 54,456 205,883 
Hattiesburg, MS 33,946 8,244 42,190 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 93,382 32,796 126,178 
Honolulu, HI 156,090 61,806 217,896 
Houma, LA 24,465 8,723 33,188 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 1,106,434 250,330 1,356,764 
Huntsville, AL 107,742 31,946 139,688 
Indianapolis, IN 484,697 128,746 613,443 
Iowa City, IA 30,314 7,042 37,356 
Jackson, MI 40,704 14,389 55,093 
Jackson, MS 127,773 33,876 161,649 
Jackson, TN 27,317 8,554 35,871 
Jacksonville, FL 323,765 87,723 411,488 
Jacksonville, NC 34,223 7,624 41,847 
Jamestown, NY 35,877 13,522 49,399 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 42,460 13,755 56,215 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 92,500 35,391 127,891 
Johnstown, PA 57,750 26,545 84,295 
Joplin, MO 45,094 14,276 59,370 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 119,413 37,684 157,097 
Kansas City, MO-KS 491,340 138,380 629,720 
Killeen-Temple, TX 72,801 16,357 89,158 
Knoxville, TN 179,928 56,436 236,364 
Kokomo, IN 26,787 10,519 37,306 
La Crosse, WI-MN 29,106 9,372 38,478 
Lafayette, LA 75,506 17,740 93,246 
Lafayette, IN 42,823 13,254 56,077 
Lake Charles, LA 50,609 15,356 65,965 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 117,912 57,600 175,512 
Lancaster, PA 124,665 42,726 167,391 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 121,380 31,672 153,052 
Laredo, TX 27,067 5,785 32,852 
Las Cruces, NM 36,196 12,098 48,294 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 372,884 107,173 480,057 
Lexington, KY 75,458 19,142 94,600 
Lima, OH 40,264 14,544 54,808 
Lincoln, NE 71,943 18,972 90,915 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 178,810 48,242 227,052 
Longview-Marshall, TX 41,580 16,624 58,204 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 2,533,034 780,789 3,313,823 
Louisville, KY-IN 274,576 80,220 354,796 
Lubbock, TX 64,469 19,069 83,538 
Lynchburg, VA 59,927 23,368 83,295 
Macon, GA 89,528 24,873 114,401 
Madison, WI 134,198 30,136 164,334 
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Mansfield, OH 31,652 12,208 43,860 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 86,434 25,364 111,798 
Medford-Ashland, OR 50,384 21,534 71,918 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 126,764 59,727 186,491 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 274,426 67,981 342,407 
Merced, CA 34,722 10,194 44,916 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 447,056 150,522 597,578 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 458,508 138,587 597,095 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 821,474 201,951 1,023,425 
Mobile, AL 149,544 50,266 199,810 
Modesto, CA 89,341 25,172 114,513 
Monroe, LA 40,463 11,925 52,388 
Montgomery, AL 92,868 28,838 121,706 
Muncie, IN 28,729 11,477 40,206 
Myrtle Beach, SC 68,022 27,745 95,767 
Naples, FL 47,414 42,647 90,061 
Nashville, TN 387,731 96,611 484,342 
New Orleans, LA 276,001 77,683 353,684 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 3,698,630 1,203,082 4,901,712 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 396,964 111,598 508,562 
Ocala, FL 66,463 47,193 113,656 
Odessa-Midland, TX 58,825 16,100 74,925 
Oklahoma City, OK 212,520 69,597 282,117 
Omaha, NE-IA 170,409 43,603 214,012 
Orlando, FL 395,423 118,943 514,366 
Panama City, FL 40,239 14,705 54,944 
Pensacola, FL 104,408 38,253 142,661 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 98,686 31,715 130,401 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 1,493,510 487,202 1,980,712 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 804,391 249,248 1,053,639 
Pittsburgh, PA 598,518 239,250 837,768 
Portland, ME 72,854 19,230 92,084 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 620,951 166,909 787,860 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 228,218 76,027 304,245 
Provo-Orem, UT 89,223 19,765 108,988 
Pueblo, CO 33,026 14,865 47,891 
Punta Gorda, FL 31,152 29,196 60,348 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 394,608 90,714 485,322 
Reading, PA 95,030 35,055 130,085 
Redding, CA 42,596 18,436 61,032 
Reno, NV 96,660 28,114 124,774 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 51,409 15,053 66,462 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 287,877 82,041 369,918 
Roanoke, VA 68,074 24,661 92,735 
Rochester, MN 36,889 10,851 47,740 
Rochester, NY 267,769 83,423 351,192 
Rockford, IL 85,526 27,871 113,397 
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in 2010 
Total HH 
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Rocky Mount, NC 40,604 14,344 54,948 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 454,462 133,906 588,368 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 101,957 38,817 140,774 
St. Cloud, MN 49,192 13,250 62,442 
St. Joseph, MO 27,010 9,764 36,774 
St. Louis, MO-IL 739,681 224,459 964,140 
Salinas, CA 34,021 13,517 47,538 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 331,437 80,782 412,219 
San Antonio, TX 411,414 114,639 526,053 
San Diego, CA 545,336 153,509 698,845 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 1,286,527 397,991 1,684,518 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 56,826 23,939 80,765 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 69,964 26,928 96,892 
Santa Fe, NM 41,600 14,922 56,522 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 137,954 107,962 245,916 
Savannah, GA 66,702 18,920 85,622 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 162,272 66,884 229,156 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 945,318 231,010 1,176,328 
Sharon, PA 30,376 13,809 44,185 
Sheboygan, WI 30,319 10,769 41,088 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 108,682 34,710 143,392 
Sioux City, IA-NE 24,545 8,523 33,068 
Sioux Falls, SD 30,352 9,967 40,319 
South Bend, IN 66,029 21,997 88,026 
Spokane, WA 121,846 37,105 158,951 
Springfield, IL 31,412 10,960 42,372 
Springfield, MO 103,945 34,515 138,460 
Springfield, MA 133,249 45,609 178,858 
State College, PA 31,150 10,901 42,051 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 113,166 31,330 144,496 
Sumter, SC 25,963 8,828 34,791 
Syracuse, NY 189,964 62,212 252,176 
Tallahassee, FL 76,960 21,299 98,259 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 623,739 254,674 878,413 
Terre Haute, IN 37,004 13,670 50,674 
Toledo, OH 162,751 50,241 212,992 
Topeka, KS 47,027 16,010 63,037 
Tucson, AZ 209,323 82,577 291,900 
Tulsa, OK 176,862 58,239 235,101 
Tuscaloosa, AL 42,805 12,606 55,411 
Tyler, TX 46,718 18,594 65,312 
Utica-Rome, NY 72,966 30,468 103,434 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 67,495 19,801 87,296 
Waco, TX 50,580 16,682 67,262 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 1,837,862 481,714 2,319,576 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 31,700 11,758 43,458 
Wausau, WI 37,387 10,521 47,908 
131 
 
MSA 
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West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 228,387 148,226 376,613 
Wichita, KS 146,141 44,062 190,203 
Wichita Falls, TX 28,037 10,731 38,768 
Williamsport, PA 29,829 11,599 41,428 
Wilmington, NC 84,899 30,701 115,600 
Yakima, WA 42,884 15,493 58,377 
York, PA 115,318 38,032 153,350 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 148,657 60,349 209,006 
Yuba City, CA 27,952 10,880 38,832 
Yuma, AZ 28,160 13,668 41,828 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) 
 
  
132 
 
Table 29. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older and proportion of all older HHs in the MSA in 
2010 
MSA 
% of MSA 
that is older in 
2010 
% of all older 
HH in the 
MSA in 2010 
Abilene, TX 28.36% 0.07% 
Albany, GA 23.05% 0.06% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 23.53% 0.44% 
Albuquerque, NM 22.14% 0.39% 
Alexandria, LA 28.12% 0.08% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 27.19% 0.40% 
Altoona, PA 28.12% 0.09% 
Amarillo, TX 21.36% 0.10% 
Anchorage, AK 12.29% 0.07% 
Anniston, AL 26.63% 0.07% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 22.88% 0.20% 
Asheville, NC 25.63% 0.16% 
Athens, GA 21.71% 0.06% 
Atlanta, GA 16.90% 1.51% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 20.77% 0.05% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 22.51% 0.24% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 15.90% 0.46% 
Bakersfield, CA 22.55% 0.25% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 38.10% 0.13% 
Baton Rouge, LA 20.24% 0.29% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 26.98% 0.21% 
Bellingham, WA 22.90% 0.09% 
Benton Harbor, MI 29.11% 0.10% 
Billings, MT 25.84% 0.09% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 22.38% 0.15% 
Binghamton, NY 27.00% 0.15% 
Birmingham, AL 22.60% 0.43% 
Bloomington, IN 21.63% 0.06% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 19.33% 0.07% 
Boise City, ID 20.06% 0.23% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 24.07% 2.41% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 24.38% 0.11% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 17.29% 0.05% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 26.09% 0.68% 
Canton-Massillon, OH 27.05% 0.26% 
Cedar Rapids, IA 23.40% 0.12% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 21.51% 0.08% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 22.91% 0.25% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 19.50% 0.78% 
Charlottesville, VA 23.91% 0.09% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 27.09% 0.28% 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 21.85% 3.59% 
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% of MSA 
that is older in 
2010 
% of all older 
HH in the 
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Chico-Paradise, CA 28.93% 0.13% 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 21.83% 0.91% 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 15.52% 0.05% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 24.77% 1.63% 
Colorado Springs, CO 18.18% 0.22% 
Columbia, MO 20.32% 0.06% 
Columbia, SC 20.08% 0.27% 
Columbus, GA-AL 22.95% 0.09% 
Columbus, OH 19.47% 0.68% 
Corpus Christi, TX 23.82% 0.12% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 18.23% 1.91% 
Danville, VA 32.28% 0.09% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 25.53% 0.15% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 26.41% 0.58% 
Daytona Beach, FL 34.58% 0.37% 
Decatur, AL 27.81% 0.10% 
Decatur, IL 28.40% 0.08% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 20.12% 1.06% 
Des Moines, IA 19.57% 0.18% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 23.29% 2.47% 
Dothan, AL 25.36% 0.09% 
Dover, DE 24.62% 0.08% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 26.07% 0.13% 
Eau Claire, WI 24.44% 0.09% 
El Paso, TX 20.24% 0.18% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 23.74% 0.09% 
Erie, PA 25.61% 0.16% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 25.24% 0.20% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 23.61% 0.15% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 19.13% 0.06% 
Fayetteville, NC 20.34% 0.12% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 22.54% 0.18% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 18.48% 0.04% 
Florence, AL 28.96% 0.10% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 22.43% 0.12% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 38.54% 0.47% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 37.38% 0.32% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 24.89% 0.10% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 24.56% 0.09% 
Fort Wayne, IN 22.65% 0.24% 
Fresno, CA 23.62% 0.34% 
Gadsden, AL 28.75% 0.07% 
Gainesville, FL 22.87% 0.10% 
Glens Falls, NY 25.79% 0.08% 
Goldsboro, NC 24.47% 0.07% 
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Grand Junction, CO 27.61% 0.08% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 21.70% 0.46% 
Green Bay, WI 20.13% 0.11% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 24.10% 0.75% 
Greenville, NC 21.89% 0.07% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 24.77% 0.49% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 26.09% 0.41% 
Hartford, CT 26.45% 0.35% 
Hattiesburg, MS 19.54% 0.05% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 25.99% 0.21% 
Honolulu, HI 28.36% 0.40% 
Houma, LA 26.28% 0.06% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 18.45% 1.61% 
Huntsville, AL 22.87% 0.21% 
Indianapolis, IN 20.99% 0.83% 
Iowa City, IA 18.85% 0.05% 
Jackson, MI 26.12% 0.09% 
Jackson, MS 20.96% 0.22% 
Jackson, TN 23.85% 0.06% 
Jacksonville, FL 21.32% 0.56% 
Jacksonville, NC 18.22% 0.05% 
Jamestown, NY 27.37% 0.09% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 24.47% 0.09% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 27.67% 0.23% 
Johnstown, PA 31.49% 0.17% 
Joplin, MO 24.05% 0.09% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 23.99% 0.24% 
Kansas City, MO-KS 21.97% 0.89% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 18.35% 0.11% 
Knoxville, TN 23.88% 0.36% 
Kokomo, IN 28.20% 0.07% 
La Crosse, WI-MN 24.36% 0.06% 
Lafayette, LA 19.02% 0.11% 
Lafayette, IN 23.64% 0.09% 
Lake Charles, LA 23.28% 0.10% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 32.82% 0.37% 
Lancaster, PA 25.52% 0.28% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 20.69% 0.20% 
Laredo, TX 17.61% 0.04% 
Las Cruces, NM 25.05% 0.08% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 22.33% 0.69% 
Lexington, KY 20.23% 0.12% 
Lima, OH 26.54% 0.09% 
Lincoln, NE 20.87% 0.12% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 21.25% 0.31% 
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Longview-Marshall, TX 28.56% 0.11% 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 23.56% 5.03% 
Louisville, KY-IN 22.61% 0.52% 
Lubbock, TX 22.83% 0.12% 
Lynchburg, VA 28.05% 0.15% 
Macon, GA 21.74% 0.16% 
Madison, WI 18.34% 0.19% 
Mansfield, OH 27.83% 0.08% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 22.69% 0.16% 
Medford-Ashland, OR 29.94% 0.14% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 32.03% 0.38% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 19.85% 0.44% 
Merced, CA 22.70% 0.07% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 25.19% 0.97% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 23.21% 0.89% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 19.73% 1.30% 
Mobile, AL 25.16% 0.32% 
Modesto, CA 21.98% 0.16% 
Monroe, LA 22.76% 0.08% 
Montgomery, AL 23.69% 0.19% 
Muncie, IN 28.55% 0.07% 
Myrtle Beach, SC 28.97% 0.18% 
Naples, FL 47.35% 0.27% 
Nashville, TN 19.95% 0.62% 
New Orleans, LA 21.96% 0.50% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 24.54% 7.75% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 21.94% 0.72% 
Ocala, FL 41.52% 0.30% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 21.49% 0.10% 
Oklahoma City, OK 24.67% 0.45% 
Omaha, NE-IA 20.37% 0.28% 
Orlando, FL 23.12% 0.77% 
Panama City, FL 26.76% 0.09% 
Pensacola, FL 26.81% 0.25% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 24.32% 0.20% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 24.60% 3.14% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 23.66% 1.60% 
Pittsburgh, PA 28.56% 1.54% 
Portland, ME 20.88% 0.12% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 21.19% 1.07% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 24.99% 0.49% 
Provo-Orem, UT 18.14% 0.13% 
Pueblo, CO 31.04% 0.10% 
Punta Gorda, FL 48.38% 0.19% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 18.69% 0.58% 
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Reading, PA 26.95% 0.23% 
Redding, CA 30.21% 0.12% 
Reno, NV 22.53% 0.18% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 22.65% 0.10% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 22.18% 0.53% 
Roanoke, VA 26.59% 0.16% 
Rochester, MN 22.73% 0.07% 
Rochester, NY 23.75% 0.54% 
Rockford, IL 24.58% 0.18% 
Rocky Mount, NC 26.10% 0.09% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 22.76% 0.86% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 27.57% 0.25% 
St. Cloud, MN 21.22% 0.09% 
St. Joseph, MO 26.55% 0.06% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 23.28% 1.45% 
Salinas, CA 28.43% 0.09% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 19.60% 0.52% 
San Antonio, TX 21.79% 0.74% 
San Diego, CA 21.97% 0.99% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 23.63% 2.56% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 29.64% 0.15% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 27.79% 0.17% 
Santa Fe, NM 26.40% 0.10% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 43.90% 0.70% 
Savannah, GA 22.10% 0.12% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 29.19% 0.43% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 19.64% 1.49% 
Sharon, PA 31.25% 0.09% 
Sheboygan, WI 26.21% 0.07% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 24.21% 0.22% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 25.77% 0.05% 
Sioux Falls, SD 24.72% 0.06% 
South Bend, IN 24.99% 0.14% 
Spokane, WA 23.34% 0.24% 
Springfield, IL 25.87% 0.07% 
Springfield, MO 24.93% 0.22% 
Springfield, MA 25.50% 0.29% 
State College, PA 25.92% 0.07% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 21.68% 0.20% 
Sumter, SC 25.37% 0.06% 
Syracuse, NY 24.67% 0.40% 
Tallahassee, FL 21.68% 0.14% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 28.99% 1.64% 
Terre Haute, IN 26.98% 0.09% 
Toledo, OH 23.59% 0.32% 
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Topeka, KS 25.40% 0.10% 
Tucson, AZ 28.29% 0.53% 
Tulsa, OK 24.77% 0.37% 
Tuscaloosa, AL 22.75% 0.08% 
Tyler, TX 28.47% 0.12% 
Utica-Rome, NY 29.46% 0.20% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 22.68% 0.13% 
Waco, TX 24.80% 0.11% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 20.77% 3.10% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 27.06% 0.08% 
Wausau, WI 21.96% 0.07% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 39.36% 0.95% 
Wichita, KS 23.17% 0.28% 
Wichita Falls, TX 27.68% 0.07% 
Williamsport, PA 28.00% 0.07% 
Wilmington, NC 26.56% 0.20% 
Yakima, WA 26.54% 0.10% 
York, PA 24.80% 0.24% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 28.87% 0.39% 
Yuba City, CA 28.02% 0.07% 
Yuma, AZ 32.68% 0.09% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) 
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Table 30. Number of younger, older, and all ages in 2030 under the sorting simulation 
MSA 
Younger 
HH in 2030 
Older HH in 
2030 
Total HH in 
2030 
Abilene, TX 31,513 18,640 50,153 
Albany, GA 27,316 14,530 41,846 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 269,009 164,245 433,254 
Albuquerque, NM 168,584 95,977 264,561 
Alexandria, LA 26,773 23,908 50,681 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 134,600 93,226 227,826 
Altoona, PA 34,037 24,574 58,611 
Amarillo, TX 63,455 29,024 92,479 
Anchorage, AK 31,075 7,527 38,602 
Anniston, AL 21,228 19,421 40,649 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 79,945 38,550 118,495 
Asheville, NC 54,677 31,224 85,901 
Athens, GA 32,485 20,265 52,750 
Atlanta, GA 945,160 371,074 1,316,234 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 33,481 16,763 50,244 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 108,594 66,605 175,199 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 384,701 119,504 504,205 
Bakersfield, CA 149,224 71,697 220,921 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 37,963 39,289 77,252 
Baton Rouge, LA 146,687 67,328 214,015 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 104,267 67,996 172,263 
Bellingham, WA 40,777 22,888 63,665 
Benton Harbor, MI 43,412 29,837 73,249 
Billings, MT 24,511 17,238 41,749 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 59,920 33,660 93,580 
Binghamton, NY 100,094 65,503 165,597 
Birmingham, AL 185,230 103,858 289,088 
Bloomington, IN 24,127 15,111 39,238 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 46,329 23,240 69,569 
Boise City, ID 93,601 43,812 137,413 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 810,464 453,350 1,263,814 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 62,887 36,511 99,398 
Bryan-College Station, TX 33,408 9,967 43,375 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 357,445 232,787 590,232 
Canton-Massillon, OH 109,539 71,883 181,422 
Cedar Rapids, IA 36,070 18,873 54,943 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 43,277 24,940 68,217 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 106,744 64,386 171,130 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 399,215 172,339 571,554 
Charlottesville, VA 44,699 27,020 71,719 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 101,137 59,326 160,463 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 1,662,251 848,847 2,511,098 
Chico-Paradise, CA 57,046 41,735 98,781 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 401,078 195,086 596,164 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 34,694 12,554 47,248 
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Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 783,442 468,625 1,252,067 
Colorado Springs, CO 126,998 49,201 176,199 
Columbia, MO 42,305 12,995 55,300 
Columbia, SC 130,183 71,343 201,526 
Columbus, GA-AL 45,876 21,068 66,944 
Columbus, OH 398,117 190,489 588,606 
Corpus Christi, TX 58,254 34,235 92,489 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 1,396,015 546,742 1,942,757 
Danville, VA 29,232 22,542 51,774 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 59,835 40,819 100,654 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 258,140 161,282 419,422 
Daytona Beach, FL 92,154 74,285 166,439 
Decatur, AL 34,069 17,761 51,830 
Decatur, IL 29,730 22,982 52,712 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 597,532 266,708 864,240 
Des Moines, IA 60,932 25,559 86,491 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 1,006,735 583,516 1,590,251 
Dothan, AL 77,696 54,778 132,474 
Dover, DE 28,784 12,890 41,674 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 57,138 32,372 89,510 
Eau Claire, WI 39,119 19,913 59,032 
El Paso, TX 106,357 50,651 157,008 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 27,850 19,482 47,332 
Erie, PA 69,562 44,434 113,996 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 73,594 46,333 119,927 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 64,096 34,378 98,474 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 23,169 8,356 31,525 
Fayetteville, NC 55,536 23,530 79,066 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 70,596 34,493 105,089 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 28,592 13,950 42,542 
Florence, AL 31,258 28,391 59,649 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 51,050 30,327 81,377 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 109,400 106,471 215,871 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 72,070 68,662 140,732 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 28,946 18,350 47,296 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 39,203 24,164 63,367 
Fort Wayne, IN 111,669 52,574 164,243 
Fresno, CA 175,341 112,471 287,812 
Gadsden, AL 22,867 20,016 42,883 
Gainesville, FL 48,737 21,575 70,312 
Glens Falls, NY 69,754 42,009 111,763 
Goldsboro, NC 42,916 29,351 72,267 
Grand Junction, CO 28,504 18,978 47,482 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 232,209 100,295 332,504 
Green Bay, WI 53,486 19,346 72,832 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 292,265 186,288 478,553 
Greenville, NC 31,507 19,358 50,865 
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Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 191,777 116,261 308,038 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 179,031 99,932 278,963 
Hartford, CT 107,978 66,616 174,594 
Hattiesburg, MS 24,131 12,494 36,625 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 88,213 52,672 140,885 
Honolulu, HI 123,146 85,889 209,035 
Houma, LA 25,518 10,607 36,125 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 1,067,442 431,165 1,498,607 
Huntsville, AL 92,034 49,572 141,606 
Indianapolis, IN 364,834 178,229 543,063 
Iowa City, IA 19,066 5,995 25,061 
Jackson, MI 35,528 18,453 53,981 
Jackson, MS 104,116 48,700 152,816 
Jackson, TN 25,987 17,288 43,275 
Jacksonville, FL 285,501 123,772 409,273 
Jacksonville, NC 31,182 12,167 43,349 
Jamestown, NY 68,319 47,360 115,679 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 30,459 14,926 45,385 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 89,128 56,666 145,794 
Johnstown, PA 87,631 57,199 144,830 
Joplin, MO 58,475 33,910 92,385 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 126,916 63,908 190,824 
Kansas City, MO-KS 337,770 163,255 501,025 
Killeen-Temple, TX 86,302 39,634 125,936 
Knoxville, TN 167,196 103,947 271,143 
Kokomo, IN 21,460 14,719 36,179 
La Crosse, WI-MN 22,769 10,550 33,319 
Lafayette, LA 60,414 25,326 85,740 
Lafayette, IN 30,770 20,020 50,790 
Lake Charles, LA 51,654 26,378 78,032 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 114,184 84,673 198,857 
Lancaster, PA 101,408 55,325 156,733 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 121,372 54,319 175,691 
Laredo, TX 25,550 11,833 37,383 
Las Cruces, NM 24,916 14,944 39,860 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 330,560 172,945 503,505 
Lexington, KY 53,261 28,912 82,173 
Lima, OH 48,694 31,779 80,473 
Lincoln, NE 42,731 15,635 58,366 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 127,852 55,451 183,303 
Longview-Marshall, TX 45,400 25,451 70,851 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 2,773,696 1,578,813 4,352,509 
Louisville, KY-IN 239,014 139,295 378,309 
Lubbock, TX 67,579 35,824 103,403 
Lynchburg, VA 57,384 39,610 96,994 
Macon, GA 79,917 38,496 118,413 
Madison, WI 92,566 36,771 129,337 
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Mansfield, OH 27,392 22,182 49,574 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 85,652 45,466 131,118 
Medford-Ashland, OR 42,550 29,528 72,078 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 117,978 83,298 201,276 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 180,745 90,530 271,275 
Merced, CA 38,726 24,852 63,578 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 403,119 215,189 618,308 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 275,864 137,440 413,304 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 563,933 216,301 780,234 
Mobile, AL 110,892 70,318 181,210 
Modesto, CA 94,261 58,435 152,696 
Monroe, LA 38,174 18,331 56,505 
Montgomery, AL 74,051 43,109 117,160 
Muncie, IN 27,548 15,923 43,471 
Myrtle Beach, SC 53,220 39,324 92,544 
Naples, FL 43,739 59,661 103,400 
Nashville, TN 348,655 147,660 496,315 
New Orleans, LA 243,792 125,219 369,011 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) 2,363,028 1,430,803 3,793,831 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 330,538 177,320 507,858 
Ocala, FL 63,711 59,900 123,611 
Odessa-Midland, TX 58,399 31,327 89,726 
Oklahoma City, OK 150,478 84,945 235,423 
Omaha, NE-IA 112,174 47,748 159,922 
Orlando, FL 371,288 184,728 556,016 
Panama City, FL 38,472 19,647 58,119 
Pensacola, FL 105,092 51,570 156,662 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 109,492 64,290 173,782 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 816,316 501,871 1,318,187 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 694,079 376,158 1,070,237 
Pittsburgh, PA 578,128 393,386 971,514 
Portland, ME 37,771 13,541 51,312 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 479,613 242,794 722,407 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 259,334 157,544 416,878 
Provo-Orem, UT 77,082 28,792 105,874 
Pueblo, CO 28,289 20,546 48,835 
Punta Gorda, FL 27,583 36,839 64,422 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 319,866 129,523 449,389 
Reading, PA 90,800 56,508 147,308 
Redding, CA 45,391 39,582 84,973 
Reno, NV 82,215 38,230 120,445 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 42,799 21,886 64,685 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 282,746 147,175 429,921 
Roanoke, VA 63,440 40,681 104,121 
Rochester, MN 26,636 11,690 38,326 
Rochester, NY 365,714 216,313 582,027 
Rockford, IL 82,438 43,904 126,342 
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Rocky Mount, NC 37,187 23,547 60,734 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 473,692 272,836 746,528 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 116,193 69,917 186,110 
St. Cloud, MN 57,791 23,165 80,956 
St. Joseph, MO 33,575 19,534 53,109 
St. Louis, MO-IL 620,162 351,640 971,802 
Salinas, CA 40,182 27,515 67,697 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 301,817 102,788 404,605 
San Antonio, TX 423,794 194,215 618,009 
San Diego, CA 620,120 313,967 934,087 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 1,433,947 757,172 2,191,119 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 58,670 42,882 101,552 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 83,684 62,504 146,188 
Santa Fe, NM 36,012 28,107 64,119 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 121,455 154,155 275,610 
Savannah, GA 54,669 34,360 89,029 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 178,038 134,645 312,683 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 813,599 389,814 1,203,413 
Sharon, PA 40,371 34,473 74,844 
Sheboygan, WI 29,516 15,557 45,073 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 94,452 59,298 153,750 
Sioux City, IA-NE 12,935 11,702 24,637 
Sioux Falls, SD 13,569 7,651 21,220 
South Bend, IN 50,020 34,019 84,039 
Spokane, WA 102,442 62,515 164,957 
Springfield, IL 26,118 17,185 43,303 
Springfield, MO 123,787 59,058 182,845 
Springfield, MA 148,755 89,540 238,295 
State College, PA 38,187 20,546 58,733 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 119,667 68,554 188,221 
Sumter, SC 24,484 13,443 37,927 
Syracuse, NY 302,785 180,594 483,379 
Tallahassee, FL 68,172 25,262 93,434 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 588,906 364,171 953,077 
Terre Haute, IN 34,373 21,186 55,559 
Toledo, OH 165,201 94,682 259,883 
Topeka, KS 28,909 21,837 50,746 
Tucson, AZ 195,585 133,421 329,006 
Tulsa, OK 120,075 63,504 183,579 
Tuscaloosa, AL 43,369 18,876 62,245 
Tyler, TX 50,923 34,309 85,232 
Utica-Rome, NY 127,031 88,049 215,080 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 86,135 49,602 135,737 
Waco, TX 59,448 33,676 93,124 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 1,279,974 654,073 1,934,047 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 23,514 13,972 37,486 
Wausau, WI 41,750 19,467 61,217 
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MSA 
Younger 
HH in 2030 
Older HH in 
2030 
Total HH in 
2030 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 217,928 200,742 418,670 
Wichita, KS 94,698 49,715 144,413 
Wichita Falls, TX 27,139 20,303 47,442 
Williamsport, PA 48,525 27,617 76,142 
Wilmington, NC 67,768 47,979 115,747 
Yakima, WA 30,389 24,200 54,589 
York, PA 106,998 51,627 158,625 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 151,520 110,960 262,480 
Yuba City, CA 35,897 22,233 58,130 
Yuma, AZ 18,983 19,260 38,243 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from the Sorting simulation 
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Table 31. Number of older HH, Change in older HH, and % change in older HH under the 
sorting simulation 
MSA 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2030 
Change 
Older HH 
% Change 
Older HH 
Abilene, TX 10,890 18,640 7,750 71.17% 
Albany, GA 9,375 14,530 5,155 54.99% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 68,063 164,245 96,182 141.31% 
Albuquerque, NM 61,161 95,977 34,816 56.93% 
Alexandria, LA 12,006 23,908 11,902 99.13% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 62,296 93,226 30,930 49.65% 
Altoona, PA 13,760 24,574 10,814 78.59% 
Amarillo, TX 15,948 29,024 13,076 81.99% 
Anchorage, AK 10,501 7,527 -2,974 -28.32% 
Anniston, AL 11,039 19,421 8,382 75.93% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 31,808 38,550 6,742 21.20% 
Asheville, NC 24,971 31,224 6,253 25.04% 
Athens, GA 9,865 20,265 10,400 105.42% 
Atlanta, GA 234,606 371,074 136,468 58.17% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 8,367 16,763 8,396 100.35% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 36,718 66,605 29,887 81.40% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 71,157 119,504 48,347 67.94% 
Bakersfield, CA 38,159 71,697 33,538 87.89% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 19,927 39,289 19,362 97.16% 
Baton Rouge, LA 45,105 67,328 22,223 49.27% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 32,720 67,996 35,276 107.81% 
Bellingham, WA 14,299 22,888 8,589 60.07% 
Benton Harbor, MI 15,973 29,837 13,864 86.80% 
Billings, MT 14,276 17,238 2,962 20.75% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 23,694 33,660 9,966 42.06% 
Binghamton, NY 23,960 65,503 41,543 173.38% 
Birmingham, AL 66,685 103,858 37,173 55.74% 
Bloomington, IN 8,857 15,111 6,254 70.61% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 10,105 23,240 13,135 129.99% 
Boise City, ID 35,883 43,812 7,929 22.10% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 374,892 453,350 78,458 20.93% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 17,274 36,511 19,237 111.36% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 7,355 9,967 2,612 35.51% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 105,730 232,787 127,057 120.17% 
Canton-Massillon, OH 40,218 71,883 31,665 78.73% 
Cedar Rapids, IA 17,971 18,873 902 5.02% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 12,696 24,940 12,244 96.44% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 38,697 64,386 25,689 66.38% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 120,906 172,339 51,433 42.54% 
Charlottesville, VA 13,928 27,020 13,092 94.00% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 44,139 59,326 15,187 34.41% 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 556,853 848,847 291,994 52.44% 
Chico-Paradise, CA 20,128 41,735 21,607 107.35% 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 141,044 195,086 54,042 38.32% 
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MSA 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2030 
Change 
Older HH 
% Change 
Older HH 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 7,720 12,554 4,834 62.62% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 253,899 468,625 214,726 84.57% 
Colorado Springs, CO 34,662 49,201 14,539 41.95% 
Columbia, MO 9,880 12,995 3,115 31.53% 
Columbia, SC 41,785 71,343 29,558 70.74% 
Columbus, GA-AL 13,578 21,068 7,490 55.16% 
Columbus, OH 105,437 190,489 85,052 80.67% 
Corpus Christi, TX 18,594 34,235 15,641 84.12% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 296,884 546,742 249,858 84.16% 
Danville, VA 13,349 22,542 9,193 68.87% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 23,292 40,819 17,527 75.25% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 90,841 161,282 70,441 77.54% 
Daytona Beach, FL 56,889 74,285 17,396 30.58% 
Decatur, AL 14,989 17,761 2,772 18.49% 
Decatur, IL 11,908 22,982 11,074 93.00% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 164,121 266,708 102,587 62.51% 
Des Moines, IA 27,560 25,559 -2,001 -7.26% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 384,361 583,516 199,155 51.81% 
Dothan, AL 13,601 54,778 41,177 302.75% 
Dover, DE 11,932 12,890 958 8.03% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 20,068 32,372 12,304 61.31% 
Eau Claire, WI 14,083 19,913 5,830 41.40% 
El Paso, TX 27,225 50,651 23,426 86.05% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 13,899 19,482 5,583 40.17% 
Erie, PA 24,791 44,434 19,643 79.23% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 30,426 46,333 15,907 52.28% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 23,276 34,378 11,102 47.70% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 9,531 8,356 -1,175 -12.33% 
Fayetteville, NC 18,547 23,530 4,983 26.87% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 27,482 34,493 7,011 25.51% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 6,493 13,950 7,457 114.85% 
Florence, AL 16,226 28,391 12,165 74.97% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 18,691 30,327 11,636 62.25% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 72,324 106,471 34,147 47.21% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 50,053 68,662 18,609 37.18% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 15,223 18,350 3,127 20.54% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 14,536 24,164 9,628 66.24% 
Fort Wayne, IN 37,712 52,574 14,862 39.41% 
Fresno, CA 52,303 112,471 60,168 115.04% 
Gadsden, AL 10,735 20,016 9,281 86.46% 
Gainesville, FL 15,350 21,575 6,225 40.55% 
Glens Falls, NY 12,428 42,009 29,581 238.02% 
Goldsboro, NC 10,145 29,351 19,206 189.31% 
Grand Junction, CO 12,146 18,978 6,832 56.25% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 71,987 100,295 28,308 39.32% 
Green Bay, WI 17,565 19,346 1,781 10.14% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 116,963 186,288 69,325 59.27% 
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MSA 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2030 
Change 
Older HH 
% Change 
Older HH 
Greenville, NC 11,351 19,358 8,007 70.54% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 76,665 116,261 39,596 51.65% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 63,207 99,932 36,725 58.10% 
Hartford, CT 54,456 66,616 12,160 22.33% 
Hattiesburg, MS 8,244 12,494 4,250 51.55% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 32,796 52,672 19,876 60.60% 
Honolulu, HI 61,806 85,889 24,083 38.97% 
Houma, LA 8,723 10,607 1,884 21.60% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 250,330 431,165 180,835 72.24% 
Huntsville, AL 31,946 49,572 17,626 55.17% 
Indianapolis, IN 128,746 178,229 49,483 38.43% 
Iowa City, IA 7,042 5,995 -1,047 -14.87% 
Jackson, MI 14,389 18,453 4,064 28.24% 
Jackson, MS 33,876 48,700 14,824 43.76% 
Jackson, TN 8,554 17,288 8,734 102.10% 
Jacksonville, FL 87,723 123,772 36,049 41.09% 
Jacksonville, NC 7,624 12,167 4,543 59.59% 
Jamestown, NY 13,522 47,360 33,838 250.24% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 13,755 14,926 1,171 8.51% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 35,391 56,666 21,275 60.11% 
Johnstown, PA 26,545 57,199 30,654 115.48% 
Joplin, MO 14,276 33,910 19,634 137.53% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 37,684 63,908 26,224 69.59% 
Kansas City, MO-KS 138,380 163,255 24,875 17.98% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 16,357 39,634 23,277 142.31% 
Knoxville, TN 56,436 103,947 47,511 84.19% 
Kokomo, IN 10,519 14,719 4,200 39.93% 
La Crosse, WI-MN 9,372 10,550 1,178 12.57% 
Lafayette, LA 17,740 25,326 7,586 42.76% 
Lafayette, IN 13,254 20,020 6,766 51.05% 
Lake Charles, LA 15,356 26,378 11,022 71.78% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 57,600 84,673 27,073 47.00% 
Lancaster, PA 42,726 55,325 12,599 29.49% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 31,672 54,319 22,647 71.50% 
Laredo, TX 5,785 11,833 6,048 104.55% 
Las Cruces, NM 12,098 14,944 2,846 23.52% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 107,173 172,945 65,772 61.37% 
Lexington, KY 19,142 28,912 9,770 51.04% 
Lima, OH 14,544 31,779 17,235 118.50% 
Lincoln, NE 18,972 15,635 -3,337 -17.59% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 48,242 55,451 7,209 14.94% 
Longview-Marshall, TX 16,624 25,451 8,827 53.10% 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 780,789 1,578,813 798,024 102.21% 
Louisville, KY-IN 80,220 139,295 59,075 73.64% 
Lubbock, TX 19,069 35,824 16,755 87.87% 
Lynchburg, VA 23,368 39,610 16,242 69.51% 
Macon, GA 24,873 38,496 13,623 54.77% 
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MSA 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2030 
Change 
Older HH 
% Change 
Older HH 
Madison, WI 30,136 36,771 6,635 22.02% 
Mansfield, OH 12,208 22,182 9,974 81.70% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 25,364 45,466 20,102 79.25% 
Medford-Ashland, OR 21,534 29,528 7,994 37.12% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 59,727 83,298 23,571 39.46% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 67,981 90,530 22,549 33.17% 
Merced, CA 10,194 24,852 14,658 143.79% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 150,522 215,189 64,667 42.96% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 138,587 137,440 -1,147 -0.83% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 201,951 216,301 14,350 7.11% 
Mobile, AL 50,266 70,318 20,052 39.89% 
Modesto, CA 25,172 58,435 33,263 132.14% 
Monroe, LA 11,925 18,331 6,406 53.72% 
Montgomery, AL 28,838 43,109 14,271 49.49% 
Muncie, IN 11,477 15,923 4,446 38.74% 
Myrtle Beach, SC 27,745 39,324 11,579 41.73% 
Naples, FL 42,647 59,661 17,014 39.89% 
Nashville, TN 96,611 147,660 51,049 52.84% 
New Orleans, LA 77,683 125,219 47,536 61.19% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-
CT-PA (C) 1,203,082 1,430,803 227,721 18.93% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 111,598 177,320 65,722 58.89% 
Ocala, FL 47,193 59,900 12,707 26.93% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 16,100 31,327 15,227 94.58% 
Oklahoma City, OK 69,597 84,945 15,348 22.05% 
Omaha, NE-IA 43,603 47,748 4,145 9.51% 
Orlando, FL 118,943 184,728 65,785 55.31% 
Panama City, FL 14,705 19,647 4,942 33.61% 
Pensacola, FL 38,253 51,570 13,317 34.81% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 31,715 64,290 32,575 102.71% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD 
(C) 487,202 501,871 14,669 3.01% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 249,248 376,158 126,910 50.92% 
Pittsburgh, PA 239,250 393,386 154,136 64.42% 
Portland, ME 19,230 13,541 -5,689 -29.58% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 166,909 242,794 75,885 45.46% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 76,027 157,544 81,517 107.22% 
Provo-Orem, UT 19,765 28,792 9,027 45.67% 
Pueblo, CO 14,865 20,546 5,681 38.22% 
Punta Gorda, FL 29,196 36,839 7,643 26.18% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 90,714 129,523 38,809 42.78% 
Reading, PA 35,055 56,508 21,453 61.20% 
Redding, CA 18,436 39,582 21,146 114.70% 
Reno, NV 28,114 38,230 10,116 35.98% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 15,053 21,886 6,833 45.39% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 82,041 147,175 65,134 79.39% 
Roanoke, VA 24,661 40,681 16,020 64.96% 
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MSA 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2030 
Change 
Older HH 
% Change 
Older HH 
Rochester, MN 10,851 11,690 839 7.73% 
Rochester, NY 83,423 216,313 132,890 159.30% 
Rockford, IL 27,871 43,904 16,033 57.53% 
Rocky Mount, NC 14,344 23,547 9,203 64.16% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 133,906 272,836 138,930 103.75% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 38,817 69,917 31,100 80.12% 
St. Cloud, MN 13,250 23,165 9,915 74.83% 
St. Joseph, MO 9,764 19,534 9,770 100.06% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 224,459 351,640 127,181 56.66% 
Salinas, CA 13,517 27,515 13,998 103.56% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 80,782 102,788 22,006 27.24% 
San Antonio, TX 114,639 194,215 79,576 69.41% 
San Diego, CA 153,509 313,967 160,458 104.53% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 397,991 757,172 359,181 90.25% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 23,939 42,882 18,943 79.13% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 26,928 62,504 35,576 132.12% 
Santa Fe, NM 14,922 28,107 13,185 88.36% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 107,962 154,155 46,193 42.79% 
Savannah, GA 18,920 34,360 15,440 81.61% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 66,884 134,645 67,761 101.31% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 231,010 389,814 158,804 68.74% 
Sharon, PA 13,809 34,473 20,664 149.64% 
Sheboygan, WI 10,769 15,557 4,788 44.46% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 34,710 59,298 24,588 70.84% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 8,523 11,702 3,179 37.30% 
Sioux Falls, SD 9,967 7,651 -2,316 -23.24% 
South Bend, IN 21,997 34,019 12,022 54.65% 
Spokane, WA 37,105 62,515 25,410 68.48% 
Springfield, IL 10,960 17,185 6,225 56.80% 
Springfield, MO 34,515 59,058 24,543 71.11% 
Springfield, MA 45,609 89,540 43,931 96.32% 
State College, PA 10,901 20,546 9,645 88.48% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 31,330 68,554 37,224 118.81% 
Sumter, SC 8,828 13,443 4,615 52.28% 
Syracuse, NY 62,212 180,594 118,382 190.29% 
Tallahassee, FL 21,299 25,262 3,963 18.61% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 254,674 364,171 109,497 42.99% 
Terre Haute, IN 13,670 21,186 7,516 54.98% 
Toledo, OH 50,241 94,682 44,441 88.46% 
Topeka, KS 16,010 21,837 5,827 36.40% 
Tucson, AZ 82,577 133,421 50,844 61.57% 
Tulsa, OK 58,239 63,504 5,265 9.04% 
Tuscaloosa, AL 12,606 18,876 6,270 49.74% 
Tyler, TX 18,594 34,309 15,715 84.52% 
Utica-Rome, NY 30,468 88,049 57,581 188.99% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 19,801 49,602 29,801 150.50% 
Waco, TX 16,682 33,676 16,994 101.87% 
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MSA 
Older HH 
in 2010 
Older HH 
in 2030 
Change 
Older HH 
% Change 
Older HH 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 481,714 654,073 172,359 35.78% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 11,758 13,972 2,214 18.83% 
Wausau, WI 10,521 19,467 8,946 85.03% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 148,226 200,742 52,516 35.43% 
Wichita, KS 44,062 49,715 5,653 12.83% 
Wichita Falls, TX 10,731 20,303 9,572 89.20% 
Williamsport, PA 11,599 27,617 16,018 138.10% 
Wilmington, NC 30,701 47,979 17,278 56.28% 
Yakima, WA 15,493 24,200 8,707 56.20% 
York, PA 38,032 51,627 13,595 35.75% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 60,349 110,960 50,611 83.86% 
Yuba City, CA 10,880 22,233 11,353 104.35% 
Yuma, AZ 13,668 19,260 5,592 40.91% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from the Sorting simulation 
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Table 32. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older (with change and % change) under the sorting 
simulation 
MSA 
% of MSA 
that is 
older in 
2010 
% of MSA 
that is 
older in 
2030 
Change in 
% of MSA 
that is 
older 
% Change 
in % of 
MSA that 
is older 
Abilene, TX 28.36% 37.17% 8.81% 31.06% 
Albany, GA 23.05% 34.72% 11.67% 50.65% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 23.53% 37.91% 14.38% 61.13% 
Albuquerque, NM 22.14% 36.28% 14.13% 63.83% 
Alexandria, LA 28.12% 47.17% 19.05% 67.74% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 27.19% 40.92% 13.72% 50.47% 
Altoona, PA 28.12% 41.93% 13.81% 49.10% 
Amarillo, TX 21.36% 31.38% 10.03% 46.96% 
Anchorage, AK 12.29% 19.50% 7.21% 58.67% 
Anniston, AL 26.63% 47.78% 21.15% 79.44% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 22.88% 32.53% 9.65% 42.20% 
Asheville, NC 25.63% 36.35% 10.71% 41.80% 
Athens, GA 21.71% 38.42% 16.71% 76.97% 
Atlanta, GA 16.90% 28.19% 11.30% 66.86% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 20.77% 33.36% 12.60% 60.65% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 22.51% 38.02% 15.51% 68.88% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 15.90% 23.70% 7.81% 49.10% 
Bakersfield, CA 22.55% 32.45% 9.91% 43.94% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 38.10% 50.86% 12.75% 33.47% 
Baton Rouge, LA 20.24% 31.46% 11.22% 55.41% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 26.98% 39.47% 12.49% 46.28% 
Bellingham, WA 22.90% 35.95% 13.05% 57.01% 
Benton Harbor, MI 29.11% 40.73% 11.62% 39.92% 
Billings, MT 25.84% 41.29% 15.45% 59.78% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 22.38% 35.97% 13.59% 60.71% 
Binghamton, NY 27.00% 39.56% 12.56% 46.50% 
Birmingham, AL 22.60% 35.93% 13.32% 58.95% 
Bloomington, IN 21.63% 38.51% 16.88% 78.06% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 19.33% 33.41% 14.08% 72.85% 
Boise City, ID 20.06% 31.88% 11.82% 58.91% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 24.07% 35.87% 11.81% 49.05% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 24.38% 36.73% 12.35% 50.65% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 17.29% 22.98% 5.69% 32.90% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 26.09% 39.44% 13.35% 51.20% 
Canton-Massillon, OH 27.05% 39.62% 12.57% 46.45% 
Cedar Rapids, IA 23.40% 34.35% 10.95% 46.77% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 21.51% 36.56% 15.05% 69.96% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 22.91% 37.62% 14.72% 64.24% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 19.50% 30.15% 10.65% 54.62% 
Charlottesville, VA 23.91% 37.67% 13.76% 57.56% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 27.09% 36.97% 9.88% 36.49% 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 21.85% 33.80% 11.95% 54.68% 
Chico-Paradise, CA 28.93% 42.25% 13.32% 46.06% 
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MSA 
% of MSA 
that is 
older in 
2010 
% of MSA 
that is 
older in 
2030 
Change in 
% of MSA 
that is 
older 
% Change 
in % of 
MSA that 
is older 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 21.83% 32.72% 10.89% 49.91% 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 15.52% 26.57% 11.05% 71.16% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 24.77% 37.43% 12.65% 51.07% 
Colorado Springs, CO 18.18% 27.92% 9.74% 53.56% 
Columbia, MO 20.32% 23.50% 3.17% 15.62% 
Columbia, SC 20.08% 35.40% 15.32% 76.32% 
Columbus, GA-AL 22.95% 31.47% 8.52% 37.13% 
Columbus, OH 19.47% 32.36% 12.89% 66.22% 
Corpus Christi, TX 23.82% 37.02% 13.19% 55.39% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 18.23% 28.14% 9.91% 54.37% 
Danville, VA 32.28% 43.54% 11.25% 34.86% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 25.53% 40.55% 15.02% 58.83% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 26.41% 38.45% 12.05% 45.63% 
Daytona Beach, FL 34.58% 44.63% 10.05% 29.05% 
Decatur, AL 27.81% 34.27% 6.46% 23.24% 
Decatur, IL 28.40% 43.60% 15.19% 53.49% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 20.12% 30.86% 10.74% 53.35% 
Des Moines, IA 19.57% 29.55% 9.98% 51.00% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 23.29% 36.69% 13.40% 57.53% 
Dothan, AL 25.36% 41.35% 15.99% 63.08% 
Dover, DE 24.62% 30.93% 6.31% 25.62% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 26.07% 36.17% 10.10% 38.75% 
Eau Claire, WI 24.44% 33.73% 9.29% 38.02% 
El Paso, TX 20.24% 32.26% 12.02% 59.37% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 23.74% 41.16% 17.42% 73.39% 
Erie, PA 25.61% 38.98% 13.37% 52.20% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 25.24% 38.63% 13.40% 53.09% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 23.61% 34.91% 11.30% 47.88% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 19.13% 26.51% 7.38% 38.57% 
Fayetteville, NC 20.34% 29.76% 9.42% 46.34% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 22.54% 32.82% 10.28% 45.63% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 18.48% 32.79% 14.31% 77.41% 
Florence, AL 28.96% 47.60% 18.64% 64.34% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 22.43% 37.27% 14.84% 66.17% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 38.54% 49.32% 10.78% 27.97% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 37.38% 48.79% 11.41% 30.53% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 24.89% 38.80% 13.90% 55.86% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 24.56% 38.13% 13.57% 55.24% 
Fort Wayne, IN 22.65% 32.01% 9.36% 41.34% 
Fresno, CA 23.62% 39.08% 15.46% 65.48% 
Gadsden, AL 28.75% 46.68% 17.93% 62.35% 
Gainesville, FL 22.87% 30.68% 7.81% 34.15% 
Glens Falls, NY 25.79% 37.59% 11.79% 45.73% 
Goldsboro, NC 24.47% 40.61% 16.15% 65.98% 
Grand Junction, CO 27.61% 39.97% 12.36% 44.79% 
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Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 21.70% 30.16% 8.46% 39.00% 
Green Bay, WI 20.13% 26.56% 6.43% 31.95% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 24.10% 38.93% 14.83% 61.56% 
Greenville, NC 21.89% 38.06% 16.17% 73.87% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 24.77% 37.74% 12.97% 52.39% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 26.09% 35.82% 9.73% 37.29% 
Hartford, CT 26.45% 38.15% 11.70% 44.25% 
Hattiesburg, MS 19.54% 34.11% 14.57% 74.58% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 25.99% 37.39% 11.39% 43.84% 
Honolulu, HI 28.36% 41.09% 12.72% 44.86% 
Houma, LA 26.28% 29.36% 3.08% 11.71% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 18.45% 28.77% 10.32% 55.94% 
Huntsville, AL 22.87% 35.01% 12.14% 53.07% 
Indianapolis, IN 20.99% 32.82% 11.83% 56.38% 
Iowa City, IA 18.85% 23.92% 5.07% 26.90% 
Jackson, MI 26.12% 34.18% 8.07% 30.89% 
Jackson, MS 20.96% 31.87% 10.91% 52.07% 
Jackson, TN 23.85% 39.95% 16.10% 67.53% 
Jacksonville, FL 21.32% 30.24% 8.92% 41.86% 
Jacksonville, NC 18.22% 28.07% 9.85% 54.06% 
Jamestown, NY 27.37% 40.94% 13.57% 49.57% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 24.47% 32.89% 8.42% 34.41% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 27.67% 38.87% 11.19% 40.45% 
Johnstown, PA 31.49% 39.49% 8.00% 25.41% 
Joplin, MO 24.05% 36.71% 12.66% 52.65% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 23.99% 33.49% 9.50% 39.62% 
Kansas City, MO-KS 21.97% 32.58% 10.61% 48.28% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 18.35% 31.47% 13.13% 71.54% 
Knoxville, TN 23.88% 38.34% 14.46% 60.56% 
Kokomo, IN 28.20% 40.68% 12.49% 44.29% 
La Crosse, WI-MN 24.36% 31.66% 7.31% 30.00% 
Lafayette, LA 19.02% 29.54% 10.51% 55.26% 
Lafayette, IN 23.64% 39.42% 15.78% 66.77% 
Lake Charles, LA 23.28% 33.80% 10.53% 45.21% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 32.82% 42.58% 9.76% 29.74% 
Lancaster, PA 25.52% 35.30% 9.77% 38.29% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 20.69% 30.92% 10.22% 49.41% 
Laredo, TX 17.61% 31.65% 14.04% 79.75% 
Las Cruces, NM 25.05% 37.49% 12.44% 49.66% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 22.33% 34.35% 12.02% 53.86% 
Lexington, KY 20.23% 35.18% 14.95% 73.88% 
Lima, OH 26.54% 39.49% 12.95% 48.82% 
Lincoln, NE 20.87% 26.79% 5.92% 28.37% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 21.25% 30.25% 9.00% 42.38% 
Longview-Marshall, TX 28.56% 35.92% 7.36% 25.77% 
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Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 23.56% 36.27% 12.71% 53.95% 
Louisville, KY-IN 22.61% 36.82% 14.21% 62.85% 
Lubbock, TX 22.83% 34.65% 11.82% 51.77% 
Lynchburg, VA 28.05% 40.84% 12.78% 45.57% 
Macon, GA 21.74% 32.51% 10.77% 49.53% 
Madison, WI 18.34% 28.43% 10.09% 55.03% 
Mansfield, OH 27.83% 44.75% 16.91% 60.76% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 22.69% 34.68% 11.99% 52.84% 
Medford-Ashland, OR 29.94% 40.97% 11.02% 36.82% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 32.03% 41.38% 9.36% 29.22% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 19.85% 33.37% 13.52% 68.09% 
Merced, CA 22.70% 39.09% 16.39% 72.23% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 25.19% 34.80% 9.61% 38.17% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 23.21% 33.25% 10.04% 43.27% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 19.73% 27.72% 7.99% 40.49% 
Mobile, AL 25.16% 38.80% 13.65% 54.25% 
Modesto, CA 21.98% 38.27% 16.29% 74.09% 
Monroe, LA 22.76% 32.44% 9.68% 42.52% 
Montgomery, AL 23.69% 36.79% 13.10% 55.29% 
Muncie, IN 28.55% 36.63% 8.08% 28.32% 
Myrtle Beach, SC 28.97% 42.49% 13.52% 46.67% 
Naples, FL 47.35% 57.70% 10.35% 21.85% 
Nashville, TN 19.95% 29.75% 9.80% 49.15% 
New Orleans, LA 21.96% 33.93% 11.97% 54.50% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-
PA (C) 24.54% 37.71% 13.17% 53.66% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 21.94% 34.92% 12.97% 59.11% 
Ocala, FL 41.52% 48.46% 6.94% 16.70% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 21.49% 34.91% 13.43% 62.48% 
Oklahoma City, OK 24.67% 36.08% 11.41% 46.26% 
Omaha, NE-IA 20.37% 29.86% 9.48% 46.54% 
Orlando, FL 23.12% 33.22% 10.10% 43.67% 
Panama City, FL 26.76% 33.80% 7.04% 26.31% 
Pensacola, FL 26.81% 32.92% 6.10% 22.76% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 24.32% 36.99% 12.67% 52.11% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 24.60% 38.07% 13.48% 54.78% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 23.66% 35.15% 11.49% 48.58% 
Pittsburgh, PA 28.56% 40.49% 11.93% 41.79% 
Portland, ME 20.88% 26.39% 5.51% 26.37% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 21.19% 33.61% 12.42% 58.64% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 24.99% 37.79% 12.80% 51.23% 
Provo-Orem, UT 18.14% 27.19% 9.06% 49.96% 
Pueblo, CO 31.04% 42.07% 11.03% 35.55% 
Punta Gorda, FL 48.38% 57.18% 8.80% 18.20% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 18.69% 28.82% 10.13% 54.20% 
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Reading, PA 26.95% 38.36% 11.41% 42.35% 
Redding, CA 30.21% 46.58% 16.37% 54.21% 
Reno, NV 22.53% 31.74% 9.21% 40.87% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 22.65% 33.83% 11.19% 49.39% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 22.18% 34.23% 12.05% 54.35% 
Roanoke, VA 26.59% 39.07% 12.48% 46.92% 
Rochester, MN 22.73% 30.50% 7.77% 34.19% 
Rochester, NY 23.75% 37.17% 13.41% 56.46% 
Rockford, IL 24.58% 34.75% 10.17% 41.39% 
Rocky Mount, NC 26.10% 38.77% 12.67% 48.52% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 22.76% 36.55% 13.79% 60.58% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 27.57% 37.57% 9.99% 36.24% 
St. Cloud, MN 21.22% 28.61% 7.39% 34.85% 
St. Joseph, MO 26.55% 36.78% 10.23% 38.53% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 23.28% 36.18% 12.90% 55.43% 
Salinas, CA 28.43% 40.64% 12.21% 42.94% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 19.60% 25.40% 5.81% 29.64% 
San Antonio, TX 21.79% 31.43% 9.63% 44.21% 
San Diego, CA 21.97% 33.61% 11.65% 53.02% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 23.63% 34.56% 10.93% 46.26% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 29.64% 42.23% 12.59% 42.46% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 27.79% 42.76% 14.96% 53.84% 
Santa Fe, NM 26.40% 43.84% 17.44% 66.04% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 43.90% 55.93% 12.03% 27.40% 
Savannah, GA 22.10% 38.59% 16.50% 74.66% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 29.19% 43.06% 13.87% 47.53% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 19.64% 32.39% 12.75% 64.95% 
Sharon, PA 31.25% 46.06% 14.81% 47.38% 
Sheboygan, WI 26.21% 34.52% 8.31% 31.69% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 24.21% 38.57% 14.36% 59.33% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 25.77% 47.50% 21.72% 84.28% 
Sioux Falls, SD 24.72% 36.06% 11.34% 45.85% 
South Bend, IN 24.99% 40.48% 15.49% 61.99% 
Spokane, WA 23.34% 37.90% 14.55% 62.35% 
Springfield, IL 25.87% 39.69% 13.82% 53.43% 
Springfield, MO 24.93% 32.30% 7.37% 29.57% 
Springfield, MA 25.50% 37.58% 12.08% 47.35% 
State College, PA 25.92% 34.98% 9.06% 34.94% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 21.68% 36.42% 14.74% 67.98% 
Sumter, SC 25.37% 35.44% 10.07% 39.69% 
Syracuse, NY 24.67% 37.36% 12.69% 51.44% 
Tallahassee, FL 21.68% 27.04% 5.36% 24.73% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 28.99% 38.21% 9.22% 31.79% 
Terre Haute, IN 26.98% 38.13% 11.16% 41.36% 
Toledo, OH 23.59% 36.43% 12.84% 54.45% 
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Topeka, KS 25.40% 43.03% 17.63% 69.43% 
Tucson, AZ 28.29% 40.55% 12.26% 43.35% 
Tulsa, OK 24.77% 34.59% 9.82% 39.64% 
Tuscaloosa, AL 22.75% 30.33% 7.58% 33.30% 
Tyler, TX 28.47% 40.25% 11.78% 41.39% 
Utica-Rome, NY 29.46% 40.94% 11.48% 38.98% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 22.68% 36.54% 13.86% 61.10% 
Waco, TX 24.80% 36.16% 11.36% 45.81% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 20.77% 33.82% 13.05% 62.85% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 27.06% 37.27% 10.22% 37.76% 
Wausau, WI 21.96% 31.80% 9.84% 44.80% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 39.36% 47.95% 8.59% 21.83% 
Wichita, KS 23.17% 34.43% 11.26% 48.61% 
Wichita Falls, TX 27.68% 42.80% 15.12% 54.61% 
Williamsport, PA 28.00% 36.27% 8.27% 29.55% 
Wilmington, NC 26.56% 41.45% 14.89% 56.08% 
Yakima, WA 26.54% 44.33% 17.79% 67.04% 
York, PA 24.80% 32.55% 7.75% 31.23% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 28.87% 42.27% 13.40% 46.41% 
Yuba City, CA 28.02% 38.25% 10.23% 36.51% 
Yuma, AZ 32.68% 50.36% 17.69% 54.12% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from the Sorting simulation 
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Table 33. % of all older HH in the MSA (with change and % change) under the sorting 
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Abilene, TX 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 9.14% 
Albany, GA 0.06% 0.06% 0.00% -1.18% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.44% 0.67% 0.24% 53.87% 
Albuquerque, NM 0.39% 0.39% 0.00% 0.06% 
Alexandria, LA 0.08% 0.10% 0.02% 26.97% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 0.40% 0.38% -0.02% -4.58% 
Altoona, PA 0.09% 0.10% 0.01% 13.87% 
Amarillo, TX 0.10% 0.12% 0.02% 16.04% 
Anchorage, AK 0.07% 0.03% -0.04% -54.30% 
Anniston, AL 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 12.18% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 0.20% 0.16% -0.05% -22.72% 
Asheville, NC 0.16% 0.13% -0.03% -20.27% 
Athens, GA 0.06% 0.08% 0.02% 30.98% 
Atlanta, GA 1.51% 1.52% 0.01% 0.85% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 0.05% 0.07% 0.01% 27.75% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 0.24% 0.27% 0.04% 15.66% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 0.46% 0.49% 0.03% 7.09% 
Bakersfield, CA 0.25% 0.29% 0.05% 19.80% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 0.13% 0.16% 0.03% 25.72% 
Baton Rouge, LA 0.29% 0.28% -0.01% -4.82% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.21% 0.28% 0.07% 32.51% 
Bellingham, WA 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% 2.06% 
Benton Harbor, MI 0.10% 0.12% 0.02% 19.11% 
Billings, MT 0.09% 0.07% -0.02% -23.01% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 0.15% 0.14% -0.01% -9.42% 
Binghamton, NY 0.15% 0.27% 0.11% 74.32% 
Birmingham, AL 0.43% 0.43% 0.00% -0.69% 
Bloomington, IN 0.06% 0.06% 0.01% 8.79% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 0.07% 0.10% 0.03% 46.64% 
Boise City, ID 0.23% 0.18% -0.05% -22.15% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) 2.41% 1.86% -0.55% -22.89% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 0.11% 0.15% 0.04% 34.77% 
Bryan-College Station, TX 0.05% 0.04% -0.01% -13.59% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.68% 0.96% 0.27% 40.39% 
Canton-Massillon, OH 0.26% 0.30% 0.04% 13.96% 
Cedar Rapids, IA 0.12% 0.08% -0.04% -33.04% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 0.08% 0.10% 0.02% 25.25% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 0.25% 0.26% 0.02% 6.09% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 0.78% 0.71% -0.07% -9.11% 
Charlottesville, VA 0.09% 0.11% 0.02% 23.70% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA 0.28% 0.24% -0.04% -14.30% 
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Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) 3.59% 3.48% -0.10% -2.80% 
Chico-Paradise, CA 0.13% 0.17% 0.04% 32.21% 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) 0.91% 0.80% -0.11% -11.81% 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 0.05% 0.05% 0.00% 3.69% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 1.63% 1.92% 0.29% 17.69% 
Colorado Springs, CO 0.22% 0.20% -0.02% -9.49% 
Columbia, MO 0.06% 0.05% -0.01% -16.13% 
Columbia, SC 0.27% 0.29% 0.02% 8.87% 
Columbus, GA-AL 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% -1.06% 
Columbus, OH 0.68% 0.78% 0.10% 15.20% 
Corpus Christi, TX 0.12% 0.14% 0.02% 17.40% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) 1.91% 2.24% 0.33% 17.42% 
Danville, VA 0.09% 0.09% 0.01% 7.67% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 0.15% 0.17% 0.02% 11.74% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.58% 0.66% 0.08% 13.21% 
Daytona Beach, FL 0.37% 0.30% -0.06% -16.74% 
Decatur, AL 0.10% 0.07% -0.02% -24.45% 
Decatur, IL 0.08% 0.09% 0.02% 23.06% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) 1.06% 1.09% 0.04% 3.62% 
Des Moines, IA 0.18% 0.10% -0.07% -40.87% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) 2.47% 2.40% -0.08% -3.20% 
Dothan, AL 0.09% 0.22% 0.14% 156.80% 
Dover, DE 0.08% 0.05% -0.02% -31.12% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 0.13% 0.13% 0.00% 2.86% 
Eau Claire, WI 0.09% 0.08% -0.01% -9.84% 
El Paso, TX 0.18% 0.21% 0.03% 18.63% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 0.09% 0.08% -0.01% -10.63% 
Erie, PA 0.16% 0.18% 0.02% 14.28% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 0.20% 0.19% -0.01% -2.90% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 0.15% 0.14% -0.01% -5.82% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% -44.10% 
Fayetteville, NC 0.12% 0.10% -0.02% -19.11% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 0.18% 0.14% -0.04% -19.97% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT 0.04% 0.06% 0.02% 36.99% 
Florence, AL 0.10% 0.12% 0.01% 11.57% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.12% 0.12% 0.00% 3.46% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.47% 0.44% -0.03% -6.13% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 0.32% 0.28% -0.04% -12.53% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 0.10% 0.08% -0.02% -23.14% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 0.09% 0.10% 0.01% 6.00% 
Fort Wayne, IN 0.24% 0.22% -0.03% -11.11% 
Fresno, CA 0.34% 0.46% 0.12% 37.11% 
Gadsden, AL 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 18.89% 
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Gainesville, FL 0.10% 0.09% -0.01% -10.38% 
Glens Falls, NY 0.08% 0.17% 0.09% 115.53% 
Goldsboro, NC 0.07% 0.12% 0.06% 84.47% 
Grand Junction, CO 0.08% 0.08% 0.00% -0.37% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI 0.46% 0.41% -0.05% -11.16% 
Green Bay, WI 0.11% 0.08% -0.03% -29.77% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 0.75% 0.76% 0.01% 1.55% 
Greenville, NC 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 8.74% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 0.49% 0.48% -0.02% -3.31% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 0.41% 0.41% 0.00% 0.81% 
Hartford, CT 0.35% 0.27% -0.08% -22.00% 
Hattiesburg, MS 0.05% 0.05% 0.00% -3.37% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 0.21% 0.22% 0.01% 2.41% 
Honolulu, HI 0.40% 0.35% -0.05% -11.39% 
Houma, LA 0.06% 0.04% -0.01% -22.47% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) 1.61% 1.77% 0.16% 9.82% 
Huntsville, AL 0.21% 0.20% 0.00% -1.06% 
Indianapolis, IN 0.83% 0.73% -0.10% -11.73% 
Iowa City, IA 0.05% 0.02% -0.02% -45.72% 
Jackson, MI 0.09% 0.08% -0.02% -18.23% 
Jackson, MS 0.22% 0.20% -0.02% -8.34% 
Jackson, TN 0.06% 0.07% 0.02% 28.87% 
Jacksonville, FL 0.56% 0.51% -0.06% -10.04% 
Jacksonville, NC 0.05% 0.05% 0.00% 1.76% 
Jamestown, NY 0.09% 0.19% 0.11% 123.32% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI 0.09% 0.06% -0.03% -30.81% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 0.23% 0.23% 0.00% 2.09% 
Johnstown, PA 0.17% 0.23% 0.06% 37.39% 
Joplin, MO 0.09% 0.14% 0.05% 51.46% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 0.24% 0.26% 0.02% 8.13% 
Kansas City, MO-KS 0.89% 0.67% -0.22% -24.78% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 0.11% 0.16% 0.06% 54.50% 
Knoxville, TN 0.36% 0.43% 0.06% 17.44% 
Kokomo, IN 0.07% 0.06% -0.01% -10.78% 
La Crosse, WI-MN 0.06% 0.04% -0.02% -28.22% 
Lafayette, LA 0.11% 0.10% -0.01% -8.97% 
Lafayette, IN 0.09% 0.08% 0.00% -3.69% 
Lake Charles, LA 0.10% 0.11% 0.01% 9.53% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 0.37% 0.35% -0.02% -6.27% 
Lancaster, PA 0.28% 0.23% -0.05% -17.44% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 0.20% 0.22% 0.02% 9.36% 
Laredo, TX 0.04% 0.05% 0.01% 30.42% 
Las Cruces, NM 0.08% 0.06% -0.02% -21.24% 
159 
 
MSA 
% of all 
older HH 
in the 
MSA in 
2010 
% of all 
older HH 
in the 
MSA in 
2030 
Change in 
% of all 
older HH 
in the 
MSA in 
2030 
% Change 
in % of all 
older HH 
in the 
MSA in 
2030 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 0.69% 0.71% 0.02% 2.89% 
Lexington, KY 0.12% 0.12% 0.00% -3.69% 
Lima, OH 0.09% 0.13% 0.04% 39.32% 
Lincoln, NE 0.12% 0.06% -0.06% -47.45% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 0.31% 0.23% -0.08% -26.71% 
Longview-Marshall, TX 0.11% 0.10% 0.00% -2.38% 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 5.03% 6.48% 1.45% 28.93% 
Louisville, KY-IN 0.52% 0.57% 0.06% 10.72% 
Lubbock, TX 0.12% 0.15% 0.02% 19.79% 
Lynchburg, VA 0.15% 0.16% 0.01% 8.08% 
Macon, GA 0.16% 0.16% 0.00% -1.31% 
Madison, WI 0.19% 0.15% -0.04% -22.20% 
Mansfield, OH 0.08% 0.09% 0.01% 15.86% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.16% 0.19% 0.02% 14.30% 
Medford-Ashland, OR 0.14% 0.12% -0.02% -12.57% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.38% 0.34% -0.04% -11.07% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 0.44% 0.37% -0.07% -15.09% 
Merced, CA 0.07% 0.10% 0.04% 55.45% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 0.97% 0.88% -0.09% -8.84% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) 0.89% 0.56% -0.33% -36.77% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 1.30% 0.89% -0.41% -31.71% 
Mobile, AL 0.32% 0.29% -0.03% -10.80% 
Modesto, CA 0.16% 0.24% 0.08% 48.02% 
Monroe, LA 0.08% 0.08% 0.00% -1.99% 
Montgomery, AL 0.19% 0.18% -0.01% -4.68% 
Muncie, IN 0.07% 0.07% -0.01% -11.54% 
Myrtle Beach, SC 0.18% 0.16% -0.02% -9.63% 
Naples, FL 0.27% 0.24% -0.03% -10.80% 
Nashville, TN 0.62% 0.61% -0.02% -2.55% 
New Orleans, LA 0.50% 0.51% 0.01% 2.78% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 
(C) 7.75% 5.87% -1.87% -24.17% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- 0.72% 0.73% 0.01% 1.31% 
Ocala, FL 0.30% 0.25% -0.06% -19.07% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 0.10% 0.13% 0.02% 24.07% 
Oklahoma City, OK 0.45% 0.35% -0.10% -22.18% 
Omaha, NE-IA 0.28% 0.20% -0.08% -30.18% 
Orlando, FL 0.77% 0.76% -0.01% -0.97% 
Panama City, FL 0.09% 0.08% -0.01% -14.81% 
Pensacola, FL 0.25% 0.21% -0.03% -14.04% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 0.20% 0.26% 0.06% 29.25% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) 3.14% 2.06% -1.08% -34.32% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 1.60% 1.54% -0.06% -3.77% 
Pittsburgh, PA 1.54% 1.62% 0.07% 4.84% 
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Portland, ME 0.12% 0.06% -0.07% -55.10% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 1.07% 1.00% -0.08% -7.25% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 0.49% 0.65% 0.16% 32.13% 
Provo-Orem, UT 0.13% 0.12% -0.01% -7.12% 
Pueblo, CO 0.10% 0.08% -0.01% -11.87% 
Punta Gorda, FL 0.19% 0.15% -0.04% -19.55% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 0.58% 0.53% -0.05% -8.96% 
Reading, PA 0.23% 0.23% 0.01% 2.78% 
Redding, CA 0.12% 0.16% 0.04% 36.90% 
Reno, NV 0.18% 0.16% -0.02% -13.29% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 0.10% 0.09% -0.01% -7.29% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 0.53% 0.60% 0.08% 14.38% 
Roanoke, VA 0.16% 0.17% 0.01% 5.18% 
Rochester, MN 0.07% 0.05% -0.02% -31.31% 
Rochester, NY 0.54% 0.89% 0.35% 65.33% 
Rockford, IL 0.18% 0.18% 0.00% 0.44% 
Rocky Mount, NC 0.09% 0.10% 0.00% 4.67% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 0.86% 1.12% 0.26% 29.92% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 0.25% 0.29% 0.04% 14.85% 
St. Cloud, MN 0.09% 0.10% 0.01% 11.48% 
St. Joseph, MO 0.06% 0.08% 0.02% 27.56% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 1.45% 1.44% 0.00% -0.11% 
Salinas, CA 0.09% 0.11% 0.03% 29.79% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 0.52% 0.42% -0.10% -18.87% 
San Antonio, TX 0.74% 0.80% 0.06% 8.02% 
San Diego, CA 0.99% 1.29% 0.30% 30.41% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 2.56% 3.11% 0.55% 21.31% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 0.15% 0.18% 0.02% 14.22% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 0.17% 0.26% 0.08% 48.00% 
Santa Fe, NM 0.10% 0.12% 0.02% 20.10% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 0.70% 0.63% -0.06% -8.96% 
Savannah, GA 0.12% 0.14% 0.02% 15.80% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 0.43% 0.55% 0.12% 28.36% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) 1.49% 1.60% 0.11% 7.59% 
Sharon, PA 0.09% 0.14% 0.05% 59.18% 
Sheboygan, WI 0.07% 0.06% -0.01% -7.89% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 0.22% 0.24% 0.02% 8.93% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 0.05% 0.05% -0.01% -12.45% 
Sioux Falls, SD 0.06% 0.03% -0.03% -51.05% 
South Bend, IN 0.14% 0.14% 0.00% -1.39% 
Spokane, WA 0.24% 0.26% 0.02% 7.43% 
Springfield, IL 0.07% 0.07% 0.00% -0.02% 
Springfield, MO 0.22% 0.24% 0.02% 9.10% 
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Springfield, MA 0.29% 0.37% 0.07% 25.18% 
State College, PA 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 20.18% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.20% 0.28% 0.08% 39.52% 
Sumter, SC 0.06% 0.06% 0.00% -2.90% 
Syracuse, NY 0.40% 0.74% 0.34% 85.09% 
Tallahassee, FL 0.14% 0.10% -0.03% -24.37% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 1.64% 1.50% -0.14% -8.82% 
Terre Haute, IN 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% -1.18% 
Toledo, OH 0.32% 0.39% 0.07% 20.16% 
Topeka, KS 0.10% 0.09% -0.01% -13.03% 
Tucson, AZ 0.53% 0.55% 0.02% 3.02% 
Tulsa, OK 0.37% 0.26% -0.11% -30.47% 
Tuscaloosa, AL 0.08% 0.08% 0.00% -4.52% 
Tyler, TX 0.12% 0.14% 0.02% 17.65% 
Utica-Rome, NY 0.20% 0.36% 0.17% 84.27% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 0.13% 0.20% 0.08% 59.73% 
Waco, TX 0.11% 0.14% 0.03% 28.72% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) 3.10% 2.69% -0.42% -13.42% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 0.08% 0.06% -0.02% -24.23% 
Wausau, WI 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 17.98% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 0.95% 0.82% -0.13% -13.65% 
Wichita, KS 0.28% 0.20% -0.08% -28.06% 
Wichita Falls, TX 0.07% 0.08% 0.01% 20.64% 
Williamsport, PA 0.07% 0.11% 0.04% 51.82% 
Wilmington, NC 0.20% 0.20% 0.00% -0.35% 
Yakima, WA 0.10% 0.10% 0.00% -0.40% 
York, PA 0.24% 0.21% -0.03% -13.44% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 0.39% 0.46% 0.07% 17.24% 
Yuba City, CA 0.07% 0.09% 0.02% 30.30% 
Yuma, AZ 0.09% 0.08% -0.01% -10.15% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from the Sorting simulation 
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Table 34. Net migration of older HHs (with % change) 
MSA 
Net Migration 
of older 
% Chng in 
older HHs due 
to migration 
Abilene, TX 5,160 47.38% 
Albany, GA -1,342 -14.31% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 57,302 84.19% 
Albuquerque, NM -6,089 -9.96% 
Alexandria, LA 9,167 76.35% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 9,634 15.46% 
Altoona, PA 7,571 55.02% 
Amarillo, TX 2,217 13.90% 
Anchorage, AK -25,767 -245.38% 
Anniston, AL 3,865 35.01% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI -11,841 -37.23% 
Asheville, NC -4,932 -19.75% 
Athens, GA 3,928 39.82% 
Atlanta, GA -135,143 -57.60% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 2,870 34.30% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 5,691 15.50% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX -29,074 -40.86% 
Bakersfield, CA 9,848 25.81% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 20,469 102.72% 
Baton Rouge, LA -14,003 -31.05% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 23,007 70.31% 
Bellingham, WA 4 0.03% 
Benton Harbor, MI 8,822 55.23% 
Billings, MT -1,755 -12.29% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS -4,431 -18.70% 
Binghamton, NY 31,057 129.62% 
Birmingham, AL -3,480 -5.22% 
Bloomington, IN 1,202 13.57% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 4,150 41.07% 
Boise City, ID -16,142 -44.99% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) -143,340 -38.24% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 14,075 81.48% 
Bryan-College Station, TX -2,932 -39.86% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 80,748 76.37% 
Canton-Massillon, OH 15,370 38.22% 
Cedar Rapids, IA -8,065 -44.88% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 5,059 39.85% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 1,237 3.20% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC -47,232 -39.07% 
Charlottesville, VA 5,995 43.04% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA -1,292 -2.93% 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) -80,251 -14.41% 
Chico-Paradise, CA 15,816 78.58% 
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Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) -46,028 -32.63% 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY -3,487 -45.17% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 76,248 30.03% 
Colorado Springs, CO -21,150 -61.02% 
Columbia, MO -4,035 -40.84% 
Columbia, SC -7,431 -17.78% 
Columbus, GA-AL 47 0.35% 
Columbus, OH -3,413 -3.24% 
Corpus Christi, TX 5,064 27.23% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) -41,213 -13.88% 
Danville, VA 6,876 51.51% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 7,563 32.47% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 34,571 38.06% 
Daytona Beach, FL 12,416 21.82% 
Decatur, AL -1,791 -11.95% 
Decatur, IL 8,119 68.18% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) -39,370 -23.99% 
Des Moines, IA -23,310 -84.58% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) -41,627 -10.83% 
Dothan, AL 35,626 261.94% 
Dover, DE -5,842 -48.96% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 3,496 17.42% 
Eau Claire, WI -550 -3.91% 
El Paso, TX 7,066 25.95% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN -2,039 -14.67% 
Erie, PA 8,111 32.72% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 1,993 6.55% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY -1,786 -7.67% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN -8,279 -86.86% 
Fayetteville, NC -8,226 -44.35% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR -8,916 -32.44% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT -1,367 -21.05% 
Florence, AL 7,975 49.15% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO -1,026 -5.49% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 37,226 51.47% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 21,137 42.23% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK -2,859 -18.78% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 880 6.05% 
Fort Wayne, IN -6,041 -16.02% 
Fresno, CA 32,481 62.10% 
Gadsden, AL 5,395 50.26% 
Gainesville, FL -3,129 -20.38% 
Glens Falls, NY 23,297 187.46% 
Goldsboro, NC 14,630 144.21% 
Grand Junction, CO 2,588 21.31% 
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Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI -20,249 -28.13% 
Green Bay, WI -11,721 -66.73% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 4,819 4.12% 
Greenville, NC 1,732 15.26% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 2,905 3.79% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 10,761 17.03% 
Hartford, CT -9,647 -17.72% 
Hattiesburg, MS -2,496 -30.28% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 5,213 15.90% 
Honolulu, HI 11,105 17.97% 
Houma, LA -1,275 -14.62% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) -71,661 -28.63% 
Huntsville, AL -3,111 -9.74% 
Indianapolis, IN -41,900 -32.54% 
Iowa City, IA -6,914 -98.18% 
Jackson, MI -2,165 -15.05% 
Jackson, MS -10,794 -31.86% 
Jackson, TN 3,415 39.92% 
Jacksonville, FL -33,421 -38.10% 
Jacksonville, NC -1,710 -22.43% 
Jamestown, NY 27,551 203.75% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI -5,713 -41.53% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 9,835 27.79% 
Johnstown, PA 26,063 98.18% 
Joplin, MO 14,371 100.67% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 6,205 16.47% 
Kansas City, MO-KS -61,334 -44.32% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 9,130 55.82% 
Knoxville, TN 17,440 30.90% 
Kokomo, IN 158 1.50% 
La Crosse, WI-MN -3,372 -35.98% 
Lafayette, LA -9,983 -56.27% 
Lafayette, IN 384 2.90% 
Lake Charles, LA 994 6.47% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 21,104 36.64% 
Lancaster, PA -5,252 -12.29% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI -3,292 -10.39% 
Laredo, TX 3,215 55.57% 
Las Cruces, NM -1,604 -13.26% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 4,727 4.41% 
Lexington, KY -3,857 -20.15% 
Lima, OH 12,181 83.75% 
Lincoln, NE -15,426 -81.31% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -27,130 -56.24% 
Longview-Marshall, TX 3,624 21.80% 
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Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 394,922 50.58% 
Louisville, KY-IN 8,407 10.48% 
Lubbock, TX 6,668 34.97% 
Lynchburg, VA 8,051 34.45% 
Macon, GA -4,168 -16.76% 
Madison, WI -20,538 -68.15% 
Mansfield, OH 5,238 42.91% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 11,691 46.09% 
Medford-Ashland, OR 2,164 10.05% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 11,067 18.53% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS -37,079 -54.54% 
Merced, CA 8,438 82.77% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) -400 -0.27% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -79,821 -57.60% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -162,528 -80.48% 
Mobile, AL -6,209 -12.35% 
Modesto, CA 15,427 61.29% 
Monroe, LA -1,270 -10.65% 
Montgomery, AL -211 -0.73% 
Muncie, IN 2,379 20.73% 
Myrtle Beach, SC 2,689 9.69% 
Naples, FL 27,808 65.21% 
Nashville, TN -25,650 -26.55% 
New Orleans, LA -10,159 -13.08% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) -360,655 -29.98% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- -9,854 -8.83% 
Ocala, FL 20,795 44.06% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 5,064 31.45% 
Oklahoma City, OK -18,637 -26.78% 
Omaha, NE-IA -25,995 -59.62% 
Orlando, FL -84 -0.07% 
Panama City, FL -374 -2.54% 
Pensacola, FL -2,547 -6.66% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 17,651 55.66% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) -246,967 -50.69% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 10,106 4.05% 
Pittsburgh, PA 80,964 33.84% 
Portland, ME -20,568 -106.96% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) -39,992 -23.96% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 44,076 57.97% 
Provo-Orem, UT -1,318 -6.67% 
Pueblo, CO 2,788 18.76% 
Punta Gorda, FL 16,010 54.84% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC -44,400 -48.95% 
Reading, PA 6,814 19.44% 
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Redding, CA 16,027 86.93% 
Reno, NV -8,343 -29.68% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA -2,720 -18.07% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 8,415 10.26% 
Roanoke, VA 6,012 24.38% 
Rochester, MN -5,187 -47.80% 
Rochester, NY 82,437 98.82% 
Rockford, IL 1,973 7.08% 
Rocky Mount, NC 3,061 21.34% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 54,344 40.58% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 18,657 48.06% 
St. Cloud, MN 2,197 16.58% 
St. Joseph, MO 6,428 65.83% 
St. Louis, MO-IL -2,736 -1.22% 
Salinas, CA 10,047 74.33% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT -34,543 -42.76% 
San Antonio, TX 10,869 9.48% 
San Diego, CA 66,755 43.49% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 128,928 32.39% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 11,721 48.96% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 27,433 101.88% 
Santa Fe, NM 2,417 16.20% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 65,627 60.79% 
Savannah, GA 2,794 14.77% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 48,714 72.83% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) -50,815 -22.00% 
Sharon, PA 18,540 134.26% 
Sheboygan, WI 270 2.51% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 8,849 25.49% 
Sioux City, IA-NE -5 -0.06% 
Sioux Falls, SD -6,371 -63.92% 
South Bend, IN 1,126 5.12% 
Spokane, WA 5,260 14.18% 
Springfield, IL 2,448 22.34% 
Springfield, MO 9,902 28.69% 
Springfield, MA 21,654 47.48% 
State College, PA 5,371 49.27% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 14,755 47.10% 
Sumter, SC 853 9.66% 
Syracuse, NY 83,472 134.17% 
Tallahassee, FL -11,798 -55.39% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 47,817 18.78% 
Terre Haute, IN 2,638 19.30% 
Toledo, OH 17,999 35.83% 
Topeka, KS -477 -2.98% 
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Tucson, AZ 25,597 31.00% 
Tulsa, OK -22,449 -38.55% 
Tuscaloosa, AL -1,034 -8.20% 
Tyler, TX 12,286 66.08% 
Utica-Rome, NY 48,552 159.35% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 20,773 104.91% 
Waco, TX 9,428 56.52% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) -214,133 -44.45% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA -437 -3.72% 
Wausau, WI 2,488 23.65% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 69,178 46.67% 
Wichita, KS -20,857 -47.34% 
Wichita Falls, TX 5,912 55.09% 
Williamsport, PA 12,584 108.49% 
Wilmington, NC 6,381 20.78% 
Yakima, WA 3,583 23.13% 
York, PA -6,513 -17.13% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 31,645 52.44% 
Yuba City, CA 8,002 73.55% 
Yuma, AZ 6,458 47.25% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from difference between the Sorting simulation and the 
Aging-in-Place simulation 
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Table 35. Change (% change) in proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older due to migration 
MSA 
Change in proportion 
of MSA’s HHs that 
are older due to 
migration 
% Change in 
proportion of MSA’s 
HHs that are older 
due to migration 
Abilene, TX 3.32% 11.72% 
Albany, GA -0.93% -4.03% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.62% 2.63% 
Albuquerque, NM 0.80% 3.62% 
Alexandria, LA 13.10% 46.58% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 1.84% 6.78% 
Altoona, PA 4.70% 16.70% 
Amarillo, TX -0.17% -0.78% 
Anchorage, AK -13.47% -109.58% 
Anniston, AL 9.82% 36.88% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI -2.31% -10.08% 
Asheville, NC -2.09% -8.16% 
Athens, GA 4.79% 22.04% 
Atlanta, GA -4.09% -24.23% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 1.21% 5.82% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 1.14% 5.07% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX -2.74% -17.24% 
Bakersfield, CA -1.16% -5.16% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 3.48% 9.13% 
Baton Rouge, LA -1.57% -7.77% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 2.19% 8.12% 
Bellingham, WA 1.68% 7.36% 
Benton Harbor, MI -1.66% -5.69% 
Billings, MT 7.55% 29.22% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 3.37% 15.07% 
Binghamton, NY -2.30% -8.51% 
Birmingham, AL 1.10% 4.89% 
Bloomington, IN 10.71% 49.51% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL -0.22% -1.16% 
Boise City, ID 3.01% 15.02% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) -2.86% -11.89% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 6.99% 28.67% 
Bryan-College Station, TX -0.85% -4.91% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY -0.12% -0.45% 
Canton-Massillon, OH -0.92% -3.41% 
Cedar Rapids, IA 0.76% 3.26% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 7.26% 33.77% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 3.38% 14.77% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC -1.68% -8.64% 
Charlottesville, VA 3.13% 13.08% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA -2.52% -9.31% 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) -0.46% -2.09% 
Chico-Paradise, CA 1.37% 4.72% 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) -3.12% -14.30% 
169 
 
MSA 
Change in proportion 
of MSA’s HHs that 
are older due to 
migration 
% Change in 
proportion of MSA’s 
HHs that are older 
due to migration 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 1.79% 11.52% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) -2.22% -8.95% 
Colorado Springs, CO -5.46% -30.02% 
Columbia, MO -6.65% -32.73% 
Columbia, SC 0.50% 2.49% 
Columbus, GA-AL -2.17% -9.46% 
Columbus, OH 0.99% 5.09% 
Corpus Christi, TX 0.53% 2.24% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) -3.71% -20.36% 
Danville, VA -4.09% -12.66% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 3.43% 13.44% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.64% 2.44% 
Daytona Beach, FL -1.87% -5.41% 
Decatur, AL -7.35% -26.43% 
Decatur, IL 7.16% 25.20% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) -4.03% -20.04% 
Des Moines, IA -0.98% -5.02% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) -2.13% -9.14% 
Dothan, AL 6.83% 26.95% 
Dover, DE -8.31% -33.76% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI -2.99% -11.47% 
Eau Claire, WI 0.78% 3.19% 
El Paso, TX 4.19% 20.68% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 2.18% 9.19% 
Erie, PA -0.08% -0.32% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 2.66% 10.53% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY -0.44% -1.88% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 0.54% 2.80% 
Fayetteville, NC -0.76% -3.76% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR 0.77% 3.43% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT -8.53% -46.17% 
Florence, AL 9.21% 31.81% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.15% 0.65% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 1.41% 3.65% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 4.20% 11.24% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 5.69% 22.87% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL -4.34% -17.66% 
Fort Wayne, IN -0.57% -2.52% 
Fresno, CA 5.51% 23.32% 
Gadsden, AL 2.72% 9.47% 
Gainesville, FL -2.20% -9.61% 
Glens Falls, NY -4.51% -17.50% 
Goldsboro, NC 5.74% 23.45% 
Grand Junction, CO 1.83% 6.62% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI -4.12% -19.01% 
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MSA 
Change in proportion 
of MSA’s HHs that 
are older due to 
migration 
% Change in 
proportion of MSA’s 
HHs that are older 
due to migration 
Green Bay, WI -5.94% -29.53% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 1.16% 4.83% 
Greenville, NC 9.73% 44.45% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 1.42% 5.73% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA -1.99% -7.64% 
Hartford, CT -0.54% -2.04% 
Hattiesburg, MS 3.33% 17.04% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC -2.73% -10.50% 
Honolulu, HI 6.97% 24.58% 
Houma, LA -6.48% -24.67% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) -4.15% -22.48% 
Huntsville, AL -0.96% -4.18% 
Indianapolis, IN -0.08% -0.37% 
Iowa City, IA -2.91% -15.45% 
Jackson, MI -7.02% -26.88% 
Jackson, MS -1.28% -6.10% 
Jackson, TN 2.85% 11.95% 
Jacksonville, FL -6.46% -30.31% 
Jacksonville, NC 1.44% 7.91% 
Jamestown, NY -4.09% -14.93% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI -5.41% -22.13% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 0.32% 1.16% 
Johnstown, PA -3.06% -9.72% 
Joplin, MO 6.96% 28.93% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI -1.56% -6.52% 
Kansas City, MO-KS -0.33% -1.50% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 2.73% 14.86% 
Knoxville, TN 2.38% 9.95% 
Kokomo, IN -2.30% -8.17% 
La Crosse, WI-MN -5.66% -23.23% 
Lafayette, LA -4.95% -26.01% 
Lafayette, IN 7.19% 30.43% 
Lake Charles, LA -4.38% -18.83% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 1.68% 5.11% 
Lancaster, PA -1.72% -6.75% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI -5.41% -26.14% 
Laredo, TX 12.08% 68.62% 
Las Cruces, NM 4.16% 16.59% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 2.79% 12.48% 
Lexington, KY 5.52% 27.30% 
Lima, OH 3.85% 14.51% 
Lincoln, NE -4.41% -21.11% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -2.33% -10.98% 
Longview-Marshall, TX -4.31% -15.10% 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 2.53% 10.75% 
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MSA 
Change in proportion 
of MSA’s HHs that 
are older due to 
migration 
% Change in 
proportion of MSA’s 
HHs that are older 
due to migration 
Louisville, KY-IN 1.80% 7.98% 
Lubbock, TX 2.97% 13.00% 
Lynchburg, VA -1.05% -3.76% 
Macon, GA -5.13% -23.58% 
Madison, WI -1.22% -6.68% 
Mansfield, OH 3.44% 12.35% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 8.94% 39.42% 
Medford-Ashland, OR -0.77% -2.58% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL -5.44% -16.97% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS -0.43% -2.19% 
Merced, CA 7.31% 32.23% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) -1.31% -5.22% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -1.81% -7.80% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -6.55% -33.17% 
Mobile, AL -0.12% -0.48% 
Modesto, CA 2.66% 12.12% 
Monroe, LA -2.30% -10.10% 
Montgomery, AL 3.08% 13.00% 
Muncie, IN 4.36% 15.27% 
Myrtle Beach, SC -0.17% -0.58% 
Naples, FL 1.65% 3.48% 
Nashville, TN -2.29% -11.49% 
New Orleans, LA -2.44% -11.13% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 
(C) 1.54% 6.26% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- -0.13% -0.61% 
Ocala, FL 2.32% 5.59% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 4.26% 19.82% 
Oklahoma City, OK 0.96% 3.90% 
Omaha, NE-IA -0.49% -2.39% 
Orlando, FL -0.76% -3.30% 
Panama City, FL -1.93% -7.20% 
Pensacola, FL -5.74% -21.40% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 1.67% 6.88% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) -0.36% -1.45% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 2.74% 11.57% 
Pittsburgh, PA -0.41% -1.45% 
Portland, ME -11.03% -52.80% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) 0.67% 3.17% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA -0.86% -3.44% 
Provo-Orem, UT 6.83% 37.67% 
Pueblo, CO -1.03% -3.33% 
Punta Gorda, FL 1.10% 2.28% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC -2.92% -15.62% 
Reading, PA -4.05% -15.05% 
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MSA 
Change in proportion 
of MSA’s HHs that 
are older due to 
migration 
% Change in 
proportion of MSA’s 
HHs that are older 
due to migration 
Redding, CA 3.32% 10.99% 
Reno, NV -3.69% -16.37% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA -2.34% -10.33% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA -2.34% -10.56% 
Roanoke, VA -1.03% -3.88% 
Rochester, MN -3.26% -14.32% 
Rochester, NY -1.16% -4.87% 
Rockford, IL -3.29% -13.38% 
Rocky Mount, NC -0.73% -2.81% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 0.98% 4.31% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI -0.08% -0.28% 
St. Cloud, MN -0.69% -3.26% 
St. Joseph, MO 2.19% 8.25% 
St. Louis, MO-IL 0.81% 3.47% 
Salinas, CA 1.96% 6.88% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT -2.16% -11.02% 
San Antonio, TX 0.19% 0.86% 
San Diego, CA 1.27% 5.78% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) -2.20% -9.33% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA -1.14% -3.83% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 6.06% 21.82% 
Santa Fe, NM -10.23% -38.73% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 2.42% 5.51% 
Savannah, GA 4.55% 20.60% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 0.87% 2.98% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) -2.08% -10.57% 
Sharon, PA 4.64% 14.85% 
Sheboygan, WI -3.09% -11.78% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 5.88% 24.27% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 11.81% 45.83% 
Sioux Falls, SD 5.22% 21.10% 
South Bend, IN 3.96% 15.84% 
Spokane, WA 3.86% 16.53% 
Springfield, IL 6.43% 24.87% 
Springfield, MO -1.58% -6.34% 
Springfield, MA -1.97% -7.72% 
State College, PA -0.89% -3.41% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 2.04% 9.42% 
Sumter, SC -0.10% -0.40% 
Syracuse, NY -2.02% -8.18% 
Tallahassee, FL -7.19% -33.18% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL -0.36% -1.24% 
Terre Haute, IN 0.65% 2.41% 
Toledo, OH 2.43% 10.31% 
Topeka, KS 8.14% 32.04% 
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MSA 
Change in proportion 
of MSA’s HHs that 
are older due to 
migration 
% Change in 
proportion of MSA’s 
HHs that are older 
due to migration 
Tucson, AZ 1.61% 5.69% 
Tulsa, OK -1.75% -7.06% 
Tuscaloosa, AL -3.27% -14.39% 
Tyler, TX 6.38% 22.42% 
Utica-Rome, NY -3.25% -11.05% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 7.34% 32.36% 
Waco, TX 0.75% 3.01% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) -1.14% -5.47% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 4.89% 18.08% 
Wausau, WI -1.01% -4.60% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 2.00% 5.08% 
Wichita, KS -0.61% -2.64% 
Wichita Falls, TX 4.15% 15.01% 
Williamsport, PA -3.62% -12.93% 
Wilmington, NC 6.11% 22.99% 
Yakima, WA 10.36% 39.03% 
York, PA -6.34% -25.56% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH -1.22% -4.21% 
Yuba City, CA -0.50% -1.78% 
Yuma, AZ 20.57% 62.96% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from difference between the Sorting simulation and the 
Aging-in-Place simulation 
 
  
174 
 
Table 36. Change (% change) in % of all older HH in the MSA due to migration 
MSA 
Change in % of all 
older HH in the 
MSA due to 
migration 
%Change in % of all 
older HH in the MSA 
due to migration 
Abilene, TX 0.02% 30.21% 
Albany, GA -0.01% -9.13% 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 0.24% 53.68% 
Albuquerque, NM -0.02% -6.35% 
Alexandria, LA 0.04% 48.68% 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA 0.04% 9.86% 
Altoona, PA 0.03% 35.08% 
Amarillo, TX 0.01% 8.86% 
Anchorage, AK -0.11% -156.46% 
Anniston, AL 0.02% 22.32% 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI -0.05% -23.74% 
Asheville, NC -0.02% -12.59% 
Athens, GA 0.02% 25.39% 
Atlanta, GA -0.55% -36.73% 
Auburn-Opelika, AL 0.01% 21.87% 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC 0.02% 9.88% 
Austin-San Marcos, TX -0.12% -26.05% 
Bakersfield, CA 0.04% 16.46% 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 0.08% 65.50% 
Baton Rouge, LA -0.06% -19.80% 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.09% 44.83% 
Bellingham, WA 0.00% 0.02% 
Benton Harbor, MI 0.04% 35.22% 
Billings, MT -0.01% -7.84% 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS -0.02% -11.92% 
Binghamton, NY 0.13% 82.65% 
Birmingham, AL -0.01% -3.33% 
Bloomington, IN 0.00% 8.65% 
Bloomington-Normal, IL 0.02% 26.19% 
Boise City, ID -0.07% -28.68% 
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, MA-NH-ME-CT (C) -0.59% -24.38% 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 0.06% 51.95% 
Bryan-College Station, TX -0.01% -25.42% 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 0.33% 48.70% 
Canton-Massillon, OH 0.06% 24.37% 
Cedar Rapids, IA -0.03% -28.62% 
Champaign-Urbana, IL 0.02% 25.41% 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 0.01% 2.04% 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC -0.19% -24.91% 
Charlottesville, VA 0.02% 27.45% 
Chattanooga, TN-GA -0.01% -1.87% 
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI (C) -0.33% -9.19% 
Chico-Paradise, CA 0.06% 50.10% 
Cincinnati-Hamilton, OH-KY-IN (C) -0.19% -20.81% 
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MSA 
Change in % of all 
older HH in the 
MSA due to 
migration 
%Change in % of all 
older HH in the MSA 
due to migration 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY -0.01% -28.80% 
Cleveland-Akron, OH (C) 0.31% 19.15% 
Colorado Springs, CO -0.09% -38.91% 
Columbia, MO -0.02% -26.04% 
Columbia, SC -0.03% -11.34% 
Columbus, GA-AL 0.00% 0.22% 
Columbus, OH -0.01% -2.06% 
Corpus Christi, TX 0.02% 17.37% 
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX (C) -0.17% -8.85% 
Danville, VA 0.03% 32.84% 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 0.03% 20.70% 
Dayton-Springfield, OH 0.14% 24.27% 
Daytona Beach, FL 0.05% 13.92% 
Decatur, AL -0.01% -7.62% 
Decatur, IL 0.03% 43.47% 
Denver-Boulder-Greeley, CO (C) -0.16% -15.30% 
Des Moines, IA -0.10% -53.93% 
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI (C) -0.17% -6.91% 
Dothan, AL 0.15% 167.02% 
Dover, DE -0.02% -31.22% 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 0.01% 11.11% 
Eau Claire, WI 0.00% -2.49% 
El Paso, TX 0.03% 16.55% 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN -0.01% -9.35% 
Erie, PA 0.03% 20.86% 
Eugene-Springfield, OR 0.01% 4.18% 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY -0.01% -4.89% 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN -0.03% -55.39% 
Fayetteville, NC -0.03% -28.28% 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR -0.04% -20.69% 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT -0.01% -13.42% 
Florence, AL 0.03% 31.34% 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 0.00% -3.50% 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 0.15% 32.82% 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 0.09% 26.93% 
Fort Smith, AR-OK -0.01% -11.98% 
Fort Walton Beach, FL 0.00% 3.86% 
Fort Wayne, IN -0.02% -10.21% 
Fresno, CA 0.13% 39.60% 
Gadsden, AL 0.02% 32.04% 
Gainesville, FL -0.01% -13.00% 
Glens Falls, NY 0.10% 119.53% 
Goldsboro, NC 0.06% 91.95% 
Grand Junction, CO 0.01% 13.59% 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI -0.08% -17.94% 
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MSA 
Change in % of all 
older HH in the 
MSA due to 
migration 
%Change in % of all 
older HH in the MSA 
due to migration 
Green Bay, WI -0.05% -42.55% 
Greensboro--Winston Salem--High Point, NC 0.02% 2.63% 
Greenville, NC 0.01% 9.73% 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC 0.01% 2.42% 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 0.04% 10.86% 
Hartford, CT -0.04% -11.30% 
Hattiesburg, MS -0.01% -19.31% 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 0.02% 10.14% 
Honolulu, HI 0.05% 11.46% 
Houma, LA -0.01% -9.32% 
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX (C) -0.29% -18.25% 
Huntsville, AL -0.01% -6.21% 
Indianapolis, IN -0.17% -20.75% 
Iowa City, IA -0.03% -62.60% 
Jackson, MI -0.01% -9.59% 
Jackson, MS -0.04% -20.32% 
Jackson, TN 0.01% 25.46% 
Jacksonville, FL -0.14% -24.29% 
Jacksonville, NC -0.01% -14.30% 
Jamestown, NY 0.11% 129.92% 
Janesville-Beloit, WI -0.02% -26.48% 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 0.04% 17.72% 
Johnstown, PA 0.11% 62.60% 
Joplin, MO 0.06% 64.19% 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 0.03% 10.50% 
Kansas City, MO-KS -0.25% -28.26% 
Killeen-Temple, TX 0.04% 35.59% 
Knoxville, TN 0.07% 19.70% 
Kokomo, IN 0.00% 0.96% 
La Crosse, WI-MN -0.01% -22.94% 
Lafayette, LA -0.04% -35.88% 
Lafayette, IN 0.00% 1.85% 
Lake Charles, LA 0.00% 4.13% 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 0.09% 23.36% 
Lancaster, PA -0.02% -7.84% 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI -0.01% -6.63% 
Laredo, TX 0.01% 35.44% 
Las Cruces, NM -0.01% -8.45% 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ 0.02% 2.81% 
Lexington, KY -0.02% -12.85% 
Lima, OH 0.05% 53.40% 
Lincoln, NE -0.06% -51.84% 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR -0.11% -35.86% 
Longview-Marshall, TX 0.01% 13.90% 
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, CA (C) 1.62% 32.25% 
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MSA 
Change in % of all 
older HH in the 
MSA due to 
migration 
%Change in % of all 
older HH in the MSA 
due to migration 
Louisville, KY-IN 0.03% 6.68% 
Lubbock, TX 0.03% 22.30% 
Lynchburg, VA 0.03% 21.97% 
Macon, GA -0.02% -10.68% 
Madison, WI -0.08% -43.45% 
Mansfield, OH 0.02% 27.36% 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 0.05% 29.39% 
Medford-Ashland, OR 0.01% 6.41% 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL 0.05% 11.81% 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS -0.15% -34.78% 
Merced, CA 0.03% 52.78% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL (C) 0.00% -0.17% 
Milwaukee-Racine, WI (C) -0.33% -36.72% 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI -0.67% -51.32% 
Mobile, AL -0.03% -7.88% 
Modesto, CA 0.06% 39.08% 
Monroe, LA -0.01% -6.79% 
Montgomery, AL 0.00% -0.47% 
Muncie, IN 0.01% 13.22% 
Myrtle Beach, SC 0.01% 6.18% 
Naples, FL 0.11% 41.58% 
Nashville, TN -0.11% -16.93% 
New Orleans, LA -0.04% -8.34% 
New York, Northern New Jersey, Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA (C) -1.48% -19.11% 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA- -0.04% -5.63% 
Ocala, FL 0.09% 28.10% 
Odessa-Midland, TX 0.02% 20.06% 
Oklahoma City, OK -0.08% -17.07% 
Omaha, NE-IA -0.11% -38.01% 
Orlando, FL 0.00% -0.05% 
Panama City, FL 0.00% -1.62% 
Pensacola, FL -0.01% -4.25% 
Peoria-Pekin, IL 0.07% 35.49% 
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City, PA-NJ-DE-MD (C) -1.01% -32.32% 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 0.04% 2.59% 
Pittsburgh, PA 0.33% 21.58% 
Portland, ME -0.08% -68.20% 
Portland-Salem, OR-WA (C) -0.16% -15.28% 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 0.18% 36.97% 
Provo-Orem, UT -0.01% -4.25% 
Pueblo, CO 0.01% 11.96% 
Punta Gorda, FL 0.07% 34.96% 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC -0.18% -31.21% 
Reading, PA 0.03% 12.39% 
Redding, CA 0.07% 55.43% 
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Change in % of all 
older HH in the 
MSA due to 
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%Change in % of all 
older HH in the MSA 
due to migration 
Reno, NV -0.03% -18.92% 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA -0.01% -11.52% 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA 0.03% 6.54% 
Roanoke, VA 0.02% 15.54% 
Rochester, MN -0.02% -30.48% 
Rochester, NY 0.34% 63.01% 
Rockford, IL 0.01% 4.51% 
Rocky Mount, NC 0.01% 13.61% 
Sacramento-Yolo, CA (C) 0.22% 25.88% 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 0.08% 30.65% 
St. Cloud, MN 0.01% 10.57% 
St. Joseph, MO 0.03% 41.98% 
St. Louis, MO-IL -0.01% -0.78% 
Salinas, CA 0.04% 47.39% 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT -0.14% -27.27% 
San Antonio, TX 0.04% 6.05% 
San Diego, CA 0.27% 27.73% 
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA (C) 0.53% 20.66% 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, CA 0.05% 31.22% 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 0.11% 64.96% 
Santa Fe, NM 0.01% 10.33% 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL 0.27% 38.76% 
Savannah, GA 0.01% 9.42% 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 0.20% 46.44% 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton, WA (C) -0.21% -14.03% 
Sharon, PA 0.08% 85.61% 
Sheboygan, WI 0.00% 1.60% 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 0.04% 16.26% 
Sioux City, IA-NE 0.00% -0.04% 
Sioux Falls, SD -0.03% -40.76% 
South Bend, IN 0.00% 3.26% 
Spokane, WA 0.02% 9.04% 
Springfield, IL 0.01% 14.24% 
Springfield, MO 0.04% 18.29% 
Springfield, MA 0.09% 30.27% 
State College, PA 0.02% 31.42% 
Stockton-Lodi, CA 0.06% 30.03% 
Sumter, SC 0.00% 6.16% 
Syracuse, NY 0.34% 85.55% 
Tallahassee, FL -0.05% -35.32% 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.20% 11.97% 
Terre Haute, IN 0.01% 12.30% 
Toledo, OH 0.07% 22.84% 
Topeka, KS 0.00% -1.90% 
Tucson, AZ 0.11% 19.76% 
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Tulsa, OK -0.09% -24.58% 
Tuscaloosa, AL 0.00% -5.23% 
Tyler, TX 0.05% 42.13% 
Utica-Rome, NY 0.20% 101.61% 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 0.09% 66.89% 
Waco, TX 0.04% 36.04% 
Washington-Baltimore, DC-MD-VA-WV (C) -0.88% -28.34% 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA 0.00% -2.37% 
Wausau, WI 0.01% 15.08% 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 0.28% 29.76% 
Wichita, KS -0.09% -30.18% 
Wichita Falls, TX 0.02% 35.13% 
Williamsport, PA 0.05% 69.18% 
Wilmington, NC 0.03% 13.25% 
Yakima, WA 0.01% 14.75% 
York, PA -0.03% -10.92% 
Youngstown-Warren, OH 0.13% 33.43% 
Yuba City, CA 0.03% 46.90% 
Yuma, AZ 0.03% 30.13% 
Note: Data based on Ruggles et al. (2010) and the results from difference between the Sorting simulation and the 
Aging-in-Place simulation 
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Appendix B Chapter 1 Maps in Color 
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Figure 23. Difference in MSA rank between older and younger HHs (Color) 
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Figure 24. Number of Older HHs in 2010 (Color) 
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Figure 25. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older in 2010 (Color) 
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Figure 26. Number of older HHs in 2030 under the sorting simulation (Color) 
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Figure 27. Proportion of MSA’s HHs that are older in 2030 under the sorting simulation (Color) 
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Figure 28. Change in number of Older HHs under the sorting simulation (Color) 
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Figure 29. Change in % of All US HHs that are Older under the sorting simulation (Color) 
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Figure 30. % Change in Older HHs under the sorting simulation (Color) 
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Figure 31. Change in % of Older HHs under the sorting simulation (Color) 
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Figure 32. Net migration of older HHs (Color) 
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Figure 33. Change in % of Older HHs due to Net Migration (Color) 
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Appendix C 
Coverage Information for 100 Most Populated Georgia Cities for Chapter 3 
Table 37. Coverage Information for 100 Most Populated Georgia Cities 
Rank Name 2012 Pop. County 
Has 
Exemptions? 
Exemption 
Included in 
Database? 
1 Atlanta 443,775 Fulton, DeKalb Yes Yes 
2 Augusta 198,413 Richmond Yes Yes 
3 Columbus  197,872 Muscogee Yes (Joint) Yes 
4 Macon 155,369 Bibb Yes Yes 
5 Savannah 142,022 Chatham Yes Yes 
6 Athens 118,999 Clarke No Yes 
7 Sandy Springs 99,419 Fulton Yes Yes 
8 Roswell 93,692 Fulton Yes Yes 
9 Johns Creek 82,306 Fulton Yes Yes 
10 Albany 77,431 Dougherty Yes Yes 
11 Warner Robins 70,712 Houston, Peach Yes Yes 
12 Alpharetta 61,981 Fulton Yes Yes 
13 Marietta  58,359 Cobb Yes Yes 
14 Valdosta  57,597 Lowndes Yes Yes 
15 Smyrna 52,650 Cobb Yes Yes 
16 Dunwoody 47,224 DeKalb Yes Yes 
17 Rome 36,159 Floyd Yes Yes 
18 East Point 35,584 Fulton Yes Yes 
19 Milton 35,015 Fulton Yes Yes 
20 Gainesville 34,786 Hall Yes Yes 
21 Hinesville 33,751 Liberty Yes Yes 
22 Peachtree City 34,662 Fayette Yes Yes 
23 Newnan 34,174 Coweta No Yes 
24 Dalton  33,413 Whitfield No Yes 
25 Douglasville  31,269 Douglas Yes Yes 
26 Kennesaw 30,990 Cobb Yes Yes 
27 LaGrange  30,478 Troup No Yes 
28 Statesboro  29,779 Bulloch No Yes 
29 Lawrenceville  29,481 Gwinnett Yes Yes 
30 Duluth 27,926 Gwinnett Yes Yes 
31 Stockbridge 26,281 Henry No Yes 
32 Woodstock 25,135 Cherokee Yes No 
33 Carrollton  24,958 Carroll Yes Yes 
34 Canton  23,791 Cherokee Yes No 
35 Griffin  23,389 Spalding Yes Yes 
36 McDonough  22,599 Henry No Yes 
37 Acworth 21,215 Cobb Yes Yes 
38 Pooler 20,598 Chatham Yes No 
39 Union City 20,501 Fulton Yes No 
40 Decatur  19,853 DeKalb Yes Yes 
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Exemptions? 
Exemption 
Included in 
Database? 
41 Cartersville  19,810 Bartow Yes Yes 
42 Sugar Hill 19,681 Gwinnett Yes No 
43 Milledgeville  19,401 Baldwin No Yes 
44 Snellville 19,026 Gwinnett Yes No 
45 Forest Park 18,874 Clayton Yes No 
46 Thomasville  18,488 Thomas No Yes 
47 St. Mary’s 17,606 Camden Yes No 
48 Tifton  16,672 Tift Yes No 
49 Americus  16,393 Sumter No Yes 
50 Kingsland 16,285 Camden Yes No 
51 Suwanee 16,253 Gwinnett Yes No 
52 Dublin  16,215 Laurens No Yes 
53 Fayetteville  16,206 Fayette No Yes 
54 Calhoun  15,812 Gordon Yes Yes 
55 Chamblee 15,790 DeKalb Yes No 
56 Brunswick  15,640 Glynn No Yes 
57 Norcross 15,632 Gwinnett Yes No 
58 Riverdale 15,493 Clayton Yes No 
59 Conyers  15,408 Rockdale Yes No 
60 Perry  14,730 Houston Yes No 
61 College Park 14,649 Fulton, Clayton Yes No 
62 Moultrie  14,506 Colquitt No Yes 
63 Waycross  14,322 Ware Yes Yes 
64 Winder  14,271 Barrow No Yes 
65 Powder Springs 14,253 Cobb Yes No 
66 Villa Rica 14,226 Carroll, Douglas Yes No 
67 Fairburn 13,720 Fulton Yes No 
68 Monroe  13,349 Walton No No 
69 Covington  13,347 Newton Yes No 
70 Cusseta  13,037 Chattahoochee Yes No 
71 Buford 12,735 Gwinnett, Hall Yes Yes 
72 Bainbridge  12,603 Decatur No Yes 
73 Lilburn 12,266 Gwinnett Yes No 
74 Grovetown 12,210 Columbia No Yes 
75 Dallas  12,044 Paulding No Yes 
76 Douglas  11,834 Coffee Yes No 
77 Cordele  11,297 Crisp No Yes 
78 Loganville 10,646 Walton, Gwinnett No Yes 
79 Vidalia 10,609 Toombs, Montgomery No Yes 
80 Richmond Hill 10,452 Bryan Yes No 
81 Jesup 10,452 Wayne No Yes 
82 Cairo 10,268 Grady No Yes 
83 Cedartown 9,821 Polk yes No 
84 Fort Valley 9,775 Peach No Yes 
85 Holly Springs 9,721 Cherokee Yes No 
86 Jefferson 9,667 Jackson Yes Yes 
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Rank Name 2012 Pop. County 
Has 
Exemptions? 
Exemption 
Included in 
Database? 
87 Fort Oglethorpe 9,601 Catoosa Yes No 
88 Rincon 9,446 Effingham Yes No 
89 Thomaston 9,198 Upson No Yes 
90 Fitzgerald 9,070 Ben Hill Yes No 
91 Garden City 9,048 Chatham Yes No 
92 Doraville 8,913 DeKalb Yes No 
93 Toccoa 8,482 Stephens No Yes 
94 Braselton 8,404 Jackson No Yes 
95 Clarkston 7,875 DeKalb Yes No 
96 Swainsboro 7,733 Emanuel No Yes 
97 Centerville 7,599 Houston Yes Yes 
98 Hampton 7,531 Henry No Yes 
99 LaFayette 7,098 Walker No Yes 
100 Auburn 7,076 Barrow Yes No 
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